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When the colonial administration founded its headquarters in Tamale in 1907, it was 
a small cluster of villages, containing together an estimated 1,435 residents.
1
 By the 
time the British flag was lowered outside the Chief Commissioner’s residence in 
Tamale in March 1957, Tamale had almost 48,000 residents; by a significant  
margin, the largest urban settlement in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. In 
the decades which followed Independence, Tamale’s population size would increase 
another 8 times to almost 400,000 today. According to Wyatt MacGaffey – the only 
other writer who has treated Tamale as distinct object of enquiry – Tamale is today 
the fastest-growing city in West Africa, although how this growth is measured 
probably has too-large an impact on the outcome. Nonetheless, Tamale during the 
colonial period and beyond as a site of profound change – social, economic, and 
political – can hardly be disputed. An outsider may ask: ‘Is it possible to write a 
                                                 





comprehensive account of colonial administration in the Northern Territories of the 
Gold Coast without Tamale as a central actor?’  
Is Tamale’s absence from the historiographical landscape of the Northern Territories 
not strange? Is, for instance, the bit-part role played by Tamale – the single largest 
economic and social transformation in northern Ghana during the colonial period – 
in Jeff Grischow’s book on ‘Civil Society’, ‘Community Development’ and 
‘Development’ in the colonial northern Ghana, not peculiar, given the major themes 
of the book?
2
 According to the index, Tamale features nine times, all on separate, 
non-sequential pages. Perhaps it is more telling that in Staniland’s seminal text on 
the political change in Dagbon, Tamale is mentioned on 5 separate pages, and once, 
fairly substantially, in a footnote. In Ladouceur’s book on the politics of regionalism 
in northern Ghana, Tamale does not feature in the index although there are sporadic 
mentions of it, albeit very sparse. Carola Lentz gives Tamale slightly more attention. 
In her 346-page book on the making of history in northern Ghana, Tamale is 
mentioned on 21 separate pages. Like more contemporary texts on colonialism in 
northern Ghana, colonialism itself had an equally disinterested approach to Tamale. 
Within the history of northern Ghana, Tamale features as by-product of colonial 
administration, not an entity of colonialism in its own right. I do not believe that 
Tamale’s apparent lack of importance in both the colonial and academic fields is 
unrelated. Today, one senses a similar sentiment in the development sector: Tamale 
is a by-product of development rather than an entity of development in its own right. 
This thesis, generally speaking, hopes to insert Tamale’s historiography within that 
of the Northern Territories. 
 
                                                 
2  Grischow, J., ‘Shaping tradition: Civil society, community and development in colonial 





‘Tamale is more an administrative and 
commercial centre within Dagomba 
than a Dagomba town.’1 
Introduction 
The opening paragraph of Staniland’s seminal text, ‘The Lions of Dagon’ reads:  
When the British moved their administration to Tamale in 1907, it was a village 
of 1,435 people. Now it is a sprawling town of 80,000, and the morning plane 
from Accra swings down to land over shimmering iron rooftops, concrete 
offices, and a web of asphalt roads, masts, and aerials.
2
 
Despite Staniland’s multi-layered recognition Tamale, he hardly mentions Tamale in 
the remainder of the book. Tamale’s urban formation is in fact hardly mentioned at 
all in the otherwise rich historiography of the Northern Territories of the Gold 
                                                 
1  Staniland, M., The lions of Dagbon: Political change in Northern Ghana (Cambridge, 
1975), 1. 




Coast. This is peculiar given that, on the one hand, the impact of colonial rule is 
perhaps the dominant theme in the historiography of the Northern Territories, and on 
the other hand, Tamale is arguably the single most profound transformation of the 
colonial period in the Northern Territories. The kind of transformation that Tamale 
represented has been regarded as rather a non-issue both within academia trends, as 
well as within the colonial administration of the Northern Territories. One colonial 
official, referring to Meyer Fortes (who perhaps serves as the most prominent bridge 
between modern academia and the colonial administration, although he might have 
resented such a categorisation) wrote: 
An anthropologist of unquestionable ability and some repute remarked to the 
writer how regrettable it was that the Talansi (sic) were becoming money 
conscious and generally criticised the efforts that are being made to develop 
trade in the Protectorate.
3
 
The omission of Tamale’s urban formation from the historiographical landscape of 
the Northern Territories, however, says as much about the development of the 
academic study of the Northern Territories (and colonialism), as it does about 
Tamale itself. The title of this introductory chapter, a remark, almost in passing, also 
by Martin Staniland, goes some way to consolidate this fact; in 1960, three years 
after Ghana had attained its independence, Tamale’s population was still over 60 per 
cent Dagomba, down from over 70 per cent in 1948. The second single largest 
‘ethnic’ group in 1960 were Ewe, with 4.5 per cent, followed by the Asante, with 
3.6 per cent.
4
 Furthermore, Tamale’s ‘traditional’ political apparatus was, and is, 
dominated by Dagomba institutions. The Gulkpe-Na, the chief of the Gulkpeagu 
subdivision, is a Dagomba chief, as also is the Dakpema, another of Tamale’s 
chiefs.
5
 The Imam of Tamale’s Central Mosque is also a Dagomba. And yet, despite 
an overwhelming ethnic demographic majority, and a political structure which at 
least until 1957, defined Dagombas as ‘natives’ and all others as ‘strangers’, Tamale 
may still feasibly be regarded as an urban entity which is somehow not of Dagbon. 
                                                 
3  Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD), Tamale, NRG 
8/3/49 ‘Annual Report for the Northern Territories, 1933-1934’. 
4  Eades, J., Strangers and traders: Yoruba migrants, markets and the state in Northern 
Ghana, Edinburgh, 1993, 57. 
5  The tension between these two chiefs is a major theme of this thesis. 
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Within this context, this thesis is fundamentally one about urban formation in 
Anglophone Africa during the colonial period. It is concerned with an urban 
settlement in the periphery, which came to exist directly due to, and for the purposes 
of, colonial administration. The thesis is concerned with how these specific 
characteristics relate to the dynamics of the urban formation itself.  
Central arguments 
Present-day Ghana is made up of a distinct north and south. The north stretches from 
the northern fringes of Asante’s cocoa-growing forest belt to the Burkina Faso 
border. Its landscape is generally of a savannah type, made up of shrub-bush dotted 
with shea trees. The north consists of three administrative units: The Northern 
Region, Upper East, and Upper West. They are, however, in a number of contexts 
often considered as a whole.
6
 The north’s economy is overwhelmingly agrarian and 
largely has a subsistence nature. The principle crops are yams, rice, sorghum, maize, 
shea, cassava, groundnuts, and cotton. The north possesses strong Muslim 
influences (except in isolated areas, that is Navrongo and Bolgatanga, where 
missions have had a strong influence),
7
 in contrast to the south, which is dominated 
by Christianity. Northern Ghana consists of a plethora of ethnically bound 
groupings, with diverse socio-political structures. The area is, however, politically 
dominated by five large centralised kingdoms, namely Dagbon, Mamprussi, Gonja, 
Wala, and Nunumba. In the years prior to its official inclusion in the British Empire 
in 1902, northern Ghana was referred to as the ‘Asante Hinterland’. In that year the 
area became recognised as the Northern Territories, a protectorate of the Gold Coast 
Colony. Since Independence, the area has been referred to as northern Ghana 
(containing the three aforementioned administrative units). Each of these titles 
reflects a different relationship vis-à-vis British colonialism, and for the remainder 
of this dissertation the employment of these terms is expressly linked to those 
differences. Tamale, the subject of this thesis, is the regional capital of northern 
Ghana. In 1907, when the British colonial administration moved its administrative 
                                                 
6  The Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) is perhaps the most recent 
example of this tendency.  




headquarters from Gambaga to Tamale, Tamale consisted of a cluster of small 
villages,
8
 with a total population of around 1,435 residents.
9
 Today, a little over a 
hundred years after the founding of the administrative headquarters in 1907, 
Tamale’s population is somewhere around the 400,000 mark.
10
  
The argument presented by this thesis is that Tamale’s socio-political and socio-
economic urban dynamic was informed profoundly by the cleavage between a 
colonially motivated, traditional political and administrative focus on the one hand, 
and an economic structure which relied almost entirely on the motorable road 
between Tamale and Kumasi, without any regard for traditional political centres 
such as Yendi, on the other. In this way, Tamale was a by-product of the colonial 
purpose. Although the nature of colonialism changed through the colonial period 
from pre-indirect rule, to indirect rule, to the second colonial occupation, all three 
colonial periods had one thing in common: Each strongly favoured the maintenance 
of African social structures as they were perceived by the British colonial 
administration. This thesis argues that the cleavage outlined above had the effect of 
firstly, disconnecting Tamale from traditional Dagbon structures, and secondly, 
creating a multitude of socio-political frameworks in Tamale which were regularly 
played off against each other in local disputes and claims, especially over land. 
More specifically, the thesis argues that: 
1. Tamale was isolated, in that its economic centrality was not matched by any real 
traditional political significance within the politics of Dagbon. In other words, 
Tamale’s urban growth must be understood in the context of a d.isconnection 
between a colonial discourse that emphasised legitimate traditional authority on 
the one hand, and on the other hand, an economic and administrative spatial 
framework that ignored that authority.  
2. The lack of traditional focus in Tamale, which itself was the result of the 
coincidence of Tamale’s lack of traditional importance coupled with its 
economic centrality, led to a local political structure in which many different 
                                                 
8  MacGaffey, W., ‘A history of Tamale, 1907-1957 and beyond’, Transactions of the 
Historical Society of Ghana, New Series, No. 10 (2006-7), 121. 
9  Staniland, Lions, 1. 
10  See Ghana Districts, Tamale. www.ghanadistricts.com (accessed on 15 March 2009). 
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claims to authority could be, and often were, legitimated. Furthermore, Tamale’s 
political structure functioned in a climate of profound ebbs and flows in 
economic activity, the commercialisation of a number of key institutions, 
including land, and increasing ethnic and religious heterogeneity. This climate 
both increased the number of claims and raised the stakes further, which both 
placed enormous strain on Tamale’s ill-defined political structure and enhanced 
and consolidated its ill-definition.  
3. The conditions arising out of unique historical urban trajectories inform the 
social interactions in the city in question. The thesis thus argues that Tamale’s 
disconnection from traditional political structures, as well as its institutional 
multiplicity (arguments 1 and 2 above), shaped and informed socio-political 



























1.1. Protecotrate of the Northern Territories, Ashanti Colony, and the 
Cold Coast 
 
Source: Chipp, T.F., 1923. The Gold Coast forestry problem. 
Empire Forestry Journal: 1-11. 
 
The thesis situates the formation of Tamale’s internal socio-political and socio-
economic layers within four interrelated historical narratives, namely, (i) the 
development of Dagomba political structures, (ii) colonial administration, (iii) north-
south trade, and (iv) new developmentalism and the emergence of nationalist politics 
in northern Ghana. These narratives, and how they have served as drivers of change 
in Tamale, form the frames of reference for the remainder of this thesis. The 
subsections below discuss each of these narratives and briefly how they relate to 
7 
 
Tamale’s urban development. Before doing so, however, it is useful to situate 
Tamale within cross-cutting themes in contemporary interpretations of northern 
history, not only to contextualise Tamale’s urban development, but also to 
contextualise the major thrust of this thesis and its contribution to the academic 
study of northern Ghana. To a considerable extent, the most dominant discourse 
within the study of northern Ghana is that relating to ‘underdevelopment’. Two 
inter-relating themes in particular are used to prop up this ‘agenda’, namely, north-
to-south labour migration, and the Northern Territories railway that never was. The 
following subsection locates Tamale within those existing themes.  
Tamale and the ‘underdevelopment’ narrative 
The ‘underdevelopment’ narrative that underpins much of the historiography of the 
Northern Territories has its foundations within the colonial period. Seasonal hunger 
in the north created very early in the colonial period an imagination of 
‘backwardness’ in the minds of the colonial administration.
11
 However, there is a 
marked distinction between the perception of an existing backwardness and the 
active ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘neglect’ which came to dominate much of the 
northern historiography. 
Northern ‘neglect’ arose as a point of serious dissatisfaction in colonial debates 
between ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ administrations, and it was later taken-up and 
extended by historians reflecting on regional relationships in Ghana generally. 
Carola Lentz notes that the talk of ‘neglect’ was ‘… adopted by the educated elite of 
the North, and Marxist-inspired authors (who) spoke not only of neglect, but of a 
deliberate policy of protracted “under-development”, pursued by the colonial 
government for the express purpose of sustaining in the North a reservoir of 
labour’.
12




 and R. B. Benning
15
 
                                                 
11  Destombes, J., ‘From long-term patterns of seasonal hunger to changing experiences in 
everyday poverty: Northern Ghana c. 1930-2000’, Journal of African History, 47: 
2(2006), 189. 
12  Lentz, C., Ethnicity and the making of history in Northern Ghana, Edinburgh, 2006, 146.  
13  Brukum, N.J.K., ‘Studied neglect or lack of resources? The socio-economic 
underdevelopment of Northern Ghana under British colonial rule’, Transactions of the 




sought to apportion blame for the north’s lack of development not to a lack of 
natural resources but to the colonial administration, and later, to southern-dominated 
governments. Ironically, there is a more or less straight line between such works and 
sentiments expressed by many early northern colonial administrators, especially 
those who had held northern posts before 1930. This thematic trajectory emphasised 
the impact on northern societies of north-to-south labour migration, especially to the 
mines, and the policies that encouraged it, particularly the decision not to build a 
railway. Interestingly, migration to the cocoa sector, which in terms of pure numbers 
was probably a larger and more sustained catchment of northern labour, has been 
less frequently incorporated into the ‘underdevelopment’ theme. There are some 
obvious reasons for this imbalance. The centralised nature of gold mining in terms 
of labour and labour recruitment makes it an easier study than, for instance, the 
cocoa sector. Sutton notes of the cocoa sector: ‘Labour … has come in ones and 
twos to work on farms of several acres … farmers probably employed more labour 
than the mines and other European enterprises, although because it was scattered it 
was less obvious a group than the concentrated labour force at the mines’.
16
 But 
there was certainly also something less-coercive about the migration to cocoa farms 
than the migration to the mines. The case that this kind of migration (not directly 
coercive, and less centralised) made for the active ‘underdevelopment’ or ‘studied 
neglect’ of the Northern Territories was weaker than those where the emphasis lay 
on a centralised policy of labour recruitment, such as for the gold mines. Gold mines 
as a labour pool were legitimated as an object of enquiry also by what Lentz and 
Erlmann called the ‘workerist tendency’: Studies were inclined to focus on ‘those 
aspects of African labour, such as miners … that best seem to illustrate such a 
                                                 
14  Nii-K. Plange, ‘“Opportunity coast” and labour migration: A misinterpretation of 
proletarianisation in Northern Ghana’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 17: 4 (Dec. 
1979), 655-76 and ‘Under-development in Northern Ghana: natural causes or colonial 
capitalism?’, Review of African Political Economy, 4: 15-16 (1979), 4-14. 
15  Benning, R.B., ‘Colonial development policy in Northern Ghana, 1898-1950’, Bulletin of 
the Ghana Geographical Association, 17(1975), 65-79. 
16  Sutton, I., ‘Colonial agricultural policy: The non-development of the Northern Territories 




concept of an African working class’.
17
 In other words, in the gold mines in Tarkwa 
and Obuasi, leftist northern and southern historians seemed to find common ground 
and could engage in discussion about the development of the Ghanaian nation-state, 
which transcended regional histories.  
Adjacent to the theme of the labour migration, at the core of the ‘underdevelopment’ 
theme is a discussion about transportation – more specifically, the Northern 
Territories Railway. This debate has been dominated by the argument that the 
colonial administration decided to ‘indefinitely postpone’ the building of a Northern 
Territories railway in order to secure a labour supply for the priority industries in the 
south. The main trend of this argument is that by the administration’s ensuring that 
transportation was prohibitively expensive in terms of northern farmers gaining 
access to southern markets, northerners were robbed of remunerative opportunities 
and were thus forced to head southwards to offer themselves as labour.
18
 This 
linkage between the decision not to pursue the construction of a Northern Territories 
Railway and purposeful underdevelopment in order to secure a labour supply for 
priority industries in the south, also has its roots in the colonial period. The District 
Commissioner for Eastern Dagomba wrote that, 
The large number of labourers that go south each year will not in my opinion 
leave the Northern Territories as soon as they can obtain work and make money 
by growing food locally.
19
  
Another Northern Administrator wrote that, ‘The movement of labour would 
diminish as soon as the demand for exports provided local employment with a 
remunerative return.’
20
 As transportation was generally regarded as the prohibiting 
                                                 
17  Lentz, C. & V. Erlmann, ‘A working class in formation? Crisis and strategies of survival 
among Dagara mine workers in Ghana’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 29: 113(1989), 70. 
18  Bening, R.B., ‘Colonial’ development policy in Northern Ghana, 1898-1950’, Bulletin of 
the Ghana Geographical Association, 17, (1975), 65-79 & N.J.K. Brukum, ‘Studied 
neglect or lack of resources? The socio-economic underdevelopment of Northern Ghana 
under British colonial rule’, Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana (New Series), 
2(1998), 117-31.  
19  PRAAD, Accra, ADM 56/1/238. ‘District Commissioner for Eastern Dagomba, 
Government Railways, Reports on Railway from Kumasi to the Northern Territories’. 




factor, such statements referred directly to the impact on labour of the decision not 
to construct a railway to the Northern Territories.  
Where is Tamale situated within the ‘underdevelopment discussion? Chapter 3 of 
thesis argues that Tamale’s demographic growth spurts were positively correlated 
with surges in north-to-south labour migration, especially those related to migration 
to the cocoa farms. For instance, in the late-1920s, during the cocoa boom, the 
population growth of the Northern Territories, largely on account of out-migration, 
returned rapid year-on-year declines. Simultaneously, Tamale recorded its fastest 
demographic growth during the colonial period. Tamale’s demographic mechanism 
is thus negatively correlated to that of the Northern Territories more generally. The 
emphasis on ‘underdevelopment’ and the arguments which prop up this argument, 
coupled with the negative correlation between the drivers of Tamale’s urban growth 
and those of the Northern Territories more generally, has had the effect of writing 
Tamale out of the underdevelopment discourse, a dominant component of northern 
history.  
Having outlined the major cross-cutting themes of northern Ghanaian 
historiography, we turn now to the four aforementioned frameworks within which 
this thesis situates Tamale’s urban transformation, namely (i) Dagbon political 
structures, (ii) colonial administration, especially in its influence over chieftaincy, 
(iii) north-south trade, and (iv) new developmentalism and the emergence of 
nationalist politics in northern Ghana. The following subsection discusses each of 
these historical narratives and how they relate to Tamale’s socio-political and urban 
development. 
Frames of reference 
The thesis locates Tamale within a number of frames of reference. The following 






Dagbon political structures 
Tamale is located within the kingdom of Dagbon, perhaps politically the most 
powerful of the north’s ethnic groups. Dagon covers an area of 15,467 square 
kilometers and is divided into eight administrative districts. Its accounts for more 
than half of the total population of northern Ghana. Dagbon was established by 
conquerors from the north prior to the fifteenth century.
21
 Dagomba folklore relates 
the origins of Dagbo to Tohadzie, the Red Hunter, who hailed from the area that is 
today northern Nigeria. According to this version of Dagbon’s history, Tohadzie 
settled within the Mali Empire somewhere between the thirteenth and fifteenth 
century. The village in which Tohadzie settled relied on a river for water, a river 
which had been taken over by a wild bush cow. According to the legend, the bush 
cow was believed to be an evil spirit who killed anyone who ventured to the river to 
draw water. Tohadzie led the villagers to kill the wild beast, making the river 
accessible. Tohadzie, by defending the village against attacks from rival villages, 
gained the reputation of a capable warrior and leader. Through his various military 
victories, he was able to marry Pagawugba, a princess from the area. Pagawugba 
gave birth to a son, Kpongnambo. After the death of Tohadzie and Pagawugba, 
Kpognambo travelled westwards from the Mali Empire to Biun in Fadan Grumah, 
where he became chief. Kpognambo ruled the kingdom of Biun until his death. 
Kpognambo married two women: Sihisabiga and Suhuyini. Suhuyini gave birth to 
Gbewaah, and Sihisabiga gave birth to Malgimsim, Nyelgili, and Namzisheli. After 
the death of Kpognambo, there was constant war between his sons for the 
chieftainship of Biun. In response, Gbewaah and his followers migrated to Pusiga. 
Naa Gbewaah established the kingdom of Greater Dagbon, which he ruled until his 
death. Of the other sons of Kpognambo, Nyeligili founded the chieftainship of 
Nangodi, and Namzisheli founded the chieftainship of Tongo. After the death of Naa 
Gbewaah, there was once again a power struggle among his sons, which led finally 
to the break-up of the Greater Dagbon kingdom. Tohagu founded the Mamprussi 
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Kingdom, Mantambo the Nanun Kingdom, and Sitobu the modern Dagbon 
Kingdom. With superior military organisation, sons and grandsons of Sitobu 
expanded the modern Dagbon kingdom, destroying existing hierarchies and 
installing their own kin as chiefs. In time, Yendi, a former Konkomba settlement 
called Chare,
22
 was established as the seat of the paramount of the modern Dagomba 
kingdom, and the paramount was entitled the Ya Na.  
Contemporary references to Dagbon political structures point to the political crisis 
which reached its zenith with the murder of the Ya Na Andani II in March 2002. 
The crisis itself however predates the formation of modern Ghana. In the period 
1824-1849 the primogenital tradition of unilateral family succession to the Ya-Na 
Skin was changed to an alternation of succession between the Abudu and Andani 
families.
23
 These family lineages are referred to as ‘gates. This ‘alteration system’ 
was introduced to incorporate the male descendants of Ya Na Yakubu I’s two 
wives.
24
 Ya Na Yakubu I’s two sons, Princes Abudu and Andani, rebelled against 
their fatherThe princes prevailed in the war but spared the life of their father and 
allowed him to remain Ya Na until his death. Princes Abudu and Andani upon their 
victory seized and ascended the royal skin, or kingship, of Mion and Savulgu skins, 
respectively. After the death of Ya Na Yakubu I, the kingmakers of Dagbon decided 
on Mion Lana, Prince Abudu, as the successor to Ya Na. The system of alteration 
between gates was complicated by polygamy, and complicated succession protocols, 
and forms the root cause of the current Dagbon crisis. The system was further 
complicated by a number of colonial interventions. The relevancy of Dagbon’s 
‘gates’ to Tamale is discussed in Chapter 7. 
Tamale is located about 95 km to the west of Yendi. There are many versions of this 
tale. Although Tamale possesses a number of Dagomba local shrines, Ta’ha, whose 
earth priest is the Bugulana, is perhaps the only one of Tamale’s traditional assets 
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that relates to Dagbon more broadly. A.W. Cardinall, who became District 
Commissioner (DC) for Yendi in 1917 and later Superintendent for Education, notes 
that the Ta’ha was apparently visited not only by local people ‘but by Dagomba 
from all over the country’.
25
 But generally speaking, drummers tend to relate Tamale 
to the larger Dagbon history only if or when prompted, and the ways in which 
Tamale’s political structures may be incorporated into Dagbon are often 
unconvincing. Put bluntly, despite Tamale’s current significance, its role in Dagbon 
political history is not particularly prominent.  
The same is true for Dagomba economic history. In most traditional 
historiographies, it is of course very difficult to separate the distribution of political 
authority and the distribution of economic activity. In terms of northern Ghana, this 
relates especially to trade routes.  
According to Ferguson and Wilks, in the century prior to the start of the Asante 
Wars in 1821, the Dagbon political structure was well developed and relatively 
robust.
26
 However, the defeat of Asante in 1874 had implications far beyond Asante 
itself. Since Asante had defeated Dagbon in 1744/5, Dagbon had served as 
peripheral of Greater Asante. For Kumasi, because Yendi lay on an important trade 
route between Salaga and Hausaland, political stability in Yendi was a priority for 
Asante royal elites. As a result, in the late eighteenth century the Ya Na’s armies 
were modernised with the assistance of the Asante. Kambonse, Asante musketeers, 
were included in the Ya Na’s army for the first time. The relationship between 
Asante and the Yendi certainly strengthened and centralized the authority of the Ya 
Na. The centripetal effect that Asante domination had on Dagbon political structures 
had a cost: Dagbon paid (with some resentment) an annual fee to the Asantehene in 
the form of slaves. When the British first launched attacks on the Asante in the 
1820s and 1830s, the Gonja, who like Dagbon paid an annual fee to the Asantehene 
in recognition of his authority, revolted, killing a number of Asante officials in 
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Salaga. The result was that Asante royalty redirected trade away from Salaga, 
through Kintampo. Wilks notes:  
The early nineteenth century Ashanti, then in command of almost all of what is 
now Ghana and the eastern Ivory Coast, deliberately re-routed its trade away 
from the north-west and to the north-east, through Salaga, Yendi, and Sansanne-
Mango to the Bussa crossing of the Niger.
27
  
Both Gonja and Dagbon political centres suffered dramatically as a result of being 
starved of Asante trade. Dagbon central authority declined dramatically after the fall 
of Asante, either because Yendi’s commercial significance severely declined, or 
because without the support of Asante, Dagbon political structures lost much of their 
strength. Ferguson and Wilks note that, ‘(t)he collapse of Ashanti control over 
northern Ghana appears to have presaged a period of considerable chaos in 
Dagbon’.
28
 In the period after the final defeat of the Asante between 1874 and the 
arrival of the British at around the turn of century, Yendi lost much of its authority 
over much of Dagbon.  
In contrast to Yendi, Tamale’s position in the Asante trade was not prominent. K. B. 
Dickson states that Tamale lay on a major trade route.
29
 MaGaffey notes that ‘a map 
of the north in 1887 showed Tamale market as the destination of cattle trails from 
Kumbungu, Savelugu and Daboya’.
30
 The pre-European commercial importance of 
Tamale must be related, however, to the size of its population (1,435), which 
suggests that Tamale’s centrality in terms of trade may be overstated. Paul Lovejoy 
has noted three north-south trade routes, none of which pass through Tamale.
31
 
Furthermore, a number of maps of the north produced around the turn of the 
twentieth century do not include Tamale (see Map 1.2). Thus, not only did Tamale 
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lack traditional political status before the arrival of the British colonial 
administration in 1907; it was also not a significant economic focal point in terms of 
Dagbon’s political and economic systems.  
Tamale thus entered the colonial period without any real significance in terms of 
Dagbon more generally. It was, indeed, colonialism itself that gave Tamale its 
significance, even if it did so reluctantly. That being said, that Tamale was not a 
significant Dagbon centre did not mean that it was unaffected by changes taking 
place, also on account of colonialism, within broader Dagbon traditional structures. 
As a result, Dagbon’s political and economic structures form the first frame of 
reference for this thesis. 
Colonial chieftainship and its implications for Tamale 
The colonial annexation of the Asante Hinterland began slowly after the defeat of 
Asante in 1874. Very little was known about Dagbon before about 1880. Some 
Europeans had created accounts based on reports from local travellers. Ludwig 
Ferdinand Romer, who based his account of Dagbon on Ga informants from Accra 
who had travelled to the north, was the first to describe Dagbon. Romer himself had 
never been to Asante, never mind its ‘hinterland’.
32
 Later, Bowditch reported on 
Dagbon, based on information from Muslims resident in Kumasi. In 1881 Lonsdale 




Before long, a ‘scramble’ between German, French, and British interests threatened 
to erupt, putting increasing pressure on each of the European powers to stake their 
claim. But competition from other European powers was not the only threat faced by 
Britain in the annexation of the Asante Hinterland. In fact, the British were 
fundamentally faced with three threats in annexing the Asante Hinterland. The first 
was the threat from outside powers, namely from competing European powers and 
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from forces of the Mandingo warrior, Samory, which were invading the region. 
Second was the threat from local actors assimilated to the invasions of Samory, such 
as Babatu, a Songhai horseman. Third, as Jack Goody puts it, ‘there were struggles 
between … the tribal peoples, continual eruptions of violence in attempts to settle 
scores by feud or by threat of feud.’
34
 
In terms of threats from European powers, the British feared that if French or 
German interests came to occupy the Asante Hinterland, the Gold Coast would be 
dependent on those European powers for important components of its food supply, 
perhaps most notably meat, which was supplied primarily by long-haul trades from 
the Niger Bend.
35
 Martin Staniland notes that the Northern Territories was annexed 
by the British ‘… not because of any intrinsic value they possessed, but because it 
was strategically undesirable to let the French or the Germans take them … ’.
36
 
From 1874, after the defeat of Asante, British, French, and German explorers 
increasingly began to map the area north of Asante, threatening transit trade down to 
the British-controlled coast.
37
 The British sent Gouldsbury north in 1876, and in 
1892 George Ekem Ferguson went north on behalf of the British colonial 
administration. In the same year as Gouldsbury’s expedition in 1876, M.J. Bonnat, a 
French trader, came up the Volta to Salaga, and in 1888 the French explorer Louis-
Gustave Binger passed through Mamprussi, Karaga, Salaga, and Kintampo on his 
way from Bamako to the coast. The Germans were represented in 1886 by G.A. 
Krause, who travelled from Accra to Ouagadougou, and in 1888 Curt von François 
visited Yendi and Gambaga. The increased competition for influence in the West 
African savannah led to the establishment of a Neutral Zone in 1888, in which it was 
agreed that no European authorities would initiate the signing of trade treaties with 
chiefs. Salaga, Yendi, and Tamale all lay within the Neutral Zone. In 1895, Britain 
and Germany tried, but failed, to agree on a solution by which Yendi would fall 
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under German jurisdiction and Salaga under British administration. A year later in 
1896, a German explorer, von Carnap-Quernheimb, passed directly across the 
Neutral Zone, inciting protests from London and increasing the instability of the 
Neutral Zone. In that same year, the Neutral Zone was abandoned.
38
  
Another serious threat to British domination of the Asante Hinterland were the 
forces of Samory, the Mandingo warrior. In September 1895, Samory’s forces 
attacked Wa, Sankana (in Dagarti), and Bole (Gonja). What was of concern to the 
British colonial administration was not only the destruction and instability which 
Samory and his forces were causing in large swaths of the Asante Hinterland, but 
also the possibility of Samory linking up with either French or German troops.
39
 
Finally, after a rather long run-up, the occupation of the area by German, French, 
and British interests was effectively settled in a rush during the final days of 1896. 
The occupation of the Asante Hinterland has been described by Martin Staniland:  
The partition finally took place in a rush at the end of 1896, with British, French, 
and German expeditions converging on the neutral zone in the last weeks of 
December. The German force, under Grunner and von Massow, moved up from 
Kete-Kratchi, defeated the Dagomba at Adibo, and then went on to occupy 
Sansanne-Mango before a French mission could get there. The French arrived too 
late, on Christmas Day. But when a German detachment moved on Gambaga, they 
in turn found that a British expedition under Captain Stewart had arrived before 




The borders between French, German, and British troops stabilized relatively 
quickly. In 1902 the Anglo-German border was finally formalised.
41
 It was to run 
along the Daka River, to the ninth parallel, and thereafter to pass northwards through 
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a point twenty kilometres west of the centre of Yendi.
42
 Four years previously, in 
1898, Samory had been captured by the French administration, further stabilising the 
area.  
The Anglo-German border bisected Dagbon such that Yendi, the seat of the Ya Na, 
the paramount chief of Dagbon, fell within German territory, whilst second-tier 
chiefs of Mion, Karaga, and Savelugu all fell under British jurisdiction. 
1.2. German Togoland and its protectorates, 1897 (showing ‘Jendi’) 
 
Source:  Geographischer Monatsbericht. In: Dr. A. Petermann‘s Mitteilungen aus 
Justus Perthes Geographischer Anstalt (Gotha), 43 (11), 1897, p.270f.  
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The splitting of Dagbon into Western (British) and Eastern (German) components 
was not considered especially problematic by the colonial administration. Even the 
Ya Na himself could not convince the British to take an interest in negotiating the 
position of the Anglo-German border such that Yendi would remain united with 
Dagbon. The Ya Na had written to the British authorities as early as 1898 stating 
that, ‘I am King of Yendi … I want to be English not German … I am king of Yendi 
for the English not the Germans. I trust in God and the English’.
43
 Although archival 
sources suggest a number of sensitivities in terms of the location of the border, the 
fact that Yendi was excluded from British Dagbon does not appear to be amongst 
them. Colonel Morris, a veteran of northern military operations, declared famously 
to an assembly of Dagomba chiefs that, ‘ ... since the Ya-Na was now in German 
Territory, he (Colonel Morris) and not the Ya-Na was henceforth their Head 
Chief’.
44
 The division of Dagbon, such that the authority of the Ya Na was excluded 
from much of Dagbon, including that part containing Tamale, created a significant 
political upheaval also in British Dagbon. Various chiefs in Western Dagbon took 
advantage of the Ya Na’s absence and advanced their chiefdoms. Tamale, along 
with Mion, Karaga, and Savelugu, found itself on the British side of the Anglo-
German border, isolated from the authority of Yendi, and it is to this that we now 
turn.  
For Tamale, the re-unification of Dagbon in 1922 was as significant as its division 
between British and German jurisdictions in 1902. Indeed, the reunification of 
Dagbon and the re-introduction of the Ya Na at the apex of Dagbon authority largely 
shaped Tamale’s internal politics. During the period in which Dagbon was divided, 
the Dakpema, which translates as ‘head of the market’, had established himself as 
the chief of Tamale.
45
 He managed to do so by gaining the sanction of the colonial 
administration. In 1919, following the end of World War I (WWI), when the Anglo-
German border was on the verge of collapse, the colonial administration began talks 
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with the Ya Na to negotiate his return to the British Dagbon political fold. One of 
his first demands was that, on the grounds that the Dakpema was not the legitimate 
chief of Tamale, the Dakpema be replaced by the ‘rightful’ chief of Tamale, the 
Gulkpe-Na. His claim was that at the moment at which the Anglo-German boundary 
was established, the Gulkpe-Na was visiting Yendi and was ordered to remain there. 
In that time, the Dakpema presented himself as the chief of Tamale and, being 
uncontested, received the backing of the colonial administration. The colonial 
administration agreed that upon the death of the Dakpema, his successor would 
receive reduced powers, and the Gulkpe-Na would be reinstalled as the chief of 
Gulkpeagu. In 1930, when the Dakpema suffered a stroke, the colonial 
administration moved to reinstate the Gulkpe-Na in Tamale. It is hardly surprising 
that those within the Dakpema’s house sought to prevent the reintroduction of the 
Gulkpe-Na. The British operation was deemed a success, and given the introduction 
of indirect rule around the same period, deemed utterly necessary for the successful 
administration of Tamale. However, the result was a traditional system in Tamale 
continually plagued by confusion over the authority and legitimacy of the Gulkpe-
Na and the Dakpema. Whilst the Gulkpe-Na had the authority of Yendi and the 
colonial administration behind him, the Dakpema had strong local support. This 
tension was a hallmark of Tamale’s local politics both during the colonial period and 
beyond.  
Chieftaincy was central in all forms of colonial administration, both before and after 
indirect rule, and, as Grischow notes, also under the new developmentalism (see 
Chapter 6). Instructions given to officers in charge of northern districts in 1899 
noted that ‘…  officers will act through the native chiefs as far as possible … ’.
46
 In 
1906, Acting Governor H. Bryan echoed existing northern administrative sentiments 
when he wrote to the Secretary of State that ‘(t)he policy of supporting and 
emphasising the position of the paramount native chiefs while, at the same time, 
making them realise their responsibility, appears to me to be the only practicable 
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system of administering this country’.
47
 Furthermore, in the annual report for 1906, 
it was noted that moving the headquarters to Tamale was favourable as it lay within 
Dagbon, and ‘Dagomba country is the most advanced from a civilised point of view 
in the whole protectorate’.
48
 The perceived strength and functioning of organisation 
of the Dagomba traditional political system fed into the use of chiefs as auxiliaries 
of colonial administration. It was felt that in such instances where chiefs had 
managed to retain some semblance of pre-European significance, they served as a 
more effective colonial tool, in contrast to those chiefs amongst peoples where 
traditional systems had lost much of their legitimacy. This also allowed for a 
‘thinner’ British administration. Colonial chieftaincy thus provides the second 
important frame of reference for this thesis. Colonial chieftaincy was not static and 
certainly changed through the colonial period. 
Commerce and Tamale 
The British annexed the Asante Hinterland largely for the purposes of securing 
north-south trade to and from the British-controlled coast. Trade was thus central to 
colonial policy in the north even prior to the formal annexation of the ‘Asante 
Hinterland’. George Ekem Ferguson, an explorer from the coastal town of 
Anomabo, was sent to the north by the British in 1892 with a mandate to negotiate 
‘treaties of friendship and freedom of trade’ between the Crown and the leaders of 
indigenous polities’.
49
 Chalfin notes that Ferguson’s ‘sights were set on a central 
object: The unobstructed movement of goods in and out of the savannah zone’.
50
 
The Asante Hinterland was not believed to possess any significant economic 
potential beyond the trade that passed through it. Staniland notes that ‘… the NT had 
very few of the assets which had made colonialism elsewhere such an uplifting and 
profitable enterprise’.
51
 This is supported also by Sutton, who notes that ‘… the 
Northern Territories was acquired belatedly, and added almost as an afterthought to 
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the Gold Coast Colony’.
52
 But the Asante Hinterland was annexed by the British 
colonial administration owing to the transit trade which passed through it en route to 
and from the coast. Brenda Chalfin notes that the colonial administration harboured 
ambitions to establish a ‘massive trade corridor where Britain was the sole imperial 
power’.
 53
 The corridor was to run several hundred miles north from the boundary of 
the Gold Coast into Mossi territory and east through the jurisdiction of the Niger 
Company.
54
 The strongest statement in this direction was the abolishment of the 
caravan tax in 1908. The southern administration felt that the tax on caravans 
passing north-south was hindering the volume of trade down to the coast. As a result 
of the abolishment of the caravan tax, the northern colonial administration was left 
without any revenue, which was believed, especially by southern administrators, to 
be inconsequential: Revenue for development was not important as long as there 
was nothing to develop.  
Tamale’s demographic and economic prominence may be reduced to two 
developments. The first was the decision by the colonial administration to establish 
a colonial headquarters at Tamale, and the second was the uptake of motorised 
transportation by local and ‘Syrian’
55
 entrepreneurs, following the completion of the 
Great North Road in 1920. The argument is not so much if one or both of these 
developments provided the catalyst for Tamale’s demographic growth and economic 
centrality, but how the two related to one another in order to produce Tamale’s 
urban growth. The demographic pull that the administrative headquarters alone 
provided was limited. Monies to build the new headquarters pulled some labour 
towards Tamale. The chiefs were encouraged to provide labour for the construction 
of the new headquarters at Tamale, in return for gifts proportionate to the amount of 
labour provided. The cost of building the headquarters was estimated at £8,935, but 
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two years later the cost had risen to £15,000.
56
 The demographic impact of this 
financial focus was significant but not defining. Tamale grew from 1,435 residents 
in 1907 to 3,901 in 1921. Although this growth is certainly significant, Tamale did 
not grow much faster than settlements such as Savelugu. In 1921, Navrongo, where 
a provincial and headquarters was based, had a population of 14,798, whilst Bawku 
also had a much larger population than Tamale in 1921, with 7,710 residents.
57
 
However, that the colonial headquarters were built in Tamale meant that in 1920, the 
Great North Road was built between Kumasi and Tamale and not elsewhere in the 
Northern Territories. From the moment the Great North Road was completed, it was 
the local commercial energies that prompted Tamale’s economic and demographic 
growth.  
The introduction of motorised transportation provided a huge impetus for trade and 
traffic between Tamale and Kumasi. As Kumasi was linked by rail to the coast, 
northern producers were able to access new demands at the coast. Furthermore, the 
road, being the only motorable road that connected the north and the south, 
monopolised the route through Tamale, and as a result, Tamale flourished. The 
increase in trade passing through Tamale on account of the adoption of the lorry 
created new, non-agrarian remunerative opportunities in the Northern Territories. 
The number of petty traders in Tamale boomed, as also did markets in car parts, 
auto-related services, oil, and petrol. The increase in lorry traffic is an indication of 
the increase in trade and human traffic which passed through Tamale. In 1927, only 
seven years after the Great North Road was completed, 4,420 lorries crossed the 
Volta River at Yeji in both directions, 2,462 of them with trailers.
58
 Tamale’s 
population grew correspondingly. In 1921 Tamale had a little under 4,000 residents, 
not significantly bigger than several other northern settlements. In 1931, eleven 
years after the Great North Road had been completed, Tamale’s population was 
12,901.
59
 During this period, Tamale grew faster than both Kumasi and Accra. By 
1948, Tamale’s population had grown to 16,055, and in 1960 it was around 
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 In economic terms, Tamale became increasingly connected to southern 
demands and supplies. Syrian traders set up stores, retailing consumer goods such as 
sugar, soap, bicycle tyres, and flour. In the 1930s and 1940s large foreign-owned 
trading firms began to take interest in Tamale’s markets. Yoruba traders settled in 
Tamale and bicycled United Africa Company (UAC) goods to rural markets.
61
 The 
amount of beer taken northwards increased from zero in 1925 to a little less than 
1,400 cases in 1929.
62
 Livestock, especially sheep, goats, and chickens, were taken 
southwards on lorries, as also were agricultural surpluses such as shea butter, 
bundles of corn, and groundnuts.
63
 These kinds of local economic activities where 
not perceived by the colonial administration to add value in the way an export crop 
would. As a result, they were relatively ignored, at least until after 1945.  
Both literally and figuratively, Tamale was linked to its Great North Road. Tamale’s 
population grew as trade volumes grew, and Tamale’s growth declined when, as 
during World War II (WWII), the volume of motorised trade declined. This 
statement must be understood, however, in the context of the Northern Railway 
which was never built. The railway (the lack thereof) in turn was (and still is) the 
ultimate symbol of northern underdevelopment at the south. It coloured colonial 
sentiment, and the motorised transport driving Tamale’s urban expansion was never 
regarded as a successful colonial economy. Despite the pervasiveness of a sense of 
commercial failure, trade statistics kept at the ferry crossing at Yeji tell a much 
different story, a story in which Tamale’s urban transformation is perhaps the 
protagonist. Motorised trade forms the bedrock of Tamale’s demographic and 
economic growth. 
“New Developmentalism” and the rise of party politics in Tamale. 
The end of WWII saw a great change in the method and purpose of colonial 
administration. Indirect rule was replaced by local government structures in order to 
absorb African intelligentsia, who might be tempted to engage in growing anti-
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colonial nationalist movements, into a local political structure in which they would 
work alongside chiefs. Furthermore, land planning and mechanisation replaced 
mixed farming. However, Grischow argues, in contrast to Cooper, that unlike the 
development ideology set forward by Chamberlain around the turn of twentieth 
century, the new developmentalism was intended to ensure large-scale economic 
development without decimating existing African social structures.
 64
 In this sense, 
the Northern Territories, on account of having large tracts of uncontested land, 
which in any case was vested in the Crown, and only a small African intelligentsia 
to absorb, was seen as an ideal playing field for the new developmentalism. This 
framework, however, wholly excluded Tamale, as Tamale’s social fabric, largely on 
account of the resettlement of ex-servicemen in Tamale, was undergoing profound 
urban processes. The contradiction between the aims of the post-war new 
developmentalism and Tamale’s urbanising process worked to further isolate 
Tamale from the north more generally, a major theme of this dissertation.  
It was in this context that party politics entered the north. Nationalist politics came 
relatively late to the Northern Territories, and the inclusion of the north in the 
political forces which led finally to independence was not unproblematic. An 
important starting point for a discussion about nationalist politics in the Northern 
Territories is that the north’s original inclusion in the state apparatus in the south 
was orchestrated by colonial intervention and conducted within the colonial vision. 
That meant primarily that chiefs and/or those aligned with chieftaincy were given 
the lead in integrating the north into nationalist politics. This was done through the 
creation in 1945 of the Northern Territories Council (NTC). Later, in 1953, in the 
run-up to the 1954 elections, the leadership of the NTC formed the Northern Peoples 
Party (NPP), to run as a northern interest group in the upcoming elections. The 
rivalry between a tradition-laden, conservative NPP and a southern dominated, 
progressive Convention People’s Party (CPP) forms the most significant political 
dichotomy of the nationalist political narrative of the Northern Territories. Although 
other political actors feature in the narrative, such as the Muslim Association Party 
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(MAP), they broadly align to one or other side of the dichotomy. Although the 
staunchly conservative MAP won the Tamale constituency in 1954, in the 1956 
election, the CPP recorded a resounding victory. The manner in which the CPP 
worked to win over Tamale’s electorate, especially through (mis)use of the Tamale 
Urban Council, is an interesting feature of Chapter 7. Equally important for this 
thesis was the alignment of traditional actors in Tamale, such as the Gulkpe-Na and 
the Dakpema, especially in relation to the positioning of the Ya Na in Yendi, and 
how such alignments affected Tamale’s internal socio-political dynamic. The 
introduction of party politics to Tamale not only shaped Tamale’s socio-economic 
and socio-political fabric going into the post-colonial period; it also reveals 
Tamale’s position within the Northern Territories more generally. It provides the 
fourth and final of the frames of reference in which this thesis situates Tamale’s 
urban development. 
Theoretical frameworks  
There are a number of theoretical perspectives that need to be unpacked in this 
introductory chapter. The theoretical frameworks employed in this dissertation relate 
to why cities come to exist, how they are sustained, and how the forces which 
prompted a city’s creation relate to the socio-economic and socio-political landscape 
within the city. Throughout the thesis, these theoretical perspectives are related to 
Tamale as a colonial city.  
Economic considerations 
How and why do cities created for and by colonial commercial aspirations thrive 
beyond the colonial period? The continued existence of cities is a theoretical 
question at the centre of a number of economic sub-disciplines, for instance New 
Economic Geography (NEG), launched by Paul Krugman in the 1990s. Although 
NEG is not customarily applied to the case of colonial cities, there is no reason why 
it should not be. Its arguments for the ongoing existence of individual cities, even in 
situations of changing political and/or economic conditions, are as relevant for 
colonial cities in the post-colonial context as they are for Chicago, London, or New 
York. The novelty of NEG is that whilst most theories preceding that of Krugman 
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suggest that the location of cities is a rational economic outcome, the NEG models 
suggest that urban development is rather characterized by path dependence, whereby 
historical accidents may have long-term cumulative consequences. In terms of 
Tamale, this encapsulates both its colonial underpinnings and its continued existence 
(expansion) during the post-colonial period.  
NEG makes a strong argument for why cities grow. In short, market-size effects 
(such as economies of scale) make it desirable for firms to locate close to one 
another, which simultaneously has the effect of increasing wages, and thus pulling 
labour. Once the process of agglomeration has started, it continues because, up to a 
point, the larger the city, the more beneficial it is for firms to locate there 
(cumulative causation). However, after ‘that point’, it is no longer beneficial for 
firms to move to the city. This is determined by centrifugal forces, which include 
land rents and immobile factors, such as natural resources and congestion. For 
instance, once land rents and/or congestion outweigh the benefits of market-size 
effects, firms will no longer locate to that agglomeration. As in Von Thunen’s work, 
transportation is another fundamental component of the NEG models. High transport 
costs result in less trade. In such instances, regions
65
 will be isolated and differ little 
from each other. Workers and firms will be evenly divided across regions. However, 
a drop in transport costs changes the distribution of both firms and workers across 
regions.
66
 Transportation is thus a critical variable of city growth within the NEG 
models. Despite its strong colonial origins, Tamale’s existence beyond the colonial 
period, as is the case with most colonial cities, is theoretically explained in this way.  
NEG is, however, subjected persistently to two primary criticisms. The first is that it 
lacks the tools to cater effectively for empirical application of its models.
67
 The 
second persistent criticism, perhaps more relevant to this thesis, is that although 
NEG models may well explain why firms locate to existing cities, the models have 
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far more difficulty in explaining why agglomerations come to exist in the first place. 
Krugman’s rebuttal to this accusation is simply to state that if we are to understand 
the location of cities, ‘history matters’. Krugman argues that the initial spark of 
urban growth is ‘an accident of history’.
68
 Tamale’s emergence as a truly urban 
space is the result of such an accident of history. What is the accident of history that 
created Tamale, and what are the implications for Tamale of the nature of that 
accident of history? Although this has been has touched on previously, it deserves 
more attention.  
Urbanising the Gold Coast  
Another important to aspect of agglomeration is how cities emerge in relation to one 
another. In understanding Tamale’s urban formation, it is thus useful to understand a 
little about the formation of other urban spaces in the Gold Coast, and how the 
emergence of such cities relate to Tamale’s own historical narrative. What follows is 
a brief discussion of the urbanisation of Ghana. This overview is then linked to 
Tamale’s urban emergence.  
Today Ghana possesses perhaps four genuine urban centres (Accra, Kumasi, 
Tamale, and Sekondi-Takoradi). Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi both possess ports. 
The ‘historical accident’
69
 which produced each of these cities is different. Accra 
was first inhabited by the Ga, who moved there during the fifteenth century. The Ga 
evolved economically as fisherman, making use of their location on the coast. That 
alone, however, does not explain the emergence of Accra as the primate city it is 
today. The figure below is taken from Taafe, E., Morrill, R. & P. Gould, ‘Transport 
Expansion in Underdeveloped Countries: A Comparative Analysis’. It shows the 
total value of goods handled at Gold Coast ports for the period 1900-25. The figure 
reveals that in 1900, economic activity was distributed fairly evening along the 
length of the coast of the Gold Coast. The only variation in concentration is at Cape 
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Coast. In 1877 Accra replaced Cape Coast as the capital of the Gold Coast colony 
largely because Accra had a drier climate than Cape Coast and was not plagued by 
tsetse fly. After 1877 there was an influx of Europeans as administrative functions 
moved to Accra. In 1905 the motorcar was introduced to the Gold Coast. Lorry 
chassis were imported and assembled in the Gold Coast, and during the 1920s, the 
cocoa sector started to blossom. Increasingly, cocoa traders brought goods to the 
Accra port by lorry. Although such developments significantly increased Accra’s 
demographic, it was the construction of a railway between Accra and Kumasi in 
1923 which really sparked Accra’s rapid growth in economic activity and, 


















1.3. Changes in port concentration, Gold Coast, 1900-1925 
 
Source: Taafe, E., R. Morrill., & P. Gould, ‘Transport expansion in 
underdeveloped countries: A comparative analysis’ in the American 
geographical society Vol. 53, No. 4 (Oct., 1963), pp. 503-529 
 
Construction on the Kumasi-Accra railway began in 1908 and was completed in 
1923. A year later in 1924, cocoa was Ghana's largest export and the Accra port was 
the primary focus of the cocoa industry. In short, the ‘accident of history’ which 
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created Accra was the interaction between possessing a port, on the one hand, and 
European commercialism (specifically the demand for cocoa), on the other. Accra’s 
harbour is no longer competitive, with harbours at Tema and Sekondi-Takoradi both 
physically better-endowed than that of Accra. However, in line with contemporary 
economic geography, Accra’s current and continued urban dominance is primarily 
due its size (market-size effects). Its initial demographic advantage (sparked by the 
number of activities centred primarily on Accra’s port) has been maintained, in the 
same way that Chicago has continued to exist as a urban heavyweight long after its 
role as a port between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River had diminished on 
account of technological innovation in the way of transportation.
70
  
Like Accra, Sekondi-Takoradi is also a coastal city possessing a port.
71
 Although the 
settlement stemmed from seventeenth century Dutch, Swedish, and English forts, its 
urban character has more contemporary origins. The tract of land between Sekondi-
Takoradi and Kumasi is Ghana’s most lucrative in terms natural resource 
endowment. Ghana’s gold deposits are concentrated in this area. In 1903 a railway 
was built to Kumasi, directly north of Sekondi-Takoradi, for the purpose of 
transporting gold to the port before being shipped to Europe. Until recently, 
however, Sekondi-Takoradi’s prominence has been on the decline. The railway 
between Sekondi-Takoradi and Kumasi has since stopped working, owing largely to 
disrepair and poor maintenance, and its distance from Accra (coupled with high 
transportation costs) meant that Sekondi-Takordai lost much of its economic raison 
d'être in the period after Independence. Sekondi-Takoradi’s fortune has, however, 
changed in recent years. The discovery of oil off Ghana’s coast, especially in the 
Western Region, looks set to re-establish the importance of Sekondi-Takoradi. In 
line with spatial economic models, because Sekondi-Takoradi (once again) straddles 
both a location near to natural resources (oil reserves) on the one hand, and a 
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location near to a deepwater harbour on the other, it will, almost without question, 
emerge as one of Ghana’s most prominent cities in the years to come.  
Kumasi is, of course, not a port city. Its urban existence is explained by two inter-
related circumstances: its proximity to gold deposits, and its location on a major pre-
European trade artery from Begho through Tafo and Adansi.
72
 Gold, unlike the ports 
of Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi, was a commodity with economic value before the 
arrival of a European presence. Thus, Kumasi did not require Europeans, as the port 
in Accra did, in order for gold to create centripetal forces. It makes sense thus that 
the location of Kumasi is the political centre of a large and powerful pre-European 
kingdom, namely Asante. A centralised politic at Kumasi accelerated Kumasi’s 
urban process as regional wealth was centred towards the apex of political hierarchy. 
Kumasi, unlike both Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi, has a genuine pre-European 
urban history because gold had a genuine pre-European value. That said, after the 
defeat of Ashanti in 1874, the building of two railway lines down to the coast, first 
to Sekondi-Takoradi (1903) and then to Accra (1923), and finally a motorable road 
northwards (1920), certainly contributed significantly to Kumasi’s contemporary 
urban character.  
In each of the cases above, there is a clear connection between physical and 
locational geography – ‘an accident of history’ and urbanity. Tamale’s urbanisation 
is somewhat more obscure than Ghana’s other urban centres. Tamale does not 
possess a seaport like Accra or Sekondi-Takoradi and is also not located near to any 
immovable natural resources such as gold, as in the case of Kumasi. There is, in 
fact, almost nothing noteworthy about the location of Tamale. What then is the 
‘accident of history’ which created Tamale, a city with around 400,000 inhabitants 
today? The answer lies in the introduction of motorised transportation and, 
indirectly, in Tamale being selected as the centre of British administration in the 
Northern Territories (based on the mistaken idea that Tamale possessed a good 
water supply, itself an accident of history). In 1907 the British moved its 
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administrative headquarters from Gambaga to Tamale. That alone, however, was not 
enough to ignite urban growth, as transport costs were too high to create long-term 
spatial variations in economic activity. This is best illustrated by the example of the 
British Cotton Growers Association (BCGA), who built a ginnery in Tamale in 1908 
but left the Northern Territories in 1911, citing ‘prohibitive transport costs’ as the 
reason why their cotton initiative in the Northern Territories failed. In 1920, 13 
years after the opening of the administrative headquarters, Tamale’s population was 
less that 4,000, about the same size as other Northern settlements such as Salaga, 
Savelugu, Bawku, and Wa.
73
 In April 1920, however, the Great North Road between 
Tamale and Kumasi was completed. Together, these two centripetal forces 
(transportation and administrative hegemony) ignited Tamale’s urban growth. The 
‘accident of history’ which created Tamale was entirely man-made: it served as road 
head, and thus as transport hub (not unlike a sea-port), and as a centre of 
administration. In the first years after the completion of the Great North road, 
northern trade made its way to Tamale, to be loaded onto lorries and taken 
southwards, and conversely, south-to-north trade was lorried to Tamale, offloaded, 
and head-loaded to northern market systems. That Tamale served as a road-head for 
north-south trade explains why it emerged, as a result of the Great North Road, as 
the economic centre of the Northern Territories. 
Patterns of urbanisation and the distribution of risk  
It has been noted that the effect of transportation on Tamale’s urban development 
was instant. In 1920, the year in which the Great North Road was completed, 
Tamale’s population was approximately 3,900, not larger than many other northern 
settlements. Ten years later, once the introduction of the motorised transportation 
had gathered momentum, Tamale’s population was almost 13,000.
74
 Innovations in 
transportation redistribute both economic activity and demographic agglomerations. 
In the case of the Gold Coast, we have seen how the construction of railways from 
Kumasi to Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra changed the concentration of economic 
activity at the coast. Transportation thus shapes the geographical patterns of a 
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national (colonial) economy. NEG models employ wage differentials to explain how 
this may work. But there are other ways in which we may model the impact of 
transportation innovations. Peter Gould, Edward Taafe, and Richard Morrill provide 
a good conceptual illustration of the impact of innovation in transportation through 
the employment of the concept of ‘risk’. In their article, ‘Transport Expansion in 
Underdeveloped Countries: A Comparative Analysis’,
75
 they employ a game theory 
model to create a hypothetical scenario of the impact of a road on cattle traders who 
operate in the area between the Niger Bend and Kumasi. The argument goes as 
follows: Cattle traders who drive cattle down on the hoof from Ouagadougou are 
faced with decisions about whether to sell their bullocks in Navrongo, Tamale, 
Prang, or Kumasi. Cattle fetch the highest prices at Kumasi and the lowest at 
Ouagadougou, owing to the distance the cattle have to travel from their origins in 
the Niger Bend. The trade-off is risk and works as follows: if the season turns out to 
be a dry one, many bullocks will not make the journey all the way to Kumasi, and 
so, despite lower prices, traders will be better off selling their bullocks closer to the 
place of origin, at for instance Ouagadougou, Navrongo, Tamale, or Prang. The drier 
the season, the more risk involved in travelling and the closer to Ouagadougou 
traders will sell their stock. The illustration provided by Taafe, Gould, and Morrill 
suggests that cattle traders are best off selling 53.4 per cent of their cattle at 
Ouagadougou and the rest (46.6 per cent) should be driven through Navrongo, 
Tamale, and Prang to the Kumasi market. The authors then suppose that a road is 
built between Tamale and Navrongo, so that cattle no longer need to be driven on 
the hoof between these two points and are instead transported by lorry from 
Navrongo to Tamale. They repeat the same analysis as above, this time with the 
inclusion of the new road. In this instance, cattle traders are best off if they sell 62.5 
per cent of their bullocks at Tamale, 25 per cent at Prang, and the remaining 12.5 per 
cent at the Kumasi market.  
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The model, although applied to the same region as this dissertation, takes as its 
example a different road. While it is concerned with the road between Tamale and 
Navrongo, this dissertation has as its starting point the construction of the Great 
North Road between Tamale and Kumasi. The Great North Road was the first 
motorable road to enter the Northern Territories and monopolized the north-south 
trade route through Tamale. There were no other motorable roads southwards, and 
the advantage of travelling by lorry was substantial (two days to Kumasi, instead of 
two weeks). The risk distribution model presented above is itself useful. The 
completion of the Great North Road had implications for the decision-making 
process of traders. The initial effect of the completion of the Great North Road 
meant that Tamale had come to be closer to Kumasi (in nominal terms). For the 
distribution of trade, this meant an increase in the economic incentives to reach 
Tamale from, for instance, the Niger Bend. By reaching Tamale, traders were 
suddenly also close to Kumasi, and only a further one-day journey from Accra, 
where the goods fetched higher prices, without huge increases in the risks involved 
in travelling. Viewing the completion of the Great North Road as changing risk 
distribution is conceptually useful. According to the model, the Great North Road 
brought trade to Tamale, trade which otherwise perhaps would not have come that 
far south or north.  
Political considerations  
Until now, all theoretical considerations relating to agglomeration have been 
economic. But cities are more than simply a dense population of firms of labour. A 
city is also a set of ideas. A city may receive cultures from its surrounding 
hinterland, digest, transform, and then transmit an urban version of those cultures. 
Rayfield notes, for instance, that cities along the West African coast became ‘… 
points from which Western culture traits were transmitted throughout West 
Africa.’
76
 Politics is one such transmission. In other words, we may expect that 
cities, by and large, are spaces where not only economic activity is concentrated but 
also political power. There is much less theoretical modelling of such spatial 
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distributions. It is possible, however, to highlight a few political considerations in 
terms of the development of urban centres.  
There exists a dynamic and constantly negotiated relationship between the 
distribution of economic activity and that of political power. This relationship 
between economic and political distributions is illustrated perhaps most famously by 
Rome. Rome lies on the banks of the Tiber River, about 25 kilometres from the sea. 
Its original existence is contested and mainly lies buried (both literally and 
figuratively) under the more prominent historiography of the Roman Empire (except 
perhaps for the myth of Romulus and Remus). Although recognising that Rome’s 
history is of course both long and complex, however, a short illustration will suffice 
here.  
Briefly, Rome’s location may be attributed to the fact that the Tiber River has only 
two islands, one at the mouth of the river and the other where Rome is located. The 
latter island made crossing the river far easier than in other places along the river – 
Tiber Island is thus Rome’s ‘accident of history’. The ability to cross the river 
relatively easily concentrated farming along the banks on both sides at this location, 
with human traffic drawn to this location in order to cross the river. That original 
agglomeration developed into the capital of the Roman Kingdom and then the 
Roman Republic (from 510 BC) and, finally, the Roman Empire (from 27 BC). 
Around 20 BC, Emperor Caesar Augustus commissioned the construction of the 
Milliarium Aureum. All roads within the Roman Empire were considered to begin 
from this monument and all distances in the Roman Empire were measured relative 
to that point. In the case of Rome, therefore, economic agglomeration created also a 
concentration of political power, which then employed this political power to further 
consolidate economic agglomeration. The same was true of Yendi. Staniland states 
that ‘… one of the main caravan routes from Ashanti to Hausaland passed through 
Yendi.’
77
 He notes further:  
The rise of the administrative class in Yendi coincided with this period of 
prosperity, and conversely, the weakening of the kings’ authority appears to have 
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The same is also true of Kumasi: Control over commerce centred power politically 
at Kumasi, power which in turn sought to consolidate commerce for its political 
benefit. What happens, however, when the initial economic agglomeration does not 
succeed in the creation of political concentration? Attention has been given to 
converse instances where political relevance is not matched by any economic 
significance, such as Yamoussoukro, Abuja, and Brasilia. But what about cities with 
economic relevance without any political relevance? Perhaps the cities on the 
Zambian Copperbelt are an example? But those cities, unlike Tamale, developed an 
organised labour force, which itself translates to political authority. Whilst Tamale, 
through an accident of history, has emerged as an economic centre of the north, 
political authority in Dagbon is (and was actively) concentrated at Yendi, a much 
smaller settlement which lies 95 kilometres to the east of Tamale. Despite Tamale’s 
unprecedented economic and demographic hegemony, political power today remains 
vested in Yendi, where the Ya Na is seated. The discontinuity between political and 
economic distributions serves more specifically as the thematic cornerstone of this 
dissertation.  
Methodological Considerations 
A methodological note may be useful. Very little has been written on the history of 
Tamale. As a result, I was very reliant on archival sources. In order to investigate 
these themes, I undertook a fieldwork period of a little over one year. In August 
2007 I spent a period of one month in the archives in Kew, and between December 
2007 and December 2008 I worked between archives in Accra and Tamale. To my 
knowledge, only one of the prominent actors in Tamale’s history is still alive, 
Ebenezer Adam, a prominent CPP member during the post-war period. As a result, 
although a number of interviews were conducted, I found only three to be 
particularly useful: interviews with Ebenezer Adam, the secretary to the regent of 
the Gulkpe-Na, and a representative of the house of the Dakpema.  
                                                 




Three questions provide some methodological insights. The first is how I arrived at 
the observation that Tamale was disconnected from the north more generally? The 
second is how I arrived at the observation that Tamale possesses an institutional 
anatomy characterised by multiplicity? The third is why I think these two 
characteristics inform the socio-political and socio-economic fabric of Tamale’s 
urban population.  
The first observation – that Tamale came to be disconnected from Dagbon 
traditional structures – was born first out of the notion of ‘isolation’. Through 
reading the exhaustive material on northern Ghana, especially its history, Tamale is 
notable especially due largely to its absence. Northern Ghana indeed has a very rich 
academic tradition. Rattray was followed by Fortes. Later Ivor Wilks, Martin 
Staniland, and Paul-Andre Ladoucer added to the growing canon, as also did Davis 
Killingray, Jean Allman, R.B. Benning, Roger Thomas, Carola Lentz, Nii-K Plange, 
Jeff Grischow, K.B. Dickson Inez Sutton, and Wyatt McGaffey – to name but a few. 
Despite the academic attention given to Tamale since the 1930s, Tamale has never 
been identified as an object of enquiry. This is peculiar, I would argue (although I do 
not expect everyone to agree with me), as Tamale’s urban growth is the single most 
profound transformation that has taken place in northern Ghana in the last one 
hundred years. Out of this absence rose the notion of isolation, especially in terms of 
the Northern Territories. Later, I would find in a footnote to Staniland’s Lions of 
Dagbon the assertion that ‘the degree to which Tamale kept to itself politically is 
interesting’.
79
 Signs of Tamale’s disconnect from Dagbon traditional structures were 
suddenly everywhere. Later still, I came across a report on Dagbon Native 
Authorities that compared the Dagomba chiefs’ attitude towards Tamale townsmen 
to their attitude towards Konkomba farmers, with whom tensions have on many 
occasions escalated to open conflict. The report noted:  
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The Dagomba chiefs have thereby found themselves stabilised by government 
backing in a position of superiority alike over the vigorous Konkomba farmer 
and the progressive … wage-earner of Tamale Town.
80
 
Not only was Tamale, as an urban space, disconnected from Dagbon traditional 
structures, but Tamale’s urban dwellers themselves also somehow did not ‘belong’ 
to the imagery of Dagbon tradition. This emerged as the first line of enquiry. 
The second observation came first during an interview with the secretary of Gulkpe-
Na in Tamale in March 2008.
81
 He explained the origins of the Dakpema to me as 
follows: The Dakpema originated from Kumbungu. He arrived in Tamale after 
fleeing from Kumbungu because he had murdered a man. In Tamale he impregnated 
the mentally handicapped daughter of the fetish priest, the Bugulana, and for fear of 
shame, the Bugulana gave him the title, the Dakpema. The emphasis which my 
informant placed on the themes of physical or mental handicaps
82
 and shame, 
coupled with the fact that I know that such themes are often so loaded in Dagbon 
folklore, called immediately for attention. After interviewing a number of members 
of the Dakpema’s house and getting a far more ‘noble’ version of the Dakpema’s 
origins, it was clear at the very least that rivalry existed between the two chiefly 
houses in Tamale. Later I would learn from archival sources that the newly 
appointed Ya Na in 1920, Abdulai II, informed the colonial administration that the 
Dakpema was not the ‘rightful’ chief of Tamale and demanded that the rightful 
chief, the Gulkpe-Na, replace the Dakpema as chief of Tamale, and that the colonial 
administration was quick to oblige. Having found in the archives the moment that 
the Dakpema replaced the Gulkpe-Na in what was clearly perceived by the colonial 
administration as an emphatic end to the matter, correspondence seemed to dry up 
for a number of years. From the record of a number of complaints, it was clear that 
the Dakpema house continued to play an active role in Tamale’s socio-political 
landscape after the emphatic return of the Gulkpe-Na. The study of the 
redevelopment of Ward D, in Chapter 4, revealed more legitimate political actors: 
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The Mallam of the central mosque, the colonial administration, and both the 
Dakpema and Gulkpe-Na all had agendas and influence and appeared to posses 
some form of legitimacy. All the documentation on indirect rule seemed to promote 
a rigid, local, traditional structure. But every local claim or dispute I came across in 
the archives showed that one or more parties manoeuvred politically between the 
different nodes of authority. It occurred to me, prompted by the work of Sara Berry, 
that the manner in which claims were made in Tamale, especially with regard to 
property, in many instances through the referencing of a number of political actors 
and institutions, was a dialogue about the constitution of authority and, also, about 
the form which societal interactions were to take. 
The third argument – that these two characteristics of Tamale shape also the socio-
political interactions within that town – I found difficult to articulate. I spent several 
weeks travelling to a number of Dagomba villages outside Tamale to see how 
Dagomba social relations in Tamale were different from those in the rural 
hinterland. It turned out to be an impossible comparison to make. Later I spent some 
time in Kumasi, and then a year in Accra. I compared also my observations of social 
lives in Tamale with those I had seen in Cape Town, London, and Amsterdam. Of 
course each of these cities felt entirely different, but how were they different, and 
what made them different was difficult to formulate. Later I stumbled across the 
work of Aiden Southall, and his distinction between Type A and Type B cities. 
Southall argues that Type A cities represent those cities which have long, pre-
European urban histories, such as Kumasi, while Type B cities are those created for 
and by the colonial economy. Southall argues that in Type B cities, where the 
occupational structure is based on clear distinctions between unskilled workers, 
skilled workers, and clerical staff, aspirations find expression in trade unions, and 
political parties and associations. He notes, ‘… there are no traditional institutions to 
provide a focus.’
83
 Southall himself noted of his dichotomy between Type A and 
Type B towns that, ‘…  no writer on the subject, including me, has found this 
                                                 
83  Southall, A., ‘Social change, demography and extrinsic factors’. In: Southall, A., ed., 
Social change in modern Africa. Oxford, 1961, 7-13. 
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classification entirely satisfactory, yet none has escaped from it’.
84
 What attracted 
me to Southall, however, was not so much in the typology that he produced, but 
rather in the link that he observed between different types of African cities and the 
social relationships within those cities. Southall thus made the connection between 
the specific historical development of a city and the social relations within it. 
Southall’s model suggested more specifically that a given city ‘type’ produced a 
number of ‘extrinsic factors’ such as ‘relationship to outlying hinterland’, 
‘occupation structures’, and ‘wage differentials’. These ‘extrinsic factors’ in turn 
shape the social relations within a city. Whether Tamale is a Type A or a Type B 
city is thus irrelevant. What matters is the revelation that Tamale’s specific urban 
formation affects the character of a number of ‘extrinsic factors’, and these factors, 
in turn, affect the social relations within Tamale. Through Southall I found a number 
of other useful texts, such as that of Anthony O’Conner and Catherine Coquery-
Vidrovitch. In the end, the question was less whether the connection existed 
between urban historical trajectories and social relations, than it was whether I could 
set out that connection in the case of Tamale. I felt I had enough evidence to argue 
that through the colonial period, Tamale became increasingly disconnected from 
Dagbon, and also to argue that Tamale’s institutional anatomy was characterised by 
multiplicity, in part as a result of that isolation. The final task is to show how these 
two characteristics of Tamale’s historical trajectory shaped socio-political 
interactions within Tamale.  
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Founding Tamale: Between European 
capitalism and African peasantry 
Introduction 
The establishment of a colonial administrative headquarters at Tamale in the first 
decade of the twentieth century coincided with a shift in colonial development 
policy. Joseph Chamberlain’s vision – advocating a colonial development approach 
which relied primarily on European capitalism and ‘destroying “unprogressive” 
African political and social systems, imposing direct taxation, and encouraging the 
development of landlordism and agrarian capitalism’
1
 – was replaced by a liberal 
agenda which sought to link existing African socio-economic structures with global 
economic forces, through European merchant capital. This chapter argues that 
Tamale’s founding is best understood within the transition between these two 
colonial development strategies. By situating Tamale’s founding within larger 
                                                 




colonial development processes, this chapter argues that Tamale proved an 
uncomfortable choice as an administrative centre and trade hub within the colonial 
development approach. Furthermore, the chapter argues, as a result of the absence of 
a railway and the uptake of motorised transportation, a trade-based economy was 
created after 1920 (with Tamale at its centre), which neither enticed European 
traders nor consolidated the systems and structures of the African peasantry in 
Tamale. Moreover, the rise of the single owner/driver model and petty traders, and 
the subsequent lack of trade centralisation which a railway might have provided, 
made it difficult for the colonial administration to derive financial benefits from the 
increases in trade that motorised transportation was inducing. The single lorry-
owner/driver model at the heart of north-south trade also created individual 
accumulations of wealth, which were regarded by the liberal agenda as the antithesis 
of the African social and political systems through which the colonial administration 
was attempting to operate. 
Founding Tamale 
Christine Oppong notes that Tamale ‘… owes its present prominence (to) being 
chosen as the district headquarters of the British Colonial administration in the first 
decade of the century’.
2
 What does Tamale’s founding reveal about the colonial 
developmental strategy for the Northern Territories more generally? One assumes 
that the choice of location of a regional headquarters is a strategic decision. 
Identifying why Tamale was selected thus should reveal something about northern 
colonial strategies and aspirations more generally. However, sources which relate to 
the reasons why Tamale emerged as a regional centre paint a confused picture of 
colonial development strategy in the Northern Territories, and trying to link the 
strategic sentiments contained within colonial citations to larger colonial policy and 
practice creates a number of contradictions. But, as this subsection argues, there are 
a number of lines that may be drawn to explain the founding of Tamale in terms of 
larger colonial processes. Those lines are to be found not in one or other colonial 
strategy but in the transition from one such strategy to another. More specifically, 
                                                 
2  Oppong, C., Growing up in Dagbon. Ghana, 1973, 16. 
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the choice of Tamale as a regional administrative headquarters is situated in the 
transition from a developmental approach that focused on the economic utility of 
European capitalism and direct taxation, to one that focused on the African 
peasantry and how it may be linked to global economic forces.  
In beginning to attempt to understand the founding of Tamale as an administrative 
headquarters and a trade hub, one is struck by the absence of advantages that Tamale 
offered the colonial administration. Tamale possessed very few identifiable 
advantages for the purpose of administration as it emerged in the decades after its 
founding in 1907. Tamale’s lack of traditional political significance has been 
discussed in the introductory chapter. Furthermore, Tamale was not of any particular 
economic importance. It was a village of 1,435 at its founding, reflecting its relative 
economic irrelevance. Although there was a rotational market system in and around 
Tamale, Tamale was not an integral part of a much more valuable north-south transit 
trade. Tamale also had no obvious physical benefits. The water supply was a 
perennial problem throughout the colonial period – Tamale is not located adjacent to 
any rivers – and it has no obvious defensive features. Gambaga, which preceded 
Tamale as the base for colonial activity, was believed by Chief Commissioner of the 
Northern Territories (CCNT), Lt. Colonel H.P. Northcott, to be the centre of the 
Mamprussi dynasty.
3
 The choice of Gambaga as a colonial base reflects the colonial 
administration’s focus on, firstly, the ‘pacification’ of peoples like the Tallensi, who 
continued to resist British rule after 1900, and secondly, on consolidating the 
structures of states, like Mamprugu, that were felt to have been relatively unaltered 
by the slave-raiding activities of Samory and Babatu.  
Only very few attempts have been made, directly or indirectly, to address the 
question of how colonial administrative activity came to be centred in Tamale 
around the turn of the twentieth century. The colonial administration had initially 
considered Lungbunga as the site for the new headquarters and went as far as to 
invite the chief of Lungbunga, together with the chief of Savelugu, to tour Accra.
4
 
MacGaffey notes that ‘legend has it that it was the Dakpema, Nsung-Na, who went 
                                                 
3  Grischow, Shaping, 31. 




to the military headquarters in Gambaga and persuaded the British to chose 
Tamale’.
5
 Martin Staniland elaborates on this ‘legend’. He argues that the 
headquarters of the Northern Territories were moved to Tamale largely on the 
initiative of the Dakpema, Nsung-Na.
6
 According to Staniland, the Dakpema had 
managed to assert himself as chief of Tamale after 1902, when the Anglo-German 
border was formally established. At the time of partition of Dagbon into British and 
German jurisdictions and the establishment of the Anglo-German boundary, the 
Gulkpe-Na was visiting Yendi and was ordered to remain there. Staniland notes that 
the Dakpema made the journey to Gambaga (then the headquarters of British 
colonial administration) to persuade the colonial administration to establish a 
colonial headquarters at Tamale. Staniland states that the Dakpema,  
 … seized the opportunity (of the Gulkpe-Na’s absence) to increase his own 
power and importance, actually making the journey to Gambaga … to invite the 
Government to build a station in his town where there was plenty of water.
7
  
In support of this argument, albeit with a slightly different emphasis, the DC for 
Yendi, Blair,
8
 noted in the early 1930s that according to conversations he had with 
the prominent members of Tamale’s community, notably the Serekin Zongo (Hausa 
Headman in Tamale), ‘… when the English were at Gambaga, they summoned all 
Dagomba Chiefs … Foremost amongst these was the Dakpema of Tamale … ’.
9
 
Blair noted from his own research that ‘… when the N.T. headquarters were moved 
to Tamale … the Da-Kpema arrogated all the powers of a chief, being safely cut off 
from Yendi and the Gulkpe Na’.
10
 But relating these facts to the decision by the 
colonial administration to house their headquarters at Tamale seems to be a stretch. 
The Dakpema had been described only a few years prior to the founding of Tamale 
                                                 
5  Ibid. 110. 
6  Staniland, Lions, 100. 
7  Ibid. 62. 
8  Blair is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
9  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/2/28 (Dagomba Native Affairs). ‘Note by District 
Commissioner for Eastern Dagomba Blair’. 
10  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/2/28 (Dagomba Native Affairs). ‘Note by District 
Commissioner for Eastern Dagomba Blair’. 
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as ‘… one of the poorest men in Tamale, and apparently has no following’.
11
 His 
influence over colonial policy was, in all likelihood, limited. Paul André Ladouceur 
notes simply, ‘In 1907 … the capital was moved to Tamale, which was better 
situated for purposes of communication’.
12
 Ladouceur is also certainly not incorrect, 
but ‘communications’ alone cannot explain the establishment of a regional 
headquarters at Tamale as a base for colonial administration.  
The superficial nature of the explanations as to why Tamale was selected reflect the 
apparent randomness of the choice of Tamale within larger colonial development 
policies. A more holistic account of how and why the colonial administration 
selected Tamale as its base must take into account broader changes and contestations 
within colonial development visions and aspirations. In 1895, Joseph Chamberlain 
sounded the call that the British had a duty to develop the colonial possessions. In 
terms specifically of the Gold Coast, Chamberlain’s call reflected a desire to open 
up the territory to British commercial interests in order to extract raw materials and 
develop consumer markets for British goods. Jeff Grischow notes: 
Chamberlain set out to achieve this goal by nationalising African lands, building 
state-sponsored infrastructure, destroying what he considered to be 
“unprogressive” African political and social systems, imposing direct taxation, 




Chamberlain’s vision was, however, abruptly ended around 1906 by a liberal 
reaction to what was seen to be the exploitation of the West African colonies. 
During the period 1906-12, the colonial development of West Africa shifted from 
encouraging the development of agrarian capitalism to blocking its growth in favour 
of preserving peasant production and African community.
14
 Coincidently, Tamale 
was founded in 1907, at the very beginning of this transition.  
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Tensions in colonial discourse  
The period 1906-12, when the transition from an emphasis on European capitalism 
to an emphasis on preserving peasant production took shape, coincided with crucial 
years for Tamale’s early development. We have noted that Tamale’s founding is 
best understood within this transition. The colonial sources underpin this assertion. 
The following subsection discusses a number of the colonial references to the 
founding of Tamale within the themes set out in this subsection. 
Only a few sources relate specifically to the founding of Tamale. The Annual Report 
in the year 1906 mentions Tamale on a number of occasions. The other two sources 
are a note by the CCNT, Lieutenant-Colonel Watherston, and his address to 57 
chiefs to mark the opening of Tamale. The following subsection analyses each of 
these sources. In 1906, the Annual Report for the Northern Territories notes:  
The new headquarters have been selected at Tamale in place of Gambaga. The 
latter place, situated as it is in the north-east corner of the Protectorate, was most 
inconvenient for communication with the outstations, whereas Tamale occupies 
a more central position.
15
  
This reflects the point raised by Ladouceur: Tamale was selected as an 
administrative centre owing to the communication benefits which it offered. Such 
reasoning alone, however, over-simplifies the complexities of colonial economic 
ambitions. Communication is not all. The Report of the Transport Department for 
1906 noted:  
When the headquarters of the Northern Territories are moved from Gambaga to 




In the same year of 1906, CCNT Lieutenant-Colonel Watherson wrote to the 
Governor, noting of Tamale as follows:  
Situated on a ridge, with very extensive views to the east and west in open park-
like country, excellent water supply, and reported amongst the natives as being 
extremely healthy for men, cattle and horses … it is doubtful if a better situated 
                                                 
15  PRO, Kew, CO 98/16 (Annual Report for the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast for 
the Year 1906). 
16  PRO, Kew, CO 96/16. (Report on the Transport Department for the Year 1906). 
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station exists in West Africa. Plenty of excellent sites exist for European 
residences, should traders settle later on.’
17
  
Watherston’s note appeals largely to Europeans. The references to European traders, 
and especially their ‘residences’, is particularly revealing in this regard. It points 
loosely to a liberal agenda, where African peasantry, through European traders, is 
connected to global economic forces. Tamale would serve as the hub of such an 
economic system. There is only one source that reveals how the colonial 
administration reasoned the founding of Tamale to (representatives of) the African 
peasantry they were attempting to coerce. This comes in the form of the address of 
the CCNT at the opening of Tamale in 1907. The opening of the new headquarters at 
Tamale came finally on Friday, 10 April 1907, and was declared a holiday. Only the 
telegraph office and the treasury remained open, the telegraph office for one hour in 
the morning and one in the afternoon to receive mail from England and Accra, and 
the treasury to collect caravan taxes from traders passing through. Following 
Watherston’s address, ‘a telegraph of loyalty to the king’ was to be sent to His 
Excellency, the Governor. At 5 p.m. horse races were to commence. Fifty-seven 
Dagomba, Mamprussi and Gonja chiefs gathered to mark the opening of the new 
headquarters. Amongst the chiefs was Mahama of Savelugu, Dakpema Nsung-Na of 
Tamale, Bukari of Sanerigu, Yisifu of Nanton, Suleman of Choggu, Naena of 
Kanvilli, and Yaya of Kasuli. Watherston addressed the 57 chiefs in the refurbished 
market-place. He told them:  
 … we have no doubt (that Tamale) will very soon form the distributing centre of 
trade in the Northern Territories, … (which) extends to Sokoto, Kano, the Upper 
Niger, Tenkodogo, Morocco, and Tripoli, in fact to everywhere where the Kola 
nut is in demand. To help yourselves you must produce things that traders will 
buy. You have enormous herds of cattle which you keep to look at. There are 
plenty of Kumasi traders ready to buy them, and give you money for them or 
cloths. Your cotton can be improved, and I hope shortly to be able to give out 
cotton seeds to people round here, who will be able to sell their cotton to traders 
in this town. Shea-butter nuts and Shea-butter will all bring you money … Some 
of your youngmen should come here for permanent work and learn carpentering, 
blacksmith and stone-mason, trades in all of which they can earn money in the 
future …  
                                                 




He also noted: 
When European traders come here they will want men who can talk English and 
Dagomba, English and Mamprussi, English and Wala, English and Gonja and 
those youngmen who can do this will get work and good wages at once.
18
 
The contradiction is obvious: despite the liberal agenda in which African peasantry 
was to play a central economic role, by locating the centre in Tamale, which had no 
real political or economic relevance in the socio-economic and socio-political 
structure of the African peasantry, no regard was given to existing African spatial 
systems. Trade to and from Tamale had to be motivated. This contradiction reflects 
the tension created by the transition between the two colonial development 
paradigms outlined above.  
Rethinking the transportation history of the Northern Territories  
To date, the transportation historiography of the Northern Territories has 
concentrated primarily on the Northern Territories railway, or the lack thereof. This 
framework, created by this concentration, brings certain histories into focus whilst 
ignoring others. This subsection is concerned with demarcating a different 
transportation history for the Northern Territories, one that emphasises the presence 
of motorised transportation rather than the absence of a railway. Through the 
adoption of such a transportation history, Tamale’s urban formation becomes a 
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2.1   Proposed station at Tamale, 1907 
 
Source: PRAAD, Accra, ADM 56/1/60 (Report on Sites for New Headquarters, 
Tamale) 
 
Transportation emerged as a central concern for the northern colonial 
administration. In 1908, the BCGA initiated a cotton industry in the Northern 
Territories. They distributed various seed types and built a ginnery at Tamale. 
Attempts were made also to develop a tobacco and shea-butter industry.
19
 Such 
initiatives served as quintessential models of the liberal agenda. In 1911, however, 
citing poor yields and transportation difficulties, the BCGA handed their buildings 
over to colonial government and left the Northern Territories.
20
 Much of the failure 
was put down to a lack of adequate transport facilities, which later projected itself in 
the railway debate.
21
 The new emphasis on northern trade meant that transportation 
was central not only to Tamale’s success as a trade hub and administrative centre but 
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also to the economy of the Northern Territories more generally. Watherston, in his 
address, noted that ‘(a) big road is being built from Kumasi to Tamale, through 
Salaga. And a road to Yapei, on the river, so that goods can be brought up to Tamale 
by cart or by canoe’.
22
 He also urged that ‘…  all chiefs in the country … clear their 
roads to Tamale 12 feet clear of all trees, stumps, roots, so that carts drawn by 
horses can go along them’.
23
 A year later, in 1907, the Annual Report for the 
Northern Territories noted ‘… the future development of these territories depends so 
largely on cheap and reliable transport facilities which at present do not exist’.
24
  
The Northern Territories railway debate  
The construction of a Northern Territories railway had initially been an assumed 
eventuality by the northern colonial administration when they moved to Tamale.
25
 
The initiative, however, soon encountered some resistance, especially from the 
south. In 1912, Governor Thorburn noted that ‘until the colony and Ashanti have 
been thoroughly opened up and developed, the Northern Territories must be content 
to wait their turn and any extensive programme designed to render the area more 
accessible must be suffered to stand over for a long time to come’.
26
 The outbreak of 
WWI put any talk of development on hold as resources were largely directed 
towards the war effort. At the outbreak of the war, it was noted that ‘the object of 
Government in the immediate future must be to reduce not to increase expenditure, 
especially in the Northern Territories’.
27
 The economic slowdown was exacerbated 
in the Northern Territories by the fact that within the wartime political and economic 
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26  Governor J.J. Thorburn, quoted in D. Kimble, A political history of Ghana, 1859-1928. 
Oxford University Press, 1963, 534. 
27  Letter from Colonial Secretary to CCNT, 1914, quoted in Kimble, Political, 534. 
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framework, the Northern Territories were to supply men not only to the Gold Coast 
Regiment but also to the gold mines.
28
  
After the war, the Northern Territories railway debate resumed, and the appointment 
of Guggisberg as governor of the Gold Coast was cause for optimism for pro-
railway elements within the colonial administration. Jeff Grischow puts 
Guggisberg’s pro-northern affinity down to a staunch commitment to the liberal 
agenda that was defining the colonial agenda more broadly. Grischow notes, ‘the 
Northern Territories provided Guggisberg with a clean slate for his experiment in 
development without denationalisation’.
29
 That Guggisberg was committed to the 
liberal agenda is not in question. But Guggisberg also saw in the Northern 
Territories the potential to diversify an economy that he felt was overly-reliant on 
cocoa and gold. In his vision, the Northern Territories railway would be heavily 
loaded with groundnuts, shea-butter, corn, and cattle’.
30
 In Guggisberg’s ten-year 
plan, the north featured prominently, and a budget was set aside for the building of a 
Northern Territories railway.  
Despite Guggisberg’s optimism for the northern economic potential, questions about 
the financial feasibility of a Northern Territories railway continued. It was felt, 
especially by some southern administrators, that the north did not possess the 
economic potential to justify such a railway. Northerners argued that the very reason 
that surpluses were so difficult to generate was because of the difficulties of market 
access, and this was attributed to the lack of a Northern Territories railway. Northern 
Nigeria was pointed to as an example where a railway northwards had initiated a 
successful groundnut industry.
31
 The rebuttal to this argument by those opposed to a 
Northern Territories railway was that on account of the population disparities 
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between the Northern Territories and Northern Nigeria, a comparison between the 
two could not be considered feasible.  
In 1926, when Guggisberg’s term as governor ended, no start had been made on the 
Northern Territories railway. The end of Guggisberg’s governorship also ended 
much of the northern colonial hope for a railway. Three years later in 1929, 
Secretary of State Lord Passfield finally ended the debate surrounding the Northern 
Territories railway. He stated categorically:  
I cannot but agree with you that circumstances … do not justify the construction 
of such a railway which must accordingly be postponed and need no longer be 
regarded as a project to be taken up in the near future.
32
  
The uptake of motorised transportation  
The only other modern transport variation on the railway was motorised 
transportation. In 1920 the Great North Road, which linked Tamale to Kumasi, was 
completed, and for the first time, motorised transportation was introduced to the 
Northern Territories. The potential offered by motorised transportation was revered 
within colonial circles. It allowed officers to trek through their jurisdictions without 
prejudice to office duties. The Annual General Report for 1929-30 noted that 
colonial administrators, 
 … can now visit various places and the tours, which usually occupied weeks are 
now only a matter of days. A tour taking ten days with carriers, can now be done 
easily in a day. This leaves Political Officers more time to attend to their office 




As a result, the northern colonial administration was certainly gratified when 
Guggisberg entered Tamale in a motorcar in April 1920. Not only did the 
introduction of motorised transport assist directly with administration within the 
Northern Territories, it also greatly increased the convenience of the transportation 
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of stores to and from Kumasi, transportation which had been a perennial problem for 
the northern administration. In lieu of the fact that the road would not be completed 
in the foreseeable future, a new system of transportation was employed to get 
government stores to Tamale: goods were taken by lorry from Kumasi to Ejura (one 
hundred kilometres from Kumasi), where the road stopped; from Ejura to Yeji by 
carrier gangs, where they would be put on canoes and then taken up-river to Tamale 
Port (Yapei); and from Tamale Port they would once again be taken by carrier gangs 
to Tamale.
34
 Stores often arrived late, or not at all, and quite frequently they had 
been ruined by water while being taken up-river from Yeji to Tamale. The Chief 
Commissioner of the Northern Territories complained in 1913:  
I regret to say that the new system of transport has worked so far, most 
unsatisfactorily. An unprecedented amount of looting of loads … many losses 
were caused by breakages, and by water which permeated the contents of boxes 
placed in leaky canoes that transport them from Yeji to Tamale Port. The 
delivery of stores was in no way expediated, in fact loads very frequently arrived 




Interestingly, in the same year, the Transport Officer at Kumasi wrote of the new 
system, that ‘… no loss of loads by any of the permanent gangs has been reported’ 
and ‘the service is working satisfactorily and is a great saving of time’
36
.  
The introduction of motorised transport also put an end to head-porterage. Prior to 
the introduction of motorised transportation, head-porterage had been widely 
employed in order to get stores from the south to the north. Head-porterage was 
considered expensive and inefficient in terms of the opportunity cost of labour. The 
Northern Territories could not, it was generally agreed, develop if it had to rely on 
head-loading as its economic motor. Per ton-mile, head porterage had been shown to 
be more expensive than both motorised transportation and railway. Although the 
colonial arguments against head-porterage were primarily economic, it was also 
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recognised as a brutal means of transportation. Governor Guggisberg described it as 
‘… an injurious form of occupation’.
37 
In 1908, the report for the Transport 
Department noted:  
With constant walking for a twelve-month averaging 400 miles a month … the 
majority (of carriers) had their soles almost completely worn through, to say 




Apart from being injurious, colonial administrators also regarded head-porterage as 
primarily slow and inefficient. 
Motorised transportation thus provided a number of new advantages: Colonial stores 
moved easily between the coast and Tamale, officers could be much better 
acquainted with their respective jurisdictions, and it put an end to head-porterage, 
which was slow and expensive, but also regarded as inhumane. But the lorry was not 
considered a direct economic development tool. In that respect, the lorry was not 
seen by colonial administrators to have been an adequate substitute for the railway. 
In 1924, in his address to the legislative assembly, Governor Guggisberg echoed 
mainstream colonial thinking when he stated: 
Motor transport is not a paying proposition, it certainly seems that railway is the 
only solution … on long haul trunk roads … they (lorries) are not a practical 
proposition … It is obvious that motor lorries can only be regarded as temporary 
and inadequate measures in meeting the general demands for trade in this 
country’. With more railways we shall be safe for all time; without them our 
future is not only imperilled, it is doomed.
39
  
Two years later, in 1926, W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (1922-29), made a tour of West Africa and noted in a report: 
The Northern Territories may be suitable for the cultivation of groundnuts and 
American cotton. The bulk of the area is free of tsetse fly. The meat supply of 
the Gold Coast Colony is obtained from the Northern Territories and French 
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Ormsby-Gore prioritised the Northern Territories railway, calling its non-existence 
‘… the chief problem before the Gold Coast railway department …’
41
 He noted 
regretfully that ‘… the greater part of the territories is outside the economic radius of 
the railway’.
42
 Ormsby-Gore stated in conclusion:  
The Gold Coast cannot be said to have fully developed until the railway to the 
Northern Territories has been constructed. That it is the duty of the Government 
to construct such a railway … I think, is clear.
43
  
In colonial circles it was felt that in order to unlock economic potential, a railway 
was a prerequisite. In the context of this pervasive sentiment, the fact that the 
Northern Territories railway was never built was thought, in the vision of the 
colonial administration, to spell the end of any ambition to create a northern 
economy. Thus, the outcome of the Northern Territories railway debate has not only 
informed much of the transportation history of the Northern Territories, it has also, 
through themes aligned to the underdevelopment topos, shaped the Northern 
Territories historiography more generally. By implication, a different emphasis 
within the transportation history of the Northern Territories radically affects the 
historiography of the Northern Territories. Furthermore, there is more than enough 
evidence that suggests that an alternative transportation history exists. During the 
years of the railway debate, in which motorised transportation was routinely 
overlooked as a (economically) feasible mode of transportation, the number of 
lorries that crossed the Yeji ferry rose from zero in 1919 to over 3,000 in 1926,
44
 of 
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which over 1,400 had trailers.
45
 Since, by definition, a northern transportation 
history focussing on the availability of motorised transportation – instead of the 
absence of a railway – has at its centre the Great North Road between Tamale and 
Kumasi, such a revised history brings Tamale firmly into the centre of northern 
historiography. In 1907, Tamale was a village of 1,435 people.
46
 By 1921 Tamale 
had a little under than 4,000 residents
47
, not significantly larger than Savelugu, 
Kumbungu and Salaga.
48
 In 1931, eleven years after the completion of the Great 
North Road, Tamale’s population had increased more than three-fold, to almost 
13,000
49
 residents, making it by a considerable margin the largest settlement in the 
Northern Territories.  
The Great North Road and its implications for Tamale  
The Great North Road was the first motorable road to enter the Northern Territories. 
Governor Guggisberg ceremoniously drove into Tamale in April 1920, followed by 
five lorries carrying his stores. Largely outside of the colonial purview, the impact 
on north-south trade was almost immediate, as also was its impact on Tamale’s own 
internal economy and demographic growth. But the trade which drove Tamale’s 
demographic growth seemed to be, like Tamale itself, ill-fitting within the liberal 
colonial development programme. The single owner-driver model which emerged 
was juxtaposed to colonial policy in that the model, firstly, created a private 
accumulation of wealth which was seen to be counterproductive in the attempts to 
consolidate African peasant structures, and secondly, it was difficult, beyond ferry 
dues, to derive any financial benefits from it. Furthermore, in the absence of the 
railway, European merchant capital was impossible to entice to the north. As a 
result, both the trade increases that emerged as a result of the introduction of 
motorised transportation, as well as the demographic growth it induced in Tamale, 
carried within colonial circles an illegitimate undertone. Such developments served 
as a reminder that, 
                                                 
45  PRAAD, Accra, ADM 56/1/310 (Yeji Trade Statistics). 
46  Staniland, Lions, 1. 
47  Population census of the Gold Coast and its protectorates for the year 1921. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Population census of the Gold Coast and its protectorates, for the year 1931. 
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What Europeans encountered in the colonies was not an open terrain for 
economic domination, but people capable of circumventing and undermining the 




The Great North certainly induced increases in trade volumes. The lorry-driven trade 
went well beyond simply replacing hitherto relied upon head-porterage. The chart 
below represents the volume of head-loaded goods against the volume of lorry cargo 
for the period 1925-30.
51
 The increase in absolute trade volumes implies also that 
the northern farmers responded to demands for agricultural goods in the south by 
producing surpluses, a point of contention throughout this period, mostly expressed 
in terms of the debate about whether to build a Northern Territories railway.
52
  
2.2. Total Lorry Loads vs. Total Head Loads, 1925-1930 
 
                                                 
50  Cooper, F. & A. L. Stoler, Tensions of empire: Colonial cultures in a Bourgeois world. 
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51  All data is taken from records taken at the Ferry in Yeji. Although each station kept its 
own trade data, they were notoriously inaccurate as traders who travelled at night were 
not required to register their goods. Furthermore, the crossing at Yeji was the gateway to 
the Northern Territories. 
52  In the debate whether or not a Northern Territories railway was to be built, pro-railway 
lobbyists argued that a lack of transportation (access to markets) created disincentives for 
the production of surpluses. Anti-railway lobbyists argued the opposite and suggested 






The increases in trade were seen across the spectrum, in both northbound and 
southbound directions. The following graphs illustrate the trend in a variety of 
northbound and southbound goods during the period 1925-30. Groundnuts, fowls, 
and corn represent southbound goods (Figures 2.2-3), and beer, European salt, and 
flour represent northbound goods (Figures 2.5-6). In all instances, trade peaked 
around the end of the decade.  
2.3. Ground Nuts (Bags) Crossing Yeji by Lorry, 1925-1931 
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2.4. Corn (Bundles) Crossinge Yeji by Lorry, 1925-1931 
 
 











2.6. Beer (Cases) Crossing Yeji by Lorry, 1925-1931 
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2.8. Flour (Barrels) Crossing Yeji by Lorry, 1925-1931 
 
The increases in trade as a result of the completion of the Great North Road in 1920 
effected significant change in Tamale’s local economy. In 1910 the stores and shops 
in Tamale, built by Watherston, failed to cover their costs.
53
 In contrast, in 1929 it 
was noted: 
There is also a good sale for petrol, oil and tyres among lorry drivers which ply 
to and fro from Tamale … many small stores are being opened, and … traders, 




The economic activity being generated in Tamale as a result of the uptake of 
motorised transportation also drove demographic growth in Tamale. The population 
by 1931 was a little under 13,000. Of these, 1,286 were listed as traders, 866 as 
market traders, and a further 385 as hawkers.
55
 Thus, over 2,500 of Tamale’s 13,000 
residents were traders. Ten years previously, very few of Tamale’s residents were 
not farmers.
56
 Even the much-revered European traders came to Tamale. In the early 
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1930s, the United Trading Company (UTC) opened a trading store, as also did a 
Syrian trader, Ziady.
57
 A 1932 map of Tamale shows two garages. Tamale’s 
demographic growth during this period was remarkable, even in terms of other 
urban centres in the Gold Coast. The chart below compares Tamale’s population 
growth between censuses to Accra, Kumasi, and Sekondi. During the decade 1921-
31, Tamale’s demographic growth was by far the highest relative to other urban 
centres in the Gold Coast and its Protectorates.  
2.8. Growth rates between censuses, Gold Coast cities, 1911-1948 
 
Source: Based on data from Census Reports of the Gold Coast, 1911, 1921, 1931 
and 1948 
 
By the end of the 1920s, the Annual Report stated that ‘(p)eople are asking for roads 
to be made, and lorries are to been seen everywhere, loaded with trade and 
passengers’.
58
 But the majority of the trade increases southwards came largely in the 
form of food staples, servicing the non-European demands in the south. Increases in 
the trade of good such as fowls, corn, groundnuts, and yams were neither centralised 
nor seen as an integral part of the larger colonial project. The result was, despite 
                                                 
57  Before 1924, the area which comprises Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria was known as 
Syria. The Syrians referred to were in fact Lebanese. See E.K. Akyeampong, ‘Race, 
identity and citizenship in Black Africa: The case of the Lebanese in Ghana’, Journal of 
International African Institute, 76: 3(2006), 297-323. 
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economic progression, that the ramifications of the trade increases were not regarded 
as denoting northern development. Tamale formed a part of the increasingly 
negative discourse that defined the northern economy. One official complained: 
‘Tamale itself has grown enormously in the last few years … and it is still increasing 
… most of the increase in population are non-productive and are chiefly petty 
traders relying on the native population for their food’.
59
 Tamale, as an urban site, 
was little more than a by-product of what the colonial administration regarded as 
progress, an unfortunate and unavoidable manifestation of colonial administration.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Tamale, as a colonial creation, straddled two 
development paradigms: one, set forward by Joseph Chamberlain, advocated for 
European capital and direct taxation at the expense of African social structures; the 
other, the liberal agenda which replaced Chamberlain’s vision of colonial 
development advocated for the consolidation of the African peasantry and 
connecting, through European traders, to the global market. That Tamale held no 
specific political or economic relevance within the existing African socio-political 
and socio-economic structures which the colonial economy was attempting to coerce 
appears to align with Chamberlain’s vision. What came afterwards was indeed a 
focus on the African peasantry. That Tamale’s founding straddled these two 
development paradigms had the affect of making it in all respects an uncomfortable 
fit within the increasingly liberal programme. The more ‘successful’ colonialism 
was in the Northern Territories, the more of a ‘by-product’ Tamale became. This 
forms the basis of discussion in the following chapter. 
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Tamale and the Northern Territories: 
Contrasting histories of demographic 
change 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has situated Tamale’s founding within a regional framing. This 
chapter continues that discussion. But the chapter also begins to reach into Tamale 
itself, revealing the changing demographic and economic configurations arising out 
of the uptake of motorised transportation after 1920. This chapter presents three 
interrelated arguments. The first is that during the decade after the introduction of 
motorised transportation, Tamale’s demographic growth was negatively correlated 
to that of the Northern Territories generally. In short, while Tamale’s demographic 
growth was a positive function of increased mobility arising out of the introduction 
of motorised transportation after 1920, the population growth rate of Northern 
Territories declined during this period. As a result, as the colonial and post-colonial 
historiography of the Northern Territories is dominated by themes aligned to 
northern out-migration, and Tamale’s demographic mechanisms worked against that 
of the north more generally, Tamale is not visible within this dominant discourse.
1
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The second argument presented in this chapter relates strongly to the first: Tamale’s 
economic change was driven by ex-servicemen returning from WWI and migrants 
moving between the north and cocoa farms in the south. Note that the emphasis on 
economic change as distinct from demographic change is purposeful. Indeed, the 
third argument suggests that the economic reconfigurations induced by non-
Dagomba, ex-servicemen and cocoa migrants was far more significant than their 
direct contribution to Tamale’s demographic growth. The challenge in 
understanding change in Tamale during the period after WWI is separating 
economic and demographic change. That sources which relate to demographic 
change, such as census reports, are much more accessible than sources which relate 
to specific economic changes taking place within Tamale’s local economic 
structures, can be misleading. In 1907, when Tamale was founded, in all likelihood 
Tamale’s 1,435 residents were close to 100 per cent Dagomba. In 1960, when 
Tamale’s population had grown to over 48,000, over 75 per cent were Dagombas. 
Despite the relatively small percentage change in Tamale’s ethnic composition, a 
demographic analysis alone betrays a number of economic realities – notably, that 
local economic innovation was largely driven by a relatively small group of non-
Dagombas in Tamale (primarily ex-servicemen and migrants to cocoa farms).  
From revenue to labour 
The pacification drives in the Northern Territories had put pressure on northern 
revenue, and in the years following 1906, the northern colonial administration 
looked for ways to boost northern revenue.
2
 The cotton, shea-butter, and tobacco 
initiatives mentioned in the previous chapter were outcomes of the search for 
northern revenue. Within the colonial administration, the failure of each of these 
initiatives served to worsen the colonial perception of the north’s prospects. Prior to 
1908, a caravan tax on trade passing through the Northern Territories served as the 
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primary source of revenue for the Northern Territories. In 1908, however, with 
Accra concerned that on account of the caravan tax, traders where redirecting their 
trade through French and German territories, west and east of the Gold Coast, 
respectively, the caravan tax was abolished. The northern revenue fell from an 
average of £13,800 for the period 1904-08 to £2,525 for the period 1909-13.
3
 In 
1910, Chief Commissioner Arthur Festing wrote that ‘one must be possessed of 
great optimism to be able to throw out hopes of much export trade from the 
Northern Territories’.
4
 In the years that followed, this sentiment was consolidated, 
especially within colonial circles in the south. It was a sentiment that more or less 
dominated northern colonial economic thinking for the remainder of the colonial 
period.  
Gold mines, cocoa farms, and WWI  
Before discussing the drivers of demographic and economic change in Tamale, a 
number of points regarding labour migration need to be clarified. There is a 
distinction to be made between labour migration to the gold mines and labour 
migration to the cocoa farms. The recruitment process for the former was centralised 
and highly coercive – while for the latter, to cocoa farms, it was significantly more 
voluntary: labourers came down to cocoa farms in ones and twos. To date, the 
majority of the work on labour migration during the colonial period has focussed on 
labour for the gold mines. But the numbers of men who went to the gold mines is far 
less than that which went to work on cocoa farms. This is in line with the argument 
presented by Inez Sutton. She notes: 
 … although officials emphasized the role of the north as a labour reserve, the 
drain of labour itself was itself not a significant a factor in the northern economy 
as is sometimes implied. Rather, the vision of the north as a supplier of labour 
conditioned colonial investment, or lack of it, in northern agriculture, especially 
infrastructure, so that little was done to create alternatives to labour migration 
when cash was demanded.
5
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Sutton concludes that the north was not ‘drained of its surplus (here, in terms of 
labour) … Northern agriculture changed little during the colonial period, and did not 
on the whole deteriorate’.
6
 Sutton of course is not disputing that a large number of 
men went southwards in search of remunerative opportunities, but that the affect of 
this migration on northern agriculture was not as destructive as previous authors 
have suggested. Furthermore, the northern colonial disillusionment with the labour 
initiative that emerged from about 1915 arose out of – not the supply labour itself – 
but the frustration of the implications for colonial capital of being identified as an 
economy that supplied labour. Certainly, when CCNT Watherston first agreed to 
supply labour to gold mines in 1905, it was not the intention that labour alone would 
define the role of the Northern Territories. Sutton’s observations are economic in 
focus. The recruitment of labour, however, had a number of important socio-
political implications. Notably, recruiting labour for gold mines, because it was so 
coercive, as was the case with soldiers between 1914 and 1918, affected 
relationships between chiefs (especially ‘whiteman’s’ chiefs) and their subjects. 
Thus, to say that labour migration to the mines was not significant in terms of 
northern agriculture is not to suggest it had no impact at all.  
Tamale and labour migration to gold mines 
In August 1905, CCNT Watherston received a request from Tarkwa mine managers 
for labourers.
7
 Given that certain guarantees were met, the first request was met with 
enthusiasm: large parts of the Northern Territories, especially in the far north 
adjacent to the French and German borders, were densely populated and, if carefully 
controlled, northern men could head southwards without any sacrifice to the colonial 
aspirations of the Northern Territories, such as the development of agricultural 
surpluses for export. Watherston demanded from the mine managers that men from 
one village should work at the same mine, that they should be able to communicate 
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with their chiefs at all times, and that a political officer should escort them south as 
far as Kumasi. Watherston’s careful approach was borne out of his observation that 
chiefs were reluctant to let men go to the mines, particularly during the farming 
season.
8
 Nevertheless, in September 1906 the DC for Navrongo and the DC for Wa 
were both instructed by the CCNT to send 30 specially selected men south to inspect 
the mines, in the hope that the prospect of regular work and wages would induce 
increasingly large numbers of men to seek employment in the mining districts. The 
men arrived in Tarkwa in December 1906 and were reported to have enjoyed their 
trip. The reaction by all parties to the visit was, in fact, generally positive. A year 
later in 1907, for the first time, 271 northern men from Bawku were recruited for the 
mines in Tarkwa.
9
 The mines, however, were not the only sector desirous of 
northern labour. Three to four hundred labourers were requested to work on an 
extension of the railway from Tarkwa to Prestea,
10
 and an additional three hundred 
men were required to construct the new Accra-Kumasi line.
11
 Mine managers 
complained that the railway was poaching mine labour and felt obliged to ask for 
1,000 labourers.
12
 Despite increasing calls from the mines for more labour, by mid-
1908 a definite labour shortage was emerging in the Gold Coast. 
Between 1905 and 1909, the initiative to recruit labour for the mines was generally 
unsatisfactory in that it failed to remedy labour supply problems in the mines.
13
 
Recruitment was complicated and politicised, often carried out through sceptical or 
self-interested chiefs. Furthermore, where labourers found themselves mistreated by 
mine managers or taken advantage of by southerners, they refused to go, or did so 
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 Many labourers were also reluctant to do underground work owing to 
the adverse working conditions.
15
 The increasing number of men who ‘deserted’ was 
evidence that northern men were not particularly inclined to work in the mines. In 
June 1909, 540 labour recruits left Gambaga, 200 of whom deserted at Tamale, and 
a further 82 disappeared on the way to Tarkwa.
16
 In 1910, the ‘Northern Territories 
Labour Experiment’ was abandoned.  
A year later, however, the fortune of the gold mines, in terms of labour supply, 
began to change – albeit temporarily. Owing to worsening local conditions in the 
French Territories further north, where both conscription and taxation had been 
implemented, French ‘subjects’ began to cross the border in significant numbers.
17
 
Crisp notes that voluntary labour from the Northern Territories also increased during 
this period, despite the reluctance of previous years. In 1917 migrant workers 
accounted for 47 per cent of the mining industry’s 19,000 workers and over 64 per 
cent of the 8,600 underground workers, an increase of over 20 per cent since 1911.
18
  
Tamale and labour migration to cocoa farms  
The boom in mining labour ended abruptly in 1918. In that year the Spanish 
influenza epidemic broke out. It is estimated to have killed 60,000 people in the 
Gold Coast, including 28,000 in the Northern Territories,
19
 although Tomkins put 
the number at 80,000-100,000.
20
 Not only did this reduce the supply of able-bodied 
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men who potentially could migrate from the north, but many mine workers were 
also killed by the epidemic.
21
 In 1920, among other measures, the administration 
placed a guard on the route between Navrongo and Zuarungu and banned infected 
persons from travelling to Tamale.
22
 The end of the war also marked the end of 
conscription in French territory, and the stream of French labour, although not 
drying up, diminished. Furthermore, in 1919 the newly appointed Governor of the 
Gold Coast, Frederick Guggisberg, announced his ‘Ten-Year Development Plan’, in 
which he proposed several large infrastructural projects, including the deepwater 
harbour at Takoradi. Guggisberg estimated that in order to achieve his goals he 
would require the employment of a further 27,000 labourers, reducing the amount of 
labour available for the mines. But perhaps the biggest threat to mining labour 
during the 1920s came from the cocoa sector. In the 1920s the production of cocoa 
soared, inducing large numbers men to head south to work on cocoa farms. The 
cocoa sector was generally preferred as work was better paid and the conditions 
were far more favourable than those of the mines. During the 1920s, the mining 
companies were effectively squeezed out of the market for labour by cocoa and 
government projects. By the mid-1920s, the government had stopped sending men 
to the mines. In 1922, 3,079 labourers went to work in the gold mines, and in 1923, 
no labour at all was sent southwards. By the close of the 1920s, owing largely to 
labour shortages, ‘… many gold mines had either relapsed into a moribund 
condition or had disappeared altogether’.
23
  
Between 1921 and 1930 several attempts were made to increase the amount of 
labour going to mines. But such attempts became increasingly coercive. On 
receiving a request for mining labour, the DC in Bole wrote, ‘…  if I am ordered to 
send men I can do so of course – but it will be forced labour’.
24
 The problem of 
labourers ‘deserting’ increased during this period, another indication that labour was 
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not as voluntary as the government and the mines had hoped. In November 1922, 48 
of the 90 recruits from Savelugu deserted, and in March 1923, 2,524 men were sent 
to the mines, of which 483 deserted prior to reaching the south.
25
  
During the period 1920-30, the cocoa industry emerged as the major destination of 
northern labour. In 1927-28, shortly before the onset of the Great Depression, the 
cocoa output of the Gold Coast peaked (Figure 3.1).  
3.1. Total value of gold vs total value of cocoa, 1895-1939 
 
Source: Colonialism and underdevelopment in Ghana, R.E. Howard 
Figure 3.1 above presents the total value of cocoa output and the total value of gold 
output for the period 1895-1939. The darker-shaded area represents the period 1920-
34. Although the production of gold fell during this period, the booming cocoa 
industry went well beyond simply attracting reluctant mining labour. Thus, despite 
the mines’ problem in securing northern labour, during the 1920s the volume of 
casual-labour migration rose steadily. The volume of labour heading southwards 
corresponded with the increase in cocoa output. Although the available data is not 
particularly accurate in terms of casual-labour migration, the 1922-3 Northern 
Territories Annual Report records 16,816 men headed south.
26
 That of 1924-5 states 
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that 33,111 men went south in the year.
27
 The impact on the demographic of the 
Northern Territories of out-migration has been illustrated by Kees Van der Geest. 
Van der Geest has employed the population growth rate over time of the Northern 
Territories, coupled with ‘out-migration’ statistics from 1931, to make some general 
observations about the demographic details of labour migration (Figure 3.2).
28
 
3.2. Annual Population Growth by Region, 1911-2000 
 
Source: Van der Geest, K., ‘North-South Migration in Ghana: What Role for the 
Environment’, 2008. Inter-censal population growth (1911-2000). The figure is 
based on population figures from Engman (1983) and Ghana Statistical Service 
(2005). Census years: 1911, 1921, 1931, 1960, 1970, 1984 and 2000. Figures for 
1948 are excluded. 
The chart above presents the population growth rates over the period 1911-2000 of 
the three territories: The Colony, Ashanti, and the Northern Territories. The darker-
shaded area represents the period 1921-31. The steep, negative gradient of this 
period indicates a sharp falling off of the Northern Territories’ growth rate, whilst 
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during the same period, the growth rate of both the Colony and Ashanti are 
relatively flat or decrease at a much lower rate than is the case for the Northern 
Territories. Van der Geest comments on the finding: ‘From the figure, one can read 




It is logical that the period in which cocoa production boomed coincided with a 
period of intense out-migration from the Northern Territories. However, in stark 
contrast to this trend, the population of Tamale grew at an unprecedented rate during 
the 1920s. The chart below shows the population growth of Tamale for the period 
1907-31 (Figure 3.3).  
3.3. Tamale, Population growth rate, 1907-1948 
 
Source: Based on data from census reports of the Gold Coast: 1911, 1921, 1931, and 
1948 
The darker-shaded area shows the period 1921-31. Tamale’s population more than 
tripled during this period from 3,901 to almost 13,000. If we compare the ‘darker-
shaded’ areas (1920s) for the three graphs above, we may conclude that the greater 
the cocoa production, the greater the fall in population growth rate of the Northern 
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Territories, and the more rapid the level of urbanisation in Tamale. In short, 
Tamale’s demographic is a function of north-south mobility. The completion of the 
Great North Road monopolised the north-south trade route through Tamale. Thus, 
whereas before the completion of the Great North Road migrants may have taken 
any number of routes southwards and northwards, after 1920 migrants funnelled 
through Tamale to the south. However, whilst the introduction of motorised 
transportation explains a significant part of the increase in mobility, it does not 
explain all of it. As has been explained above, the cocoa boom during the 1920s is 
the first addition in explaining the increase in mobility. The second important 
addition is the conclusion of WWI and the discharge of soldiers. This is the subject 
of the following section.  
The impact of ex-servicemen during the aftermath of WWI 
In 1914, the Northern Territories became directly involved in the WWI when an 
offensive was launched to seize control of German Togoland. In the years that 
followed, as the war escalated, the Northern Territories would play an increasingly 
important role, largely in the supply of soldiers. According to Thomas, a total of 
9,890 Gold Coast soldiers (differentiated here from carriers and drivers) were used 
during the war, of which 5,608 were recruited during the period 1914-18. Of the 
5,608 men recruited during the period 1914-18, 3,879 or 69 per cent were recruited 
in the Northern Territories, an overwhelming regional majority when compared with 
the 17 per cent recruited in the Colony, 12 per cent in Ashanti and 2 per cent in 









3.4. Number of recruits by region, 1914-1918. 
 
Source: From Data in Thomas, ‘Military Recruitment in the Gold Coast during the 
First World War’, in Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, Vol. 15, Cahier 57, 1975, pp 57-
83 
In reality, the number of northern men employed in the Gold Coast Regiment during 
the war is likely to have been even higher. Governor Hugh Clifford stated in 1918 
that ‘(t)he Northern Territories has rendered an even more important service to the 
Gold Coast by providing, by voluntary enlistment, ninety per cent of the rank and 
file of the Regiment which bears this Colony’s name’ (emphasis mine).
30
 Many men 
recruited in Ashanti were known to be northerners who had migrated to Ashanti 
prior to the outbreak of the war in 1914. There were examples of some northerners 
who ‘… were paid by the Ashanti Chiefs sums ranging from ₤5 to ₤25 to induce 
them to join the Gold Coast Regiment in their (the Chiefs’) names.’
31
  
Roger Thomas has illustrated in an excellent article how soldiers were recruited in 
the Northern Territories. He argues that although forced recruitment is a 
phenomenon largely attributed to French colonial administrations, in the Northern 
Territories recruitment policies were also highly coercive. The high rates of 
                                                 
30  PRO, Kew, CO 98/30, (Annual Report for the Northern Territories, 1918), ‘Governor 
Clifford’. 
31  PRO, Kew, CO 98/30, (Annual Report for the Northern Territories, 1918). 
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desertion amongst recruits en route to the training centre at Tamale is an indication 
that the ‘voluntary’ nature of British recruitment was perhaps not so ‘voluntary’ at 
all. In October 1915, the Acting Chief Commissioner wrote: ‘it is difficult to 
understand why if recruits were desirous of enlisting so many should have bolted 
and I cannot help thinking that the terms of enlistment was (sic) not understood by 
the recruits.’
32
 Recruitment was carried out through the chiefs. The effect was in 
many places a breakdown of an already tenuous relationship between chiefs and 
their subjects. Thomas lists a number of examples, including in Bole and in Bongo.
33
  
Despite a military training base at Tamale, for Tamale the end of WWI was perhaps 
more significant than its commencement. In 1918, after the conclusion of the war, a 
relatively large number of soldiers were demobilised. It was noted in the Annual 
Report for 1918 that on  
‘… the 1
st
 January 1918 there were 429 rank and file stationed at Tamale. 1,595 
recruits were enlisted during the year … The signing of the Armistice in 
November was followed by instructions to discharge all recruits who had 
enlisted for the period of the War … ’
34
  
Although no direct data is available for the resettlement patterns of ex-servicemen, 
the colonial administration in Tamale frequently referred to ex-servicemen. In the 
Annual Report of the Northern Territories for 1918, ex-servicemen were referred to 
as a ‘… large body of high-spirited young men … who possessed more money than 
they knew what to do with’.
35
 There are also other indications that suggest that 
soldiers came to settle in Tamale after being discharged and that they had a 
significant impact on Tamale’s local economy. 
The first indication is obtained through a comparison between the ethnic breakdown 
of enlisted men and the ethnic breakdown of non-Dagomba leaseholders. The 
                                                 
32  Acting CCNT Mountray-Read, quoted. In: Thomas, R., ‘Military recruitment in the Gold 
Coast during the First World War’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 15: 57(1975), 57-83. 
33  Thomas, R., ‘Military recruitment in the Gold Coast during the First World War’ Cahiers 
d’Etudes Africaines, 15: 57(1975), 62. 
34  PRO, Kew, CO 98/30, (Annual Report for the Northern Territories for the Year, 1918). 




recruitment of men for WWI in the Northern Territories was not simply random.
36
 
Significantly in this respect, the colonial administration relied on a distinction 
between ‘martial’ and ‘non-martial’ peoples. Whether a people were regarded as 
‘martial’ or ‘non-martial’ was often based on little more than historical coincidence, 
but to colonial administrators these types of distinction were real and informed 
policy. Hausas, for instance, were considered to be a particularly ‘martial’ people. 
This sentiment was born first due to the fact that in the early 1860s in present-day 
Nigeria, runaway slaves were recruited into a local constabulary. Interestingly, not 
all of these men were Hausa, but Hausa was adopted as the lingua franca. Hausa 
troops become known as Glover’s Forty Thieves and in 1872 were added to the 
garrison of the Gold Coast and employed successfully in the Anglo-Ashanti war in 
1874, consolidating the imagination of the Hausa as being a particularly ‘martial’ 
race. In 1916, General J. C. Smuts, Commander in Chief in East Africa, for instance, 
requested 4,000 Hausa carriers to join the Nigerian Regiment. The Colonial Office 
responded to Smuts stating that the Hausa were a ‘combative race’ and could not be 
spared as carriers, which instead should come from ‘non-combative’ peoples such as 
the Mende and Temne of Sierra Leone.
37
 A correspondent writing to the London 
Times described Hausas as ‘all pure blooded negroes, and, as a rule … fine, tall, and 
soldierly … they walk with a good deal of swagger.’
38
 The high incidence of Mossi 
men enlisted in the Northern Territories for the Gold Coast Regiment had its own 
incidental history. In 1898 Major Morris, an early pioneer of the ‘Northern 
Hinterland’, began recruiting Mossi into a cavalry corps known as the ‘Moshie 
Horse’. These men were used in expeditions against the Tallensi and the Dagomba. 
Through these campaigns the Mossi gained a reputation as excellent fighters and 
horsemen. Major Morris wrote that ‘… without their (Mossi men) most valuable 
assistance these expeditions could not have been brought to so successful an 
                                                 
36  A breakdown of men enlisted by ethnicity does not correspond at all with the relative 
population sizes of each ethnicity, suggesting that there were other, mitigating factors in 
the enlistment process.  
37  Killingray, D., ‘Imagined martial communities: Recruiting for the military and police in 
colonial Ghana, 1860-1960’. In: Lentz, C. & P. Nugent, eds, Ethnicity in Ghana: The 
limits of invention. Macmillan, 2000, 121. 
38  Killingray, D., Imagined Martial, 121. 




 Furthermore, Killingray notes that ‘… coastal and southern peoples were 
regarded by political and military officials as non-martial and often useless even for 
carrier work’.
40
 Thomas explains the high incidence of acephalous groups amongst 
the enlisted men as reflecting the invented nature of the chiefs that came to possess 
power over them. According to Thomas, that the colonial administration had 
installed such chiefs meant that such chiefs were reliant on the colonial 
administration for their legitimacy. In turn, they were far more receptive to the 
coercive recruitment methods of the colonial administration than other chiefs. 
According to Thomas, 64 per cent of recruits came from what are today the upper 
regions of Ghana. ‘This was also the area – apart from Mamprussi proper – where 
chiefs had been imposed by the British upon a basically “acephalous” population’.
41
 
For the reasons given above, Mossi, Dagarti, and Grunshi made up the bulk of 
recruits (11, 16 and 15 per cent, respectively). A number of other acephalous 
peoples, such as the Fra Fra and the Sissalla, also contribute significantly (Figure 
3.5). This is in contrast to the number of Dagomba recruits (only 7 per cent), which 
is rather low considering the large demographic of Dagbon and the fact that the 







                                                 
39  PRAAD, Accra, ADM 56/1/2 (Morris to Secretary of State, Dec. 21st, 1900). 
40  Killingray, D., ‘Beast of burden: British West African carriers in the First World War’. In: 
Canadian Journal of African Studies, 13: 1(1979), 90. 
41  Thomas, R., ‘Military recruitment in the Gold Coast during the First World War’, Cahiers 




3.5. Ethnic breakdown of northern men enlisted, 1914 -1918 (per cent 
of total) 
 
Source: Thomas, R., ‘Military recruitment in the Gold Coast during the First World 
War’. In: Cahiers d'Études Africaines, Vol. 15, Cahier 57 (1975). 
Whilst the chart above shows the ethnic breakdown for men enlisted during the 
period of the 1914-18 war, the chart below shows the ethnic breakdown of non-







                                                 
42  In 1935, for the first time, ‘stranger’ leaseholders in Tamale were broken down by 
ethnicity. Dagombas were not required to pay rent and were thus not included in the 
breakdown, despite being the majority. But the stranger living in Tamale may be more 
interesting than the Dagomba majority in terms of drivers of social and economic change. 
Furthermore, although this list was compiled for the year 1935, the slowdown of the 
economy as a result of the onset of the Great Depression and the corresponding slowdown 
of demographic growth suggest that little changed in terms of leaseholders between 1928 
and 1935. As a result, an ethnic breakdown of leaseholders in 1935 provides at least some 
indication of who was migrating to Tamale during the 1920s. 
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3.6. Ethnic breakdown of non-Dagomba leaseholders, 1935-1944 
 
Source: List of non-Dagomba leaseholders, Tamale Land Allocations, NRG 2/1/3 
The coincidence of the two charts is noteworthy. The Moshi and the Grunshi are 
particularly prominent in both. The Grunshi and the Moshi rank first and third, 
respectively, in terms of the numbers of men who were recruited for military service 
during the period 1914-18, and rank second and
 
first in terms of number of 
leaseholders in Tamale in the period 1935-9. In the 1920s, the Mossi Zongo (Ward 
A) was built in Tamale to house ex-servicemen, next to the transport yard. The Fra 
Fra and the Zabarima also feature fairly prominently in both charts. One notable 
exception is that of the Dagarti. Although the number of Dagarti recruited in 1914-
18 is high, they accounted for only a very small component of Tamale’s population 
in 1935. On the whole, however, there is enough evidence to suggest that ex-
servicemen, after the conclusion of WWI, settled in Tamale. It is not yet clear, 
however, why they settled in Tamale, or why they did not settle in other large towns 
such as Kumasi or Accra.  
The overwhelming majority of the northern men who served during the period 1914-
18 had spent some time at the Tamale military training base. Tamale was thus not 
entirely new to them. Most also returned to the Tamale training base after the war 




Tamale served increasingly as a much more natural place for (northern) ex-
servicemen to settle than Kumasi or Accra. Furthermore, through the recruitment 
methods employed during the war, the relationship between chiefs and their 
subjects, especially in acephalous communities, had broken down. This created a 
hostility towards chiefs, exacerbated by the macho and anti-establishment attitudes 
of young men who had experienced a world largely unknown to their parents and 
grandparents, and later returned home. In the Annual Report for the Northern 
Territories for the year 1918, it was noted that:  
 … in some cases, the chiefs were insulted and informed that they were mere 
‘bush-men’ – if not worse – and their authority flouted. Quarrels also arose 
between the returned recruits and their brothers who had elected to stay at home 
and who were roundly jeered at by the former … 
43
  
Economic versus demographic change  
I noted earlier in the chapter that the direct ethnic sources of demographic and 
economic change in Tamale should be viewed differently. Irvine Gass, DC for 
Tamale in the early 1930s, noted:  
The Dagomba in Tamale … have behind them the power and authority of 
tradition and although constantly subject to the influence of change, tend to 




Although Gass’ observation was a political one, the same was true, if not more so, in 
an economic sense. That is not to say that the Dagomba had no economic function in 
Tamale at all. Many Dagombas worked as petty traders, catering to food demands of 
the new human traffic passing through Tamale. But much of the innovative 
economic change in Tamale, such as the uptake of motorised transportation, was 
driven by non-Dagombas.  
There were a number of reasons for this development. Roger Thomas notes: ‘…  the 
First World War provided (for the first time) an important … introduction to a wider 
                                                 
43  PRO, Kew, CO 98/30, (Annual Report for the Northern Territories for the Year, 1918).  
44  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/2/91 (Dagomba Native Administration) Report by Colonial 
Administrator, Irvine Gass, The traditional authority in urban administration in West 
Africa, 1931. 
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world for thousands of ordinary West Africans’.
45
 Similarly, Killingray asserted that 
‘… the war provided Africans with new technical skills that contributed to the 
economic development of the Gold Coast in the 1920s’.
46
 Furthermore, the Gold 
Coast administration resisted, fairly successfully, demands from the East African 
campaign and the War Office to provide carriers and labour for Inland Water 
Transport Service in Mesopotamia. The Gold Coast administration, however, did 
agree to the recruitment of non-combatant motor transport drivers for the East Africa 
campaign. Between November 1916 and May 1918 about 760 Gold Coast men were 
recruited. The following table, taken from the work of Roger Thomas, breaks down 
the function of recruited men by West African country of origin. Nigeria clearly 
provided the majority of the rank and file of the West African Frontier Force 
(WAFF) and the Carrier Corps.
47
 Sierra Leone provided, especially in terms of the 
total population, a significant number of men to the Carrier Corps. The Gold Coast, 
compared with other West African Anglophone territories, provided relatively few 









                                                 
45  Thomas, R., Military recruitment in the Gold Coast during the First World War’, Cahiers 
d’Etudes Africaine, Vol. 15: 57(1975), 57. 
46  Killingray, ‘Repercussions’, 48. 
47  Ghana probably provided a larger portion of its population to both the WAFF and the 




3.7. Men enlisted per colony by occupation 
 
Source: Killingray, D. ‘Repercussions of World War I’ in the Gold Coast 
As the majority of ex-servicemen and migrants to cocoa farms were non-Dagombas, 
Dagombas profited relatively less from the skill-sets acquired during military 
service. Once the Great North Road was completed in 1920, Tamale became a 
logical location for ex-servicemen to settle because they could employ their newly 
acquired skills there, especially in the form of driving, without being too far from 
home. Today in Tamale, driving is something particularly associated with Moshis.
48
 
This corresponds with the coincidence of having established pre-WWI trade 
networks
49
 and serving as soldiers during WWI (and was supported also by the 
establishment of the Ward A in 1920, which became known as the Moshi Zongo 
after a large number of Moshi ex-servicemen settled there). Furthermore, ‘strangers’ 
– all non-Dagombas – were forced to pay economic rent for their leases in Tamale, 
while Dagombas had to pay only peppercorn rent, which amounted to a symbolic 
gesture, such as a fowl given to the chief if the chief demanded it.
50
 The need to pay 
                                                 
48  Thanks to Ntewusu Agniegye for pointing this out to me.  
49  Schildkrout, E., People of the Zongo: The transformation of ethnic identities in Ghana. 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
50  This is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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rent had the same impact as the introduction of taxation. ‘Strangers’ in Tamale were 
forced to find remunerative opportunities, while the Dagombas could rely on a 
relatively subsistence existence, even in Tamale.  
Accumulation and individualism 
The ex-servicemen and cocoa migrants driving Tamale’s local economy posed an 
ideological and policy dilemma for colonial administration more generally. Jeff 
Grischow notes that ‘(t)he colonial office did not want to produce agrarian 
capitalism through its West African development policy’.
51
 That Grischow refers to 
the agrarian context does not discount its relevance in the urban context. Wealth 
accumulation was seen as undermining efforts to ‘preserve’ African peasant 
structures and systems. This was a crucial component of the liberal development 
approach. In this sense, after 1920, Tamale really began to represent an antithesis to 
development in the Northern Territories more generally. More specifically, the 
gratuities and skill-sets of soldiers, coupled with the economy of motorised 
transportation as it was manifesting itself in Tamale, drove individual accumulation 
of wealth, seen very much as the antithesis of the African peasantry which the 
colonial administration was attempting to create. It was noted in the Annual Report 
for 1929-30:  
Transport is increasing in efficiency and in cheapness, as competition of private 
firms becomes more acute … there are always plenty of lorries ready to take on 
any available work … One private individual … is given most of the 
Government transport to do as he only charges one way, whereas it was usual to 
charge for the return of empty lorries … 
52
 
Migrants returning from the cocoa farms and also from the mines, just like ex-
servicemen, possessed money. The individual accumulation of wealth in Tamale, 
made possible by an increasingly urban economy, served as yet another way in 
which Tamale contradicted the colonial development approach to the Northern 
Territories. Tamale’s socio-economic stratification ran counter to the colonial 
development policy of the Northern Territories that was (increasingly) to consolidate 
                                                 
51  Grischow, Shaping, 149. 




African social structures. This sentiment was pervasive at least until the mid-1930s. 
Referring to Meyer Fortes, one colonial official of the Gold Coast echoed this 
sentiment in 1933. He wrote: 
An anthropologist of unquestionable ability and some repute remarked to the 
writer how regrettable it was that the Talansi (sic) were becoming money 
conscious and generally criticised the efforts that are being made to develop 




In Tamale’s history, the 1920s was a period of profound demographic and economic 
change. This fact has been lost in narratives of labour migration and the Northern 
Territories railway debate. Tamale’s early urban growth was a function primarily of 
migration to cocoa farms and the discharge of soldiers after WWI. In short, 
Tamale’s demographic is a function of north-south mobility. From the completion of 
the Great North Road in 1920, as north-south mobility increased, so too did 
Tamale’s population. This demographic mechanism was negatively correlated to the 
Northern Territories more generally, where increased mobility led to out-migration 
and a decline in population growth rates. Furthermore, this chapter has argued that 
ex-servicemen and cocoa migrants, both possessed of money, also drove significant 
economic changes in Tamale. The transportation sector itself especially presented 
new types of employment, with concomitant socio-political implications, perhaps 
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 PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/3/49 (Annual Report for the Northern Territories, 1933-
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From Dakpema to Gulkpe-Na:  
Introducing indirect rule in  
urban Tamale 
Introduction 
In the years before and after 1930, indirect rule was introduced across much of 
British Africa. On paper, this meant a new emphasis on creating native institutions, 
taking account of the historical dimensions of native affairs. The introduction of 
indirect rule set in motion a movement to resurrect ‘tradition’ across much of 
Anglophone Africa, with the intention of endowing chiefs with a broader range of 
political, judicial, and financial tools in order to regain public legitimacy. The first 
steps of indirect rule were to unearth traditional trajectories and re-establish them 
where such trajectories were felt to have been altered by, amongst other things, the 
European presence. In some instances, traditional trajectories were felt to have been 
only fractionally changed by the European arrival. In such cases, indirect rule aimed 
to consolidate chiefly authority. But in other instances, the traditional political 
system was felt to have been profoundly altered and thus needed to be structurally 




jurisdiction to include both a powerful native tribunal and a native treasury. The 
relationship between chiefs and their subjects was to be guided by these two 
institutions. In exchange, adherence to the traditional laws, recognition of the 
jurisdiction of the native tribunal, and the payment of taxation were motivated by 
the chief’s power to allocate tracts of land. In other words, customary rights in land 
were seen as flowing downward. ‘They were derived from political authority, rather 
than residing in the African peasantry’.
54
  
In line with what was happening across Africa more generally, in 1929 an explicit 
policy of indirect rule was introduced to the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 
including Tamale. This chapter argues that both in Tamale and in the Northern 
Territories more generally, the introduction and implementation of indirect rule was 
rather a damp squib, albeit for somewhat different reasons. In many instances in the 
Northern Territories, the potency of both native tribunals and native treasuries was 
undermined by the colonial administration itself.  
But the failure of indirect rule in Tamale, judged by the criteria of indirect rule itself, 
was spectacular. This chapter is concerned with the reasons for the spectacular 
failure of this indirect rule. The chapter argues that the failure of indirect rule in 
Tamale was the result both of an equally spectacular underestimation on the part of 
the colonial administration of how chiefly legitimacy functioned in an environment 
of rapid economic and demographic change, and of Tamale’s increasingly urban, 
heterogeneous character.  
Indirect rule and its ‘imposition’ in the Northern Territories  
There were essentially two arguments that promoted the introduction of indirect rule 
in British Africa: A financial one, and an ideological one. The financial 
consideration was essentially a response to the onset of the Great Depression in 
1929. The Depression limited the resources available for colonialism, and the policy 
of indirect rule, with its reliance on chiefs and native institutions, addressed the new 
restrictions without having to abandon colonialism altogether. As Christian Lund 
                                                 
54  Chanock, M., ‘Paradigms, policies and property: A review of the customary law of land 
tenure’. In: Mann, K. & R. Roberts, eds, Law in colonial Africa. James Curry, 1991, 64. 
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puts it, the recognition of chiefs as native authorities in turn meant that chiefs could 
act as ‘mediators between government and the population’.
55
 This in turn reduced 
the expense of having a large administration. But although Sir Donald Cameron (the 
co-initiator of indirect rule along with Lugard) ‘acknowledged that the initial 
attraction of indirect rule was administrative and financial expediency, he stressed 
that it represented that “will of the people”, the “natural authority” of chiefs and the 
established customs of the people’.
56
 Ideologically, indirect rule suggested that the 
maturity of African political systems could be achieved through the creation of local 
governments. Devolution would provide for chiefs an education in the proper 
administration of their jurisdictions. As Ladouceur notes, ‘it was hoped that chiefs 
would learn to exercise political authority within a simplified framework of modern 
local government’.
57
 In contrast to direct rule, indirect rule thus meant the 
recognition not only of the institution of chieftaincy but also its historical dimension 
and the rules by which it operated. Native authorities would be presided over by a 
chief, one determined by custom. Each native authority would possess a native court 
and a native treasury. The major source of revenue was to be taxation. The native 
authority would also have the power to distribute land. 
The introduction of indirect rule to the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast led to 
a conflict between northern and southern administrators, with severe consequences 
for the staffing of the northern colonial administration. Wholesale staff changes 
followed the conclusion of the ‘conflict’. Staniland calls this the ‘Battle of 
Watherston Road’.
58
 The ‘Battle of Watherston Road’ was, according to Staniland, a 
short and bitter conflict between long-serving northern colonial officials (he calls 
them the ‘northern interest’) and mostly southern colonial administrators determined 
to introduce fully, indirect rule (he calls them the ‘Indirect Rule Team’). The 
                                                 
55  Lund, C, Local politics and the dynamics of froperty in Africa. Cambridge, 2008.  
56  Spear, T., ‘Neo-traditionalism and the limits of invention in British Colonial Africa’, 
Journal of African History, 44: 1(2003), 8, 
57  Ladouceur, Chiefs, 54. 
58  Watherston Road in Tamale is the road where the political apparatus is concentrated. 
Furthermore, the colonial administrators lived in bungalows along Watherston Road. At 
the western end of the road (the opposite end to the ‘Tamale Township’ side) was the 




striking thing about the tension between the ‘northern interest’ and the ‘Indirect 
Rule Team’, however – in the transition from direct rule to indirect rule in the 
Northern Territories – is that while discussion about the introduction of indirect rule 
was heated and the personnel implications profound, the change in form of 
administration was only incremental. This apparent incongruence is understood only 
if the analysis of the transition to indirect rule and the discussions surrounding the 
transition take account of deteriorating north-south relations over a longer period. 
This subsection argues that the ‘southern’ imposition of indirect rule on the northern 
colonial administration and the disputes that arose within that discussion were the 
result of a deteriorating relationship between the northern colonial administration 
and ‘Accra’, rather than a fundamental and deal-breaking difference of opinion on 
the method of administration.  
In his analysis of the ‘Battle of Watherston Road’, Martin Staniland distinguishes 
between those who supported the introduction of full indirect rule, the ‘Indirect Rule 
Team’, and those did not – the ‘northern interest’. The disagreements about indirect 
rule itself were less polarised than the title ‘Battle of Watherston Road’ suggests. 
Indeed, the northern colonial administration had always been relatively reliant on 
chiefs as instruments of colonial rule, even before the formulation of indirect rule. In 
1898, even before the formal annexation of the Northern Territories, Captain 
Northcott had written:  
 … the agency employed will be that of the native chiefs, and their power will, 
during good behaviour, be uniformly supported, except in matters of their 
relationship with neighbouring chiefs and of offences of a capital nature.
59
  
In 1906, Acting Governor Bryan echoed Northcott’s sentiments, when he wrote of 
the Northern Territories to the Secretary of State: 
The policy of supporting and emphasising the position of the paramount native 
chiefs while, at the same time, making them realise their responsibility, appears 
to me to be the only practicable system of administering this country.
60
  
                                                 
59  Ladouceur, Chiefs, 41. 
60  PRO, Kew, CO98/14 (Letter by Acting Governor Bryan to Secretary of State, 13th July, 
1906). 
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The formulation of indirect rule as ‘ruling through the chiefs’ was thus not 
something which northern colonial officials regarded as radical. During the ‘Battle 
of Watherston Road’, the DC for Eastern Dagomba, W. E. Gilbert, commented:  
 … indirect rule ... has been my policy ever since I have been stationed here, all 
civil cases and all orders concerning the Dagomba country have been sent to the 




That the perceived difference between direct and indirect was not as large as the 
argument surrounding the transition suggests does not mean that there were no 
differences at all between the two systems of administration. The manner in which 
‘ruling through the chiefs’ had been carried out prior to the introduction of indirect 
rule is well illustrated by an entry in the diary of CCNT Armitage. On 15 May 1918 
Armitage recalled a letter he had received from Captain Hobart regarding the 
succession of the Karaga ‘Stool’:
62
 
 … This morning I endeavoured to hold an election but I regret to say that I was 
unsuccessful. All the Chiefs and Headmen stated that they wished the 
appointment to be made direct by the Government ... in the old days the 
claimants to a stool appeared before the big Chiefs, presided over by the King of 
Yendi, and their choice was final. Now-a-days it was their wish that the Chief 
Commissioner should appoint new Chiefs. 
Hobart stressed in his letter to the CCNT that,  
Addressing the Chiefs I told them that it had always been my policy to interfere 
as little as possible with native custom and that I learnt with some regret that 




Under pressure from the chiefs to elect a new Karaga-Na, Hobart obliged, describing 
his decision-making procedure as follows: 
                                                 
61  Staniland, Lions, 80. 
62  ‘Stool’, as it is used here, referred to the seat of chief. It was a term taken from the south, 
especially from Asante, where the golden stool of the Asantehene is sacred. In colonial 
terminology, ‘Stool’ was used as a synonym for chieftaincy in the south and also in the 
north. In the north, however, chiefs sit on ‘skins’ rather than stools. Later on in the 
colonial period, the term ‘skins’ generally replaced the term ‘stools’. Interestingly, the 
department for local lands in Tamale continues to refer to ‘Stool Lands’.   
63  PRAAD, Accra, ADM 56/1/252. (Tamale District Native Affairs), ‘Extract from the 




Of the seven candidates, one was immediately ruled out. I referred to Mahama, 
ex-Chief of Savelugu, who had once held one of the most important 
chieftainships in Dagomba but who lost his head and committed acts that 
brought about his de-stoolment in 1910, and subsequent imprisonment. He could 
never again expect to be appointed a chief under our administration … I 
considered Zibbrim, Chief of Pisigu, and eldest son of the late Chief, to be the 
best man to place on the stool of Karaga. I had watched him for some years and 
had found him to be an energetic and just man, and one whose loyalty to the 
Government was beyond dispute. In electing Zibbrim chief of Karaga, I was not 
only paying a tribute to his father’s memory, but was giving to the people a man 
who would, I was convinced, rule over them wisely and well.
64
 
Finally, Hobart wrote:  
It was extremely gratifying to the P.C. and myself to witness the unanimity with 
which the chiefs accepted my decision … not a single note of protest against it 




But northern colonial administrators struggled to see how the attitudes expressed in 
this type of administration differed from those set out by indirect rule. The DC for 
Tamale, Rutherford, stated that ‘indirect rule is an established fact and has been so 
for years … ’
66
  
The key issue was the extent of chiefly authority and on this point there were 
certainly a number of disagreements. The northern administrators argued for a 
limited amount authority with which chiefs would be endowed. Members of the 
‘northern interest’ cited a lack of education and other ‘northern conditions’, of 
which they felt ‘Accra’ was not aware, as the reasons for curtailing the power of 
chiefs. But these were not more than technicalities, albeit significant ones, and can 
hardly explain the obstinacies displayed by northern colonial administrators. On 16 
December 1929, Governor Thomas announced categorically that ‘indirect’ rule is 
the policy of the government’,
67
 bringing to an end the ‘Battle of Watherston Road’. 
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informal diary of the CCNT Armitage, 15th May, 1918’. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Staniland, Lions, 80. 
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Wholesale changes of northern colonial staff followed, as the northern interest was 
replaced by the ‘Indirect Rule Team’.  
There is important sub-text in the discussions about the introduction of indirect rule 
in the Northern Territories. The ‘northern interest’ comprised men who had served 
long terms as northern officials and, against the backdrop of a desire amongst the 
northern colonial administrators to create a northern raison d’être beyond the supply 
of labour, had developed a degree of hostility towards the ‘southern administration’, 
or ‘Accra’, on account of a series of setbacks. The negative attitude towards the 
north more generally has been dealt with in previous chapters. The sentiment 
contained in the advice in 1898 of Governor Hodgson – ‘I would not at present 
spend upon the Northern Territories … a single penny more than is absolutely 
necessary’
68
 – had not significantly changed in the thirty years since the annexation 
of the Northern Territories in 1900. The abolition of the caravan tax in 1908, 
stripping the Northern Territories of the lion’s share of its revenue, had served as a 
reminder of the general attitude. In 1910 colonial administrators in Tamale 
submitted a request for funds from the colonial treasury for the building of a 
clubhouse in Tamale. To the great dissatisfaction of the northern colonial 
administration, the funds were not granted, a refusal regarded by a number of 
colonial administrators not only as indicative of the negative perception by southern 
administrators of the northern contribution to larger colonial aspirations, but also as 
an underestimation of the brutal conditions under which northern administrators 
were forced to work. The increasingly tiresome debate about the Northern 
Territories railway was running alongside the discussion about the introduction of 
indirect rule. It was, in fact, in the same year that the ‘Battle of Watherston Road’ 
was concluded that the railway project was indefinitely postponed. Such setbacks 
had soured the northern view of ‘Accra’. One official from within the ‘Indirect Rule 
Team’ noted retrospectively that there was  
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... a definite attitude of hostility to the Coast emanating from the N.T.s 
headquarters. Officers were allowed to speak and write openly of ‘Accra’ (the 
name by which all authority was known) in a most contemptuous way.
69
  
The ‘Accra’ view of the northern administration was at least contemptuous. A dim 
view was taken of the feeling that the ‘northern interest’ had become, as a group, 
isolated from the central administration in Accra. Governor Shenton Thomas, who 
replaced Guggisberg in 1926, wrote: 
 … so far as I can ascertain, this Government is completely in the dark as regards 
the native Administration policy in the Northern Territories; there seems to be no 
clear-cut statement of policy; we do not know what is being done or what our 
administration is intended to bring forth.
70
  
Finally, the CCNT after 1930, referring to the few northern administrators who were 
not re-posted after the introduction of indirect rule, noted that ‘the use of this 
administration as a dump for unsuccessful officers is not obsolete’.
71
  
By the time the ‘Battle of Watherston Road’ took place over the transition from 
direct to indirect rule, hostilities between northern and southern administrators had 
soured to such an extent that it is difficult to separate exiting frustrations from the 
discussion about indirect rule itself. Put differently, the ‘Battle of Watherston Road’ 
was as much about existing frustrations as it was about the introduction of indirect 
rule. Furthermore, the manner in which indirect rule would be implemented 
rendered the heated nature of the ‘Battle of Watherston Road’, and the consequences 
thereof, even more nonsensical. Most of criteria outlined by Lugard’s manifesto 
were never realised in the Northern Territories, despite the ambitious intentions. 
This was especially true of Tamale.  
Duncan-Johnstone & Blair  
Changes in the staffing and character of the Northern Territories colonial 
administration followed the ‘Battle of Watherston Road’. In 1929 members of the 
‘Indirect Rule Team’ such as Duncan-Johnstone and Blair replaced long-serving 
members of the Northern Territories’ administration such as Major Walker-Leigh, 
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who was CCNT between 1924 and 1929, but had first served in the north in 1907.
72
 
Before turning to Tamale itself, a brief discussion on prominent personalities 
amongst those who took over the northern colonial administration is illustrative of 
the colonial context in the Northern Territories after the introduction of indirect rule. 
Two men were particularly influential: Duncan-Johnstone and Blair.  
The members of the ‘Indirect Rule Team’ were, generally speaking, more integrated 
into the colonial centre at Accra. They comprised men such as A. C. Duncan-
Johnstone, who became Provincial Commissioner (PC) for the Southern Province 
after the introduction of indirect rule, and Blair, who became DC for Eastern 
Dagomba after 1930. The approach to colonial administration changed rather 
radically with the change of personal. Administrators such as Duncan-Johnston and 
Blair immersed themselves in understanding ‘native affairs’. Blair gained the 
nickname ‘Dagbon-bia’, which translates from Dagbani as ‘son of Dagbon’. He 
spoke Dagbani and was revered for spending days in the field, investigating Dagbon 
history and tradition. Duncan-Johnstone’s career reads as an ode to the British 
Empire, and his approach and attitude towards administration also reads as an ode to 
indirect rule, both its ideological underpinnings and its financial necessity.  
Duncan-Johnston began his career serving with the British Red Cross expedition 
in Turkey in 1912. In 1913 he first arrived in the Gold Coast, assuming the duties in 
the Southern Province, Ashanti. A year later in 1914, he became the DC for 
Sunyani. He served with the British forces in Togoland during WWI and in 1917 
joined the administration of the Northern Territories, serving as DC for Lawra. In 
1922 he was transferred to Akim, again in the Ashanti region, and spent a year in the 
Seychelles arranging the repatriation of the exiled Asantehene, Prempeh. In 1925, 
the year in which he became engaged to a niece of Lady Guggisberg, wife of 
Governor Guggisberg, he served as Acting Chief Commissioner of Ashanti. Thora 
Williamson notes:  
                                                 




The career and reputation of Duncan-Johnstone are said to have advanced 
considerably during the 1920s when he became engaged to a niece of Lady 
Guggisberg, wife of Governor Guggisberg.
73
 
In 1928 he returned to the Northern Territories, serving as PC, and in 1936 he served 
as acting CCNT. On a day in August 1930, he noted in his diary that he spent ‘the 
afternoon and evening on the Arabic manuscript I got from Kpandai. From the dates 
given the chronicle begins about 1693 A.D. or the 1093 … It is full of 
information’.
74
 He felt strongly that administrators had a duty to be very close to 
their subjects, in order to improve the quality of colonial administration. He wrote 
that ‘(t)he first thing I did here was to strafe the District Commissioners for not 
travelling … ’.
75
 He also wrote: ‘It is of paramount importance that they (Political 
Officers) should be in touch with their Chiefs and people and should know every 
inch of their Districts and the characteristics of their villages’.
76
 He deplored the 
‘tendency to discourage’ what he called the ‘personal elements of government’.
77
 He 
noted in his diary: 
Reading a delightful book entitled “The India We Served” by Sir Walter 
Lawrence. He remarks that in British India there is now very little personal touch 
between the people and the British members of the administration ... increasing 
office work, decreasing opportunities for going on tour, the use of motor cars 
which rarely leave the high road and the disuse of languages of the people, all 
combined, are destructive of that touch of nature which leavened and lightened 
the heavy regularity of our rule. We are following a somewhat similar road out 
here, but can we read the writing on the wall? 
78
 
In a similar vein, he wrote in his diary in August 1930:  
There is a good article in Elders Review for July by a former Nigerian resident, 
Hastings, entitled ‘Nigeria Revisited’. He says, head transport is slow and 
expensive and economically unsound and is rightly superseded. But it had one 
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value which was, and still is incalculable and its disuse will be disadvantageous 
to all administrative officers. They used to trek their twenty miles a day along 
bush roads, halting continually to talk with hamlet headmen and even the folk 
who passed them on the track. They would interview all sorts and conditions of 
men while breakfasting by the road side, make notes, notice small things in 
every mile and above all they were moving at the peoples own pace living in an 
atmosphere of calm unhaste. Today, they flash past villages and wayfarers on 
motor cycle … sometimes too impatient to reach camp a hundred miles ahead. 
They have become strangers to the people they are supposed to know. The old 
liaison between them is broken; the old confidence weakened. A night’s camping 
– six or seven of them in a hundred miles – did very much to familiarise both 
with each other. It may be true that far more ground is covered and far more 
often, but nowadays a village gets no more than a whiff of petrol to remind it 
that the District Officer had come and gone.
 79
  
Duncan-Johnstone was not only intensely engaged with ideological and moral 
aspects of indirect rule, he was also intensely engaged with the financial restrictions 
which had been ushered in with indirect rule. He boasted: ‘On my last two trips I 
have travelled without a lorry cramming everything into the car in order to save 
money, uncomfortable but necessary as we are so hard up’,
80
 and juxtaposed this 
with Rutherford, DC for Tamale, a member of the ‘northern interest’. In a June 
entry, he wrote of Rutherford:  
‘The District Commissioner, Tamale (Rutherford), is going on tour today for 
three days, the first time he has left the station for a long time, in fact since the 
beginning of April … I noticed a lorry outside his house this morning … as the 
District Commissioner is only to be away for four days I cannot see why he 
wants a lorry … ’
81
  
He was especially hard on Rutherford, writing, ‘I have to push the District 
Commissioner continually to do something. The trouble is he is lacking in ability 
and initiative … ’
82
 Rutherford was one of the few surviving members of the 
‘northern interest’, having first served in the north in 1924, the same year that 
Walker-Leigh became CCNT. But Rutherford was certainly not the only one. Mr. 
Plange, a new administrator who was on his way to his new post at Navrongo, could 
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not complete the journey as a result of his lorry getting stuck. Duncan-Johnstone 
wrote disapprovingly in his diary:  
Mr Plange presented himself having given up his attempt to get to Navaro. Said 
the lorry could not get along after leaving Wulugu. Apparently he made no 
attempt to get carriers to take him on to Pwalugu but came straight back on the 
lorry … If you want something done in Tamale … you have to do it yourself. 
83
 
In contrast, Duncan-Johnstone noted of Blair, then DC for Yendi: 
I have a high opinion of Blair, an earnest, keen, highly principled young man. 
When he has a gained a little more experience he should grow into a very fine 
type of Political Officer.
84
  
Blair particularly impressed his seniors with the energy with which he engaged with 
his ‘subjects’, their history, and the local customs. Duncan-Johnstone noted 
enthusiastically in his diary: ‘He (Blair) tells me that he has spent three days at 
Gushiegu getting the drummers to drum out the old Dagomba history’.
85
 Duncan-
Johnstone boasted regularly about his own fluency in Hausa, while Blair was fluent 
in Dagomba. Together, Blair and Johnstone embodied the new colonial 
administrator. They were men who prided themselves on getting their hands dirty 
and knowing their ‘subjects’. And certainly, they were indirect-rule men, through 
and through.  
The new northern administration, embodied by men such as Duncan-Johnstone and 
Blair, was thus fiercely dedicated to indirect rule and its introduction and 
implementation. Indirect rule was to be based on the Nigerian system.
86
 
Furthermore, the historical basis for the introduction of indirect rule was based on 
the fieldwork carried out by Rattray for the purposes of writing Tribes of the Ashanti 
Hinterland.
87
 In a car, on the road between Yendi and Tamale, the Governor of the 
Gold Coast asked Duncan-Johnstone, the Commissioner for the Southern Province 
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of the Northern Territories after the introduction of indirect rule, if he had ever 
visited Nigeria:  
... to which I replied in the negative and I thought we ought to see the Northern 
Nigeria Courts, Treasury and native Authority Ordinances before framing our 
own … and he agreed and said the Nigerian were very good and thorough.
88
  
But the dedication of Duncan-Johnstone and Blair to understanding native customs 
did not equate directly to a significant devolution of power to chiefs, as indirect rule 
demanded. There were without question a number of changes in the new approach to 
colonial administration. Clear attempts were made to identify the traditional domain, 
and every attempt was made not to intervene in matters which were regarded as 
being within that domain. In one instance, a young woman was seen ‘hobbling 
through Tamale with her feet in leg irons’.
89
 After an enquiry, it turned out that the 
woman was a young wife of the Savelugu Chief (Yo Na). She had eloped from 
Savelugu to the house of a Steward Boy in Tamale. The Steward Boy, fearing 
punishment for the seduction of the wife of a chief,
90
 had sent her back to Savelugu, 
where the Yo Na, displeased with her actions, beat her and fettered her legs. At 
midnight she had once again escaped from the Yo Na’s compound and returned to 
Tamale, this time in leg irons. Duncan-Johnstone responded to the incident by 
noting that ‘although to our ideas it is repugnant to us to see a woman in leg irons, it 
is not so to the native, and according to Native Custom the Chief of Savelugu was 
acting within his rights’.
91
 He went on to state that ‘to have taken action against 
Savelugu would have served no good purpose … it would not have been in 
accordance with the Policy of Ruling Indirectly through the Chiefs’.
92
 A week 
previously, on the arrival of the Governor in Tamale, Duncan-Johnstone had noted 
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in his diary of the chief in question that ‘(t)he Na of Savelugu marred the 
proceedings by turning up very drunk and being violently sick before His 
Excellency’s arrival.’
93
 The Yo Na was a regular source of disruption. A month 
previously, Duncan-Johnstone, on hearing that the Yo Na had contracted Guinea 
Worm in his Stomach and one in each thigh, remarked that he could not ‘understand 
how he got them as he lives on Peto
94
 and sometimes, I suspect, something 
stronger’.
95
 Despite the ill-repute of the chief, he was still allowed to act, 
unhindered, within the domain which the colonial administration deemed to be 
‘customary’.  
But such inactions were superficial, especially in terms of what indirect rule was 
essentially about, namely native institutions – most prominently, the native treasury 
and native courts. Native institutions, with some kind of legitimated authority, were 
to form the bedrock of the new policy, satisfying both ideological and financial 
requirements. In practice in the Northern Territories, however, such native 
institutions never attained the kind of autonomy which indirect rule propagated, 
despite the enthusiasm with which they were pursued. The native treasury was one 
source of chiefly authority. But the potential revenue streams of the Dagomba native 
treasury were limited: monies came from court fees, fines, and cattle kraals and were 
by and large meagre. As a result, the Dagomba native treasury in Yendi (the monies 
available to the Ya Na) never possessed the funds to carry out any real 
‘development’ projects or command significant authority (the Ya Na got authority 
from other sources). In 1933 it had only ₤593. Taxation was introduced only in 
1936, and even then, there were serious problems with revenue collection. 
Furthermore, the colonial administration retained all manner of rights over chiefs, 
which worked to de-concentrate traditional authority, specifically in terms of the 
judicial powers of chiefs. The Native Tribunals Ordinance of 1932, which was 
supposed to empower chiefs in judicial terms, was laden with restrictions. It 
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empowered the colonial administration to establish native tribunals as it saw fit, and 
colonial administrators had the right of access to all courts and their records. The 
DC could also order the transfer of a case from the native court to his own. Innez 
Sutton notes that ‘by the 1930s, the British felt that more effective supervision of 
traditional tribunals was necessary’,
96
 largely on account of local challenges to 
chiefs’ courts. She notes, ‘gradually the traditional courts came more closely under 
government control … a great deal of litigation was carried on through the British 
court system in the Gold Coast, more so than in East Africa’.
97
 Sutton states further 
that ‘it was difficult to fit new urban centres and new social and economic classes 
into the structure of indirect rule; in this situation, more direct British rule, and the 
English court system had to be applied’.
98
 In this sense, the compromise with the 
authority of Tamale’s Gulkpe-Na was heightened, compared with other northern 
native authorities.  
Despite the enthusiasm to introduce indirect rule by the administrators who were 
posted to the north after 1930, indirect rule did not, in many instances, really 
empower chiefs. There were a number of changes, some more significant than 
others. But the changes to the institution of chieftaincy were often cosmetic rather 
than structural. Essentially, indirect rule had the same motivation as direct rule: A 
response to the ‘native question’ – how a tiny minority can effectively maintain 
control over an oppressed mass.
99
 And it functioned in much the same way: At its 
apex a colonial administration concerned with maintaining control.  
Indirect rule in Tamale: From Dakpema to Gulkpe-Na 
An inherent tension within indirect rule was that between chiefly control over land 
and control over people, and if and how such powers should be separated. In many 
rural settings this nuanced distinction was often unproblematic. But in the urban 
setting, where the question of control over land and people was often difficult to 
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separate, indirect rule was especially problematic. That urban centres did not easily 
fit into the indirect-rule framework did not mean that Tamale was exempt from its 
application. On the contrary, the introduction of indirect rule in Tamale served as a 
type of test case for colonial administrators. 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that Tamale’s ‘traditional’ political structures had been 
confused by the partition of Dagbon into British and German Territories in 1902 
British chiefs were ordered to abstain from any form of contact with the Ya Na at 
Yendi and faced punishments if such orders were breached. The argument presented 
by those who supported the Gulkpe-Na’s return to Tamale was that the Gulkpe-Na, 
chief of the Gulkpeagu subdivision, in which Tamale is located, was in Yendi at the 
time of the partition and was ordered to remain there.
100
 As a result, between 1907, 
when the administrative headquarters were moved to Tamale, and 1932, when the 
Gulkpe-Na was (re)instated as the highest chief in Tamale, the Dakpema 
consolidated his position as the apex of ‘traditional’ authority in Tamale.  
Staniland states that the colonial administration ‘discovered the falsity of the 
Dakpema’s claims to paramountcy in the district at the end of the twenties, during 
investigations connected with the establishment of indirect rule’.
101
 Although this 
version of facts makes for a logical correspondence between the introduction of 
indirect rule and the change from Dakpiema to Gulkpe-Na, the return of the Gulkpe-
Na to Tamale began in 1920, when the British colonial administration first sought 
contact with the Ya Na at Yendi, after it became increasingly likely that Germany 
was going to lose its colonial possessions, and talk of a united Dagbon began to 
surface. The Ya Na lodged a complaint with the colonial administration regarding 
the position of the Dakpema in 1920, a number of years prior to the introduction of 
indirect rule. According to the Annual Report of the Northern Territories for the 
years 1921-2:  
The status of the Chief of Tamale was challenged by the Head Chief of the 
Dagombas who lives at Yendi. It appeared on investigation that during the 
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separation of the Dagbombas into English and German he had been given 
powers in excess of those allowed him by old custom.
102
  
The report stated that ‘an agreement was come to by which he (the Dakpiema) was 
allowed to retain his powers until his death, when his successor would revert to his 
proper position’.
103
 The Commissioner for the Southern Province wrote a letter to 
the DC for Yendi on 15 April 1922, explaining: 
The Chiefs of Tamale, Choggu and Kanvilli are proceeding to Yendi for the 
Paramount Chief to explain to them personally the result of the palaver … 
Tamale is to remain in its present position during his (the Dakpiema) lifetime 




He stated that with immediate effect, ‘any village stools becoming vacant from now 
on will be appointed by the Gupero (sic)’.
105
 The Ya Na’s version of Tamale’s 
political history (corroborated by Blair) did not go uncontested. A. H. Chandler, 
then Superintendent for Education, challenged the Gulkpe-Na’s legitimacy. 
According to his source,
106
 within Dagomba tradition, the origins of the Dakpema 
were as follows:  
 … a very long time ago a Na of Yendi came to Tamale to fight a rebellion of 
some of the adjacent village, and after a struggle he conquered them during this 
civil war Tamale was actually loyal to Yendi … The day after the decisive action 
the Na was taken ill of a head-ache. He retired to the shade of a tree and there the 
pain became so acute that he decided to leave this earth … he rose and shook 
himself whereupon the earth opened and swallowed him. Consequently the earth 
of Tamale still contains his spirit. To guard this the next Na had a house built on 
the spot and entrusted Gupiena (sic) with its care. The latter lives close to Yendi 
so he had to make a local representative. This he did and called him the 
Dakpiema. Every year the Na still sends a present of a cow to the Dakpiema.
107
 
Chandler’s informant was J.S. Kaleem, a teacher from Tamale. Blair noted of 
Chandler’s memorandum in a private letter to Commissioner for the Southern 
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Province, Duncan-Johnstone, that ‘it must be remembered that Chandler’s informant 
was Mr Kaleem, School Teacher, and possible heir to the present Dakpema’.
108
 Blair 
rejected Chandler’s version of the origins of the Dakpiema. According to Blair, the 
line of the Dakpiema was started by Dabila, who was an elder of the chief of 
Kumbungu (Kumbungu-Na), a village some 21 kilometres north-east of Tamale. 
According to Blair, Dabila was driven from Kumbungu because he was charged 
with murder and fled to Tamale. Once in Tamale, he married into Tamale’s local 
elite. His first son was then placed in charge of the market.
109
 In a thorough response 
to Chandler’s memorandum, Blair stated that ‘the Dakpema was a petty elder, not an 
elder of Dagbon at all’.
110
 He went on to speculate that the Dakpema ‘would not 
stand for a month if we left the country’.
111
 The Dakpema was, according to Blair, 
‘an excellent example of a “white-man’s chief”’.
112
 In yet more correspondence on 
the matter, Blair noted, perhaps rather dramatically, that ‘(t)he loss of the Gulkpe-
Na’s regime around Tamale has caused much discontent against our rule’.
113
 The 
standing of Blair within the colonial administration rendered the discussion rather a 
no-contest.  
The Dakpema Nsung-Na’s successor, Lag’mbu, himself objected strongly to the 
Gulkpe-Na’s position in Tamale. He wrote to the District Commissioner that ‘it has 
never occurred that the chief of Yendi has interfered with the business of Gukpeogu, 
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the Tamale area. This area has never been under the rule of any prince of Yendi’.
114
 
The Dakpema was forced by the colonial administration to retract his assertion and 
apologise. He denied writing the letter and blamed his court clerk, J.S. Kaleem, a 
recent graduate of Achimota, the same Kaleem who had informed Chandler. 
Although the administration accepted the Dakpema’s apology, J.S. Kaleem was sent 
into exile as a punishment, to teach at a school in Yendi.
115
  
The return of the Gulkpe-Na was further complicated by a series of taboos. There 
was, for instance, a taboo on the Gulkpe-Na’s coming west more than three times. 
The last holder was said to have died from the effects of a fourth visit to Tamale.
116
 
Furthermore, the Gulkpe-Na was reportedly ‘very frightened of the local fetishes 
and taboos, to take over the reigns of government from the Dakpiema and begin to 
seriously organise Gulkpiego himself’.
117
 The Ya Na, on the consultation of the 
colonial administration, claimed that the taboo was only operative if the Gulkpe-Na 
actually entered Tamale township and set eyes on the Dakpema, and he made the 
suggestion that the Gulkpe-Na make his headquarters just outside Tamale in 
Zoguyili.
118
 Finally, in April 1932, the colonial administration took advantage of a 
stroke suffered by the Dakpiema to reinstate the Gulkpe-Na. In a report on the 
progress of native administration, Blair noted: 
‘On this date (April, 1932), the newly appointed sub-divisional chief of 
Gulkpiego, the Gulkpe Na was persuaded to come to Tamale … This takeover 
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Blair concluded rather categorically that ‘the controversy that the Dakpiema was an 
important chief was laid to rest’.
120
 To Blair, the appointment of the Gulkpe-Na as 
chief of Tamale marked the opening of the way for the introduction of indirect rule 
to Tamale. Indeed, within a relatively short period, the Gulkpe-Na, with the 
assistance of the colonial administration, was able to assert some authority in 
Tamale. He built a house in Tamale and extended his house in Zoguyili. In June 
1932 he went on tour to Accra, taking along with him an entourage of 16 
subordinate chiefs, paying all the expenses. Furthermore, five years later in 1937, 
the Ya Na and council stated that, ‘the Ya Na holds the ultimate control over land in 
Dagomba and may remove any person from such land. The right of removal, 
however, is not exercised in practice save in cases of extreme insubordination’.
121
 In 
such ways, as the Ya Na’s authority over Dagbon increased, so too, it was felt, did 
the authority of the Gulkpe-Na, whose authority came directly from Yendi. 
However, while the Gulkpe-Na drew his authority from Yendi, the Dakpema had the 
advantage of deep and extensive political and marital alliances in the local 
population, and so the rivalry continued.
122
 Thus, the matter of the 
Dakpema/Gulkpe-Na was not laid to rest as Blair had anticipated. In 1932, Lag’mbu 
was replaced by Dakpema Allassani, who managed to assert some authority over 
parts of Tamale, especially Dagomba Fong (which translates in Dagomba to ‘area of 
men’, an area in the heart of Tamale which served as a mausoleum for local royals). 
He was paid a salary of £20, and extracted rent in parts of Tamale. The Dakpema 
continued to have a strong local following, while the Gulkpe-Na was seen as 
someone who belonged to both Yendi and the colonial administration. Fifteen years 
after the Gulkpe-Na replaced the Dakpema as chief of Tamale, in 1947, the DC for 
Tamale, on drawing up a scheme for the establishment of a Tamale Urban Council 
wrote: ‘The Chief problem seems to be the relation between the proposed council 
and the N.A. as well as the position of the Gulkpena and the Dakpema in the 
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 After 1957, the tension between the Dakpema and the Gulkpe-Na would 
again lead to the intervention of the national government and the Ya Na. The result 
was a political structure riddled with ambiguities. Frequently, authority overlapped, 
especially when disputes over land arose. Such disputes worked to legitimate either 
the Dakpema or the Gulkpe-Na, despite colonial support of the Gulkpe-Na. The 
colonial administration either overestimated the value placed on ‘tradition’ by 
Tamale’s increasingly urban community or underestimated the importance of claims 
legitimated by the Dakpema prior to 1932.  
Tamale’s institutional multiplicity manifested itself primarily in how contested 
claims were made and settled in Tamale. Usually such claims related to land, but not 
always. For instance, in 1948 Niendow Dawuda claimed that plot 6 in Ward D was 
given to his father by the late Dakpema, Nsung-Na, ‘during the time the white men 
were at Gambaga’.
124
 Neindow Dawuda had gone to Accra to work as a cook. On 
his return a Mallan, Alidu Nyobaliga, was residing in his house. The Mallam 
claimed that the Dakpema had said that he could stay in the house until Niendow 
Dawuda returned. Niendow Dawuda, who was on a short visit to Tamale, went with 
the Mallam to the Dakpema to ascertain if that was indeed the case. The Dakpema 
confirmed that it was, so Niendow Dawuda returned to the south leaving the Mallam 
in his house. While Niendow Dawuda was in the south, the Gulkpe-Na was 
enskinned as chief of Tamale. The Gulkpe-Na reallocated the house. Niendow 
Dawuda notes that ‘the Gulkpe-Na came from Yendi and put his people in the 
house’.
125
 Niendow Dawuda put his claim to Mr Barker, the Commissioner of 
Lands. Mr Barker referred the case back to the Gulkpe-Na, who ruled that Niendow 
Dawuda ‘should quit his house’.
126
  
In another case, in 1946 Emmanuel Bawah had consulted the DC for Tamale, Irvine 
Glass, regarding a dispute about plot 27 in Ward B of the town. The DC sent 
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Emmanuel Bawah to see the Gulkpe-Na. According to Emmanuel Bawah, the 
Gulkpe-Na told him that if he paid the Gulkpe-Na £6, he would be granted the plot. 
Emmanuel Bawah claimed to have paid the money but was not awarded the plot and 
so wrote a letter to the District Commissioner stating that, ‘the Gulkpe-Na is selling 
justice for money, I therefore humbly and respectfully beg to appeal to you to re-
hear the case please’.
127
 Irvine Glass, after carrying out some investigations, 




The cases above (of which there were many) were not simply disputes about facts, 
but a debate about the control and, consequently, the constitution of authority and 
legitimacy in Tamale. They called into question the authority of the District 
Commissioner, the authority of the institution of chieftaincy in Tamale, and the 
legitimacy of ‘traditional customs’, on which indirect rule relied, and confused the 
traditional focus which they were attempting to create. Christian Lund has noted that 
‘the process whereby rights over land … are settled and contested, are fundamental 
to how public authority is established and challenged’.
129
 The colonial 
administration was compelled to side with the Gulkpe-Na, as in the cases above, in 
order to consolidate his authority. By doing so, however, men like Emmanuel 
Bawah, and especially Niendow Dawuda, sought alternative sources of authority. In 
this way, the Dakpema remained a figure of political concentration in Tamale. 
Chiefs were also far more than simply settlers of disputes. They were regarded by 
most as possessors of wisdom and capable of providing useful advice in the case of 
domestic or other problems. The Dakpema did not suddenly lose these 
characteristics on the arrival of the Gulkpe-Na. He continued to gain the respect of 
many of the residents of Tamale, thereby maintaining the presence of his authority. 
As long as there were people in Tamale who legitimised the authority of the 
Dakpema, the institution of the Dakpema would continue to exist. This was an 
oversight of the top-down approach taken by the colonial administration. Thus, 
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despite the efforts of the colonial administration, the claim of the institution of the 
Dakpema to at least some authority in Tamale persisted – and for indirect rule, 
remained problematic.  
Furthermore, such disputes frequently induced the colonial administration to wade 
into jurisdictions which under indirect rule were intended to be dealt with within the 
‘traditional’ domain (as in both the examples cited above). The persistent 
involvement of colonial authority in such domains set precedents which further 
undermined ‘traditional’ authority and, importantly, ran contrary to the tenets of 
‘ruling indirectly’. Duncan-Johnstone had hoped that ‘the Political Officers of this 
Province will act as sympathetic advisors and councillors to the Paramount Chiefs, 
keeping in the background as far as possible so as not to lower the Chief’s 
prestige’.
130
 This was rarely the case in Tamale, where the colonial administration 
was in many instances looked to settle claims. Tamale’s increasingly urban 
population was well aware that the colonial administrators held the ultimate 
authority.  
To conclude, that the Gulkpe-Na’s authority did not replace that of the Dakpema is 
clear, and as a result Tamale’s traditional focus developed as a confused hierarchical 
system, accommodating several ill-defined centres of traditional authority. The 
constant interference of the colonial administration in domains regarded as 
‘traditional’ by indirect rule further weakened the native institutions in Tamale, 
which the colonial administration was trying to create.  
The politics and economics of an urban space under indirect rule 
Paul Nugent does an entertaining job of highlighting a number of symbols of power 
in Accra. In Tamale, symbols of power are perhaps less overt than they may be in 
Accra.
131
 But certainly, behind a low-key façade, they are there; what is more, with a 
few exceptions, many have been there since the 1930s. On the corner, opposite 
Tamale’s first underground petrol tank, built by Lebanese businessman, P. K. 
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Kassardjan, is the palace of Gulkpe-Na. A little to the west is the central mosque, 
perhaps the most prominent building on the Tamale skyline. To the north of the 
mosque lies the taxi-rank and the central market, while to the south of the central 
mosque lies the palace of the Dakpema (it is somewhat grander than that of the 
Gulkpe-Na). Far to the west, along Watherston Road, lies the administrative heart of 
Tamale. Heading eastwards along Waterstone Road, the first striking presence is 
that of the Parade Ground. It is not comparable to Independence Square in Accra, 
but somehow, relatively speaking, its presence is equally powerful. Further down 
Waterston Road, on the right-hand side, is Tamale’s police headquarters. One then 
approaches a traffic circle. The traffic circle has, through its centre, gates on both the 
eastern and western side. Apparently, it was built when Nkrumah came, so that his 
motorcade could cross straight over the circle, without slowing down to go around 
it. Then, on the right-hand side, lies Tamale’s High Court. It was first the court of 
the administration, and later, when the Gulkpe-Na was re-introduced to Tamale, he 
established his native tribunal there. Then, on both the right and left, one comes 
across a series of dilapidated, colonial-style houses. These served as the residences 
for colonial administrators and medical officers. Finally, right at the end of 
Watherston Road, by now some distance from the town centre, lies the largest 
residence of all, with military guards at the gate, under a giant Ghanaian flag – the 
former residence of the Chief Commissioner of the Gold Coast, now the residence 
of the MP for northern Ghana. How these symbols of power relate to one another 
spatially is more than a simple metaphor. Their location is rather the result of those 
relationships. Tamale’s constellation of authority had a spatial dynamic. Andreas 
Eckhert notes: 
Relations of power and social stratification are reflected in space … we can 
discern in the order of space something of a lived map of daily life. Space is an 
important and contested area of colonial and post-colonial daily life. Power 
structures are inscribed in space, and space reflects social organisation and 
defines the people in it. 
A spatial analysis of Tamale thus helps not only to further delineate the centres of 
power in Tamale, it also provides insights into how each of these related to one 
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another in daily life. This subsection is concerned with the power and the politics of 
urban space in Tamale under indirect rule. 




Apart from the problems arising from a lack of traditional focus in Tamale, indirect 
rule was severely undermined by the increasingly urban character of the town. 
Indirect rule assumed geographically bound, mutually exclusive, ethnic units. 
Tamale’s increasingly heterogeneous character contradicted these assumptions. In 
order to cater for Tamale’s heterogeneous character, wards were intended to be 
ethnically bound, although this was not enforced by law. In some instances, a 
narrow street was all that separated wards. The Moshie Zongo, for instance, lay 
adjacent to the old Dagomba area of Tamale (Central Mosque or Ward D) to the 
north, and to the South of Ward D lay the Hausa Zongo. The Gold Coast had a 




began ‘planning’ Accra. While the Ga community claimed the area around Korle 
Lagoon to be sacred, the British created Agbogbloshie (from Ga, meaning ‘site of 
the Agbogblo shrine’) for the Ga, and Fadama (from the Hausa, meaning 
‘floodplains’) for northern migrants.
132
  
Despite these attempts, the kind of heterogeneity created by urban settlements 
caused a plethora of administrative problems. This is best illustrated in a note in his 
informal diary of the Commissioner for the Southern Province. He reported that 
 … trouble originated with certain Hausas who lived in the Hausa Zongo going 
to live in the Moshi Zongo … If the Sarikin Zongo (Hausa Chief) called them for 
work … they replied they were not under him but under the Moshi Chief because 
they lived in the latter’s Zongo. If the latter called them for labour they replied 
they were Hausa and not Moshis.
133
 
Thus, apart from the ongoing confusion between the authority of the Dakpema and 
that of the Gulkpe-Na, the large communities of non-Dagomba residents posed other 
problems for Tamale’s ‘traditional’ structures under indirect rule. It was, for 
instance, problematic that the Gulkpe-Na, a Dagomba, presided over a native 
tribunal which heard cases often involving non-Dagombas. As a result, a system of 
‘headmen’ was established. Under the system, each ‘stranger’ community elected a 
headman, who would act as an advisor to the Gulkpe-Na in cases where members of 
their community were involved. These headmen became powerful members of 
Tamale’s community, although the Gulkpe-Na was regarded, at least by the colonial 
administration, as the apex of Tamale’s ‘traditional’ political system. Furthermore, 
there was the large community of southern clerical employees of the colonial 
administration. The Twi-speaking element of this community already numbered 
over fifty in Tamale in 1913. The ‘little colony’ rejected any initiatives to be 
integrated into Tamale’s northern communities. Kimble notes that they ‘must have 
lived like expatriates, with their own amusements and church services’.
134
 They 
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seldom intermarried. In 1913 the Twi-speaking element formed a society, ‘The 
Foreigners’ Arbitration’, ‘in order to avoid being summoned before local 
tribunals’.
135
 The colonial administration refused to officially recognise the society, 
but it serves as an illustration of southerners’ aversion to local political elites in 
Tamale, thereby creating yet another extra-colonial constellation of authority in 
Tamale.  
Before reflecting on Tamale’s urban space, several groupings need to be considered, 
some of which have been mentioned previously in this chapter. There is a strong 
distinction between the colonised and the coloniser. This distinction may be less 
relevant than in comparable East African towns as a result of larger European 
populations, but the distinction is relevant in the case of Tamale nonetheless. The 
fact that segregation in the West Africa was underpinned by medical theories has a 
long history.
136
 In the case of Tamale, as in many East African examples, the 
distinction between Europeans and Africans, despite only a small European 
population, had a strong spatial dynamic. But racial distinctions were not the only 
urban socio-cultural distinctions; ethnic distinctions form another important 
framework within which to understand the daily politics of urban space. These too 
had a spatial dynamic, although perhaps not as vivid as the racial distinction. Within 
the ethnic distinction, an important distinction needs to be made between natives and 
strangers, or between Dagombas and non-Dagombas. In Tamale, religious 
distinctions also has a spatial dimension. Finally, there was the large aforementioned 
community of southerners. A spatial analysis of Tamale under direct rule reveals a 
number of insights into the relationships between these categories. It also reveals 
something about the manner in which chieftaincy operated in Tamale. The 
remainder of this subsection is concerned with these revelations.  
Thomas Spear, regarding colonial town planning in colonial cities, notes: 
European headquarters usually overlooked and physically dominated ‘native 
settlements’, while Europeans preferred to live in picturesque hillside locations 
                                                 
135  Kimble, D., Political, 535-6. 
136  See, for instance, Leo Spitzer’s article, ‘The mosquito and segregation in Sierra Leone’, 








Although Thomas Spear was especially interested in East African towns, he did not 
limit his description to East African towns. During the planning of Tamale, there 
was indeed evidence of Spear’s ‘colonial vision’. In 1907, the colonial offices and 
residences were to be built ‘not windward of the town’.
138
 Everything was done to 
create the type of ‘Garden City’ feel which colonial administrations across Africa 
were trying to create. Watherston Road, along which the colonial residences were 
built, was lined with Neem trees, which originate from the Indian subcontinent. At 
the end of Watherston Road, furthest from Tamale Township, stood the residence of 
CCNT, by some distance the largest residence in Tamale. The employment of the 
phrase ‘protection zone’ to denote the colonial residential area on the 1932 map of 
Tamale is also interesting. This type of discourse was employed in the urban 
planning of many African cities which possessed a colonial administration, and it 
points to prevailing medical theories as vindications of segregation. Perhaps the 
most well-documented of urban planning underpinned by medical arguments is that 
of Free Town, where a similar discourse was used to justify urban segregation 
owing to malaria.
139
 The police headquarters and the court were situated at the 
beginning of Watherston Road, between Tamale Township and the start of the 
colonial ‘protection zone’. Thomas Spear notes: ‘Colonial planning was further 
marked by European iconographies of status … ’
140
 Although the examples of this in 
Tamale are relatively few (I suggest not due to a lack of intent, but due to a lack of 
resources), the location of the police headquarters and the court in relation to 
European and African residences does provide an excellent example of this kind of 
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thinking. The police headquarters was situated as a kind of gateway between Tamale 
township and the colonial offices and residences (see Map of Tamale above).  
Natives and strangers  
The wards which were created to house Tamale’s growing population were intended 
to have an ethnic dimension, but there were no legal rules as to who could lease land 
where. However, that there were no legal rules regarding the ethnic settlement in 
wards did not mean that wards did not possess strong ethnic inclinations. Newer 
wards tended to be larger than older ward. Ward C, D and G, the oldest wards, were 
also the smallest in terms of number of persons, whilst newer wards, such as B and 
E, and H and I, were larger. 
The oldest and original settlement in Tamale is Ward D, illustrated on the map 
above. In 1935, Ward D comprised almost entirely Dagomba leaseholders. It was 
the most homogenous ward in Tamale. Apart from 49 Dagomba leaseholders in 
Ward D, there was one Mamprussi leaseholder, 1 southerner, 1 Bamzaberima, and 1 
other. Ward D lies close to the market. It also contains all the prominent political 
and religious intuitions: The central mosque is located in Ward D, as also is the 
palace of the Gulkpe-Na and that of the Dakpema. Interestingly, in 1948, Ward D 
had the second least educated persons as a percentage of total persons in the ward.
141
 
Only Ward G, also an old ward, had a lower percentage of educated persons. Ward 
C, like Ward D, was both an old ward of Tamale and had a largely Dagomba 
demographic, albeit slightly more heterogeneous. Ward C had 4 southern 
leaseholders, 3 Mamprussi, 1 Hausa, and 1 Grunshi leaseholder, the remainder being 
made up of Dagomba tenants. The concentration of political and religious apparatus 
in and around Ward D and C, more or less in the centre of Tamale, is highly 
suggestive of the manner in which both colonial and local politics operated in 
Tamale: Politically, Tamale was a Dagomba town. Irvine Glass, DC for Tamale in 
the early 1930s, noted:  
                                                 




The Dagomba in Tamale … have behind them the power and authority of 
tradition and although constantly subject to the influence of change, tend to 




4.2.   Tamale Wards, Number of Persons, 1948 
 
Source: Population census of the Gold Coast and its protectorates for the year 1948 
Wards A and B were demarcated after WWI, when a number of ex-servicemen, 
mainly Moshis, settled in Tamale. Ward A unsurprisingly later became known as the 
Moshi Zongo,
143
 consisting overwhelmingly of Moshi leaseholders, although there 
were also a number of Hausa, and Grunshi leaseholders. It is not coincidental that 
these ethnic groups formed prominent components of the men recruited for WWI. 
Of all the wards, the ethnic breakdown of Ward A most strongly resembles the 
ethnic breakdown of soldiers employed in WWI and WWII. This is hardly 
surprising, given that Ward A was specifically built to house returning soldiers. 
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Ward B, adjacent to Ward A, resembles Ward A and was inhabited primarily by 
Moshi, with a strong Hausa presence. Ward D also housed a ‘foreigner’, probably a 
Lebanese trader. Wards G and I, which later became known as ‘Sabongida’, housed 
a number of Yoruba, the subject of Jeremy Eades’ book, Strangers and Traders.
144
 
The Yoruba had a very prominent economic role in Tamale: They served as ‘bulk-
breakers’ and were also often to be seen bicycling consumer goods purchased from 
colonial trading firms out to rural areas. As a group, the Yoruba are distinguished by 
a degree of urbanisation altogether exceptional in tropical Africa.
145
 Ward E housed 
many southerners, the majority of whom were employees of the colonial 
administration. Finally, Ward F, which later became known as the ‘Zongo’, housed 
Hausa traders.  
The political conservatism of the large Dagomba community in Tamale is reflected 
also in the spatial constellation of Tamale’s political apparatus. Financially, 
however, the opposite was true. Of all the wards, Ward D had the largest number of 
persons per household. Political hegemony thus had little if no relations to financial 
or economic hegemony. Furthermore, the distinction between ‘native’ and ‘stranger’ 
was not only important for how politics in Tamale functioned but also in terms of 
the native treasury. ‘Natives’ would pay only ‘peppercorn rent’,
146
 which amounted 
to a small tribute to the chief, and only if called upon to do so, while ‘strangers’ paid 
‘economic rent’, which was fixed by the colonial administration. Half of all 
‘economic rent’ went to the native authority, while the other half went to the 
colonial government. This financial arrangement empowered the ‘stranger’ 
communities in Tamale, both within the native authority and within the colonial 
government. Duncan-Johnstone noted, for instance, that he ‘issued permits to the 
Limam of Tamale, the Serikin Zongo, the Sarikin Moshi and the Sarikin Yoruba to 
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sacrifice sheep in their houses on the feast of the Zulhadj on May 10, the first day of 
the Moslem New Year’.
147
 However, he noted that ‘(t)he Principal Veterinary 
Officer (Stewart) has written protesting against this and insists that the animals must 
be killed in the slaughter house’.
148
 Duncan-Johnstone noted that ‘Stewart asks why 
we should study the wishes of aliens with an alien religion’.
149
 He stated that the 
grounds for his refusal to renege on his word were, in his own words, ‘(t)he so-
called aliens have been settled here for years and it is from them that we draw the 
town revenue’.
150
 Furthermore, the economic activity generated by groups such as 
the Yoruba was extraordinarily valuable. Albeit much later, in the 1960s, Yoruba 
traders occupied over a third of all stalls in the Tamale Central Market.
151
 But even 
in 1931, 305 Yoruba were residing in Tamale and injecting significant 
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4.2: Centrifugal political authority versus centripetal finances for 





















Native Treasury  
 
 
In Tamale there thus emerged an inverse relationship between the spatial 
distribution of political concentration on the one hand, and economic and financial 
concentration on the other. This is illustrated by the image above (Figure 4.2). As far 
as the system of indirect rule was concerned, on paper at least, this contradiction was 
devastating. It further exacerbated the tension between Dagomba and stranger 
communities. The relationship between chiefs and their subjects under indirect rule 
was intended to be through a kind of patronage system, where payments in the form 
of taxation or rent ensured a degree of ‘belonging’, and on the basis of ‘belonging’, 
one could access land and profit from other institutional functions, such as 
protection. In Tamale, especially before the introduction of taxation, the inverse was 
true. Those who filled the native treasury profited the least from Tamale’s political 
arrangements. As the town became increasingly populated, pressure on land also 




disputes were not only between individual leaseholders, but between the colonial 
administration and local communities. The most notable of such disputes arose out 
of the plans to redevelop Ward D. This case study is explored in the following 
chapter.  
Conclusion 
The implementation of indirect rule in Tamale, judged by the criteria of indirect rule 
itself, was a failure. Tamale did not emerge from indirect rule with a strong 
traditional political structure, as had been the intention of the ‘Indirect Rule Team’. 
Instead, it emerged with several ill-defined centres of authority. In 1930, ambitious 
administrators keen to introduce indirect rule in the Northern Territories replaced 
those administrators who had served long terms in the north. The new 
administrators, represented by men such as Duncan-Johnstone and Blair, put much 
energy into unearthing the ‘tradition’ which they hoped to resurrect, in line with the 
indirect rule mandate. This did not translate into the establishment of effective 
native institutions, however, as indirect rule demanded. This chapter has argued that 
for a number of reasons, this failure was particularly felt in Tamale. Underpinning 
this failure was the replacement of the Dakpema with the Gulkpe-Na in 1932. In 
attempting to establish a ‘traditional’ chain of command in Tamale, the colonial 
administration (re)introduced the Gulkpe-Na’s authority at the expense of the 
Dakpema. The authority of the Dakpema, however, lingered on, despite attempts to 
legitimise the Gulkpe-Na. This bi-nodal power construction had implications for the 
manner in which chieftaincy functions in Tamale on a daily basis, illustrated by the 
two distinct land disputes in Tamale. The problem of urban chieftaincy in Tamale 
under indirect rule was further exacerbated by the diversity of urban life. Tamale’s 
multi-ethnic composition also resulted in the introduction of headmen, which further 
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Tamale from the east, 1910 
 
Source: Basel Mission Image Archive  
 
 
Government station, Tamale, 1910   
 












Source: Basel Mission Image Archive 
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The Ya Na and followers, visiting Tamale, 1936  
 




Carrier gang between Tamale and Savelugu, (pre-1920) 
 








Government postman, 1906 
 
Source: Basel Mission Image Archive 
 
 
Tamale high street, 1955 
 
Source: Information Services, Ghana, Accra 
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Tamale Central Market, 1955 
 
Source: Information Services, Ghana, Accra 
 
Tamale Lorry Park, 1955 
 














‘The whole of Tamale within the town 
boundaries is the property of the 
crown’: Urbanism, land and authority 
Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that the colonial administration failed to create an 
effective traditional political structure in Tamale under the Gulkpe-Na as indirect 
rule had intended. This failure had a number of practical implications, perhaps the 
most visible of which was in terms of land. As a result, this chapter is concerned 
with Tamale’s land. The chapter intends to show how Tamale’s complex political 
matrix worked. It also employs Tamale’s land as an informative and analytical tool 
in order to unpack broader implications of Tamale’s lack of traditional focus. The 
use of land in this way is not wholly novel.
1
 However, as Andreas Eckert points out, 
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‘the literature on issues such as control over land, land conflicts and land law has 
almost exclusively dealt with rural areas … only a very few scholars have used land 
issues as a tool to explore broader questions of urban development during the 
colonial and post-colonial periods’.
2
 The chapter focuses specifically on the plans to 
redevelop Ward D, the heart of Tamale Township. Ward D was the oldest (original) 
settlement in Tamale. It was also located on the road as one enters Tamale from 
Kumasi and adjacent to the Lorry Park and the market, making it commercially 
desirable land. Ward D was thus the intersection between ‘traditional’ values and 
commercial ambitions. As a result, the political and economic colonial aspirations 
were, in Tamale, nowhere else as profoundly contradicted. The redevelopment of 
Ward D exposes both Tamale’s lack of traditional focus and the resulting 
institutional multiplicity. The chapter argues that the exploitation of Tamale’s 
institutional anatomy by traditional elites, the colonial administration, businessmen, 
and religious leaders consolidated and maintained Tamale’s institutional 
multiplicity.  
Legislating land in the Northern Territories  
There were fundamentally two dimensions to the administration of land in the 
Northern Territories. The first was land as a source of power in order to legitimise 
chieftaincy. As it emerged from colonial investigations into what constituted ‘the 
customary’, the political dimensions of land came to be regarded as central. In short, 
obligations and benefits were to flow in large part from control over, and access to, 
land. Kojo Sebastiaan Amanor states:  
‘chiefs had powers … to regulate and allocate land … Land rights were acquired 
through citizenship and citizenship created a series of “customary” obligations, 
which were determined by the chiefs. These involved obligations to provide the 




                                                 
2  Eckert. A., ‘Urbanisation in volonial & post-volonial West Africa’. In: Acheampong, 
E.K., ed., Themes in West Africa’s history (2006), 208. 
3  Amanor, K.S., ‘Conflicts and the reinterpretation of customary Tenure in Ghana’. In: 
Derman, B., R. Odgaard & E. Sjaastad, eds, Conflicts over water and land in Africa. 
(2007), 36. 
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Thus, in recognising the authority of any given chief, subjects accrued certain 
benefits such as access to land and other forms of both economic and social security. 
In return, subjects had certain obligations: They were required to pay taxes, 
sometimes in the form of labour, and they were obliged to recognise laws as they 
had been defined by ‘custom’. From the perspective of the colonial administration, 
that chiefs controlled land was necessary in order to underpin their authority, which, 
amongst other things, might be employed for the procurement of labour for road-
building, mining in the south, or the military. 
The second dimension concentrated on the intersection between land and the cost of 
development. Governor A. R. Slater noted that the ‘protection of the natives from 
exploitation is only one of the objects at which we are aiming, namely … to secure 
for legitimate outside enterprises sound titles to any land that they wish to take up in 
the Northern Territories’.
4
 Land for commercial purposes, as well as transport 
infrastructure such as roads and railways, it was feared, would be prohibitively 
expensive if the colonial government, or private enterprises such as the UAC, 
needed to pay compensation for land commercially desired. Lund points out: ‘One 
philosophy … was that the government should seize control over all lands in the 
North to keep costs of development down and eliminate speculation in its wake’.
5
 
And as Amanor states: ‘Its (the colonial administration’s) main concern was to 
prevent the evolution of land markets which it could not control’. Thus, the colonial 
administration desired a mechanism within land legislation which allowed for the 
appropriation of land by the colonial administration for the sake of development and 
commercial initiatives. 
Together, these dimensions of land posed a conundrum for the colonial 
administration. On the one hand, indirect-rule policies employed land as a primary 
source of power for chieftaincy (and thus the possession of authority to procure 
labour), and on the other hand, the colonial administration wanted to maintain 
                                                 
4  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/6, (Land and Native Rights Ordinance), ‘Minute by 
Governor A.R. Slater, unknown date (July 1927 to April 1932)’. 




control over land so as to be able to initiate development initiatives without 
requiring large capital investments in the form of land acquisitions or compensation. 
This contradiction has been summed by Sara Berry. She notes, ‘it was not enough 
for Europeans to claim exclusive ownership of land and natural resources: They also 
needed to mobilise African labour to work them’.
6
 
The rhetoric employed to resolve this contradiction focussed on the ‘alienation’ of 
land. It was suggested that ‘natives’ needed to be protected against the affects of the 
imminent development of the Northern Territories and that the colonial 
administration was to provide such protection. Acting Governor J. Maxwell noted in 
1927: ‘the development of the resources of the Northern Territories will begin at an 
early date and will be rapid once it is begun’,
7
 and as a result, ‘it is necessary to 
provide for … the influx of non-natives of the Northern Territories. This influx will 
introduce factors which the natives themselves are not competent to deal with so as 
to safeguard their own interests ... government must be able to control these 
factors’.
8
 In reality, the concern was the same as the concern surrounding colonial 
appropriation of land: if chiefs were to sell off land to non-natives (including the 
colonial administration), they would undermine their own authority, which meant 
they would be less effective as tools of colonial administration. In other words, the 
purpose of land legislation in the Northern Territories would be aimed at addressing 
the ill-effects of potential speculation, and yet, it was itself a speculation. The 
negative experiences faced by the colonial administration in Ashanti and the Colony, 
where land markets had developed before the government legislated land in order to 
control it, served to heighten the importance of effective land legislation in the 
Northern Territories. Thus, in terms of land legislation, what the colonial 
government sought was a legal apparatus which would make the acquisition of land 
cheap in instances when and where roads, railways, and other land-intensive 
initiatives needed to be built in order to encourage and facilitate economic 
                                                 
6  Berry, S., ‘Debating the land question in Africa’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 44: 4(2002), 642. 
7  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/6, (Land and Native Rights Ordinance), ‘Confidential 
Memorandum, Acting Governor Maxwell, 7th April, 1927’. 
8  Ibid. 
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development, while not undermining chiefly authority in order to, amongst other 
things, provide labour and collect rent.  
The first of a series of elaborate land ordinances were passed, beginning in 1922. 
Thereafter, amended ordinances were gazetted in 1927, 1928, 1930, and 1934. The 
ordinances differed from one another in detail, but all offered the same basic 
framework: in order to solve the above contradiction, all lands in the Northern 
Territories were to be entrusted in the Governor, who would exercise his powers 
‘with due regard to native customary law existing in the locality in which such lands 
are situated’.
9
 The ordinances prevented ‘the alienation of native lands to any person 
not a native of the Protectorate without the approval of Governor’.
10
 The Governor 
would be entitled to appropriate land if he could illustrate he had ‘good cause’, and 
‘good cause’ included, amongst other things, ‘requirement of the land for public 
purposes’ and ‘requirement of the land for mining purposes or any purpose 
connected therewith’.
11
 The colonial administration thus retained all powers to 
allocate land, with very little real power left to chiefs. The previous chapter has 
noted the safeguards and restrictions within colonial legislation (relating especially 
to native tribunals and the meagre state of the native treasuries), which inhibited the 
devolution of any real power to chiefs in order for indirect rule to function. In terms 
of land allocation (another pillar of indirect rule in terms of establishing chiefly 
legitimacy), such restrictions and safeguards clearly also applied. However, in 
practice, much of the land of the Northern Territories was allocated by chiefs 
without colonial interference, and when the colonial administration required land, 
there was no need to resort to legal disclaimers because land appropriations by the 
colonial government were rarely contested. The CCNT noted in 1938: ‘Since we 
first arrived in the Northern Territories the people have allowed the seizure of 
                                                 
9  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/6, (Land and Native Rights Ordinance), ‘Note in ‘The 
Northern Territories Land and Native Rights Ordinance, 1930’.  
10  Ibid. 
11  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/6, (Land and Native Rights Ordinance), ‘Note in ‘The 




thousands of acres without ever demanding compensation or making a complaint’.
12
 
Because the anticipated development of the north largely did not occur, the land 
legislation was hardly relevant.  
In the few instances in which colonial acquisition of land was contested, the legal 
frameworks confronted moral reservations. Once such instance was the rebuilding of 
a 13-mile stretch of road between Bolgatanga and Pwalugu (NT2) in the late 1930s. 
The Commissioner of Lands responded to the suggestion that compensation was to 
be paid for the land on which the road was to be built by stating: ‘I think there must 
be some misunderstanding, in the first place, as no compensation is of course 
payable in connection with an acquisition in the Northern Territories’.
13
 He went on: 
‘I am informed that the crops upon the land which it is proposed to take have been 
harvested already and there would therefore appear to be nothing payable in respect 
of such crops … the word “improvements” … must be taken to be … in the nature 
of buildings or works and would not extend to compensation for improvements to 
the “soil”’.
14
 The CCNT responded, stating that the issue of the new road ‘… is 
certainly not a case in which Government should rely on its legal rights’. He 
reminded those against the payment of compensation that ‘in Great Britain 
compensation for arable land is generally assessed at a higher rate than that for 
pasture land, presumably on the ground that some improvement to the former has 
been affected’.
15
 This tension, between legal and moral frameworks, was a constant 
theme in the colonial administration of land in the Northern Territories.  
The land legislation implemented in the Northern Territories was designed to 
resolve tensions between controlling land and indirect rule. The colonial desire to 
control land markets contradicted the colonial desire to endow chieftaincy with a 
legitimate source of authority. Because the north remained in most places a land-
                                                 
12  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/6, (Land and Native Rights Ordinance), ‘Note in ‘The 
Northern Territories Land and Native Rights Ordinance, 1930’ 
13  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 19/5/9, (Acquisition of Land for Road Sites), ‘Senior Executive 
Engineer to CCNT, Jones 3rd October, 1938’.  
14  Ibid. 
15  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 19/5/9, (Acquisition of Land for Road Sites), ‘Senior Executive 
Engineer to CCNT, Jones 3rd October, 1938’. 
    135        
 
abundant region, land ordinances very rarely came into question. There were, 
however, exceptions, one of which was Tamale, where a changing urban climate 
pitted political and economic aspirations against each other in a more pronounced 
way than elsewhere in the Northern Territories. The following section is concerned 
with land legislation and land practice in Tamale.  
Legislating land in Tamale  
Land legislation in the Northern Territories was designed to reconcile two seemingly 
contradictory objectives, namely to provide chieftaincy with a solid foundation (as 
indirect rule argued that land was a primary source of traditional legitimacy), on the 
one hand, and controlling (and enabling) economic development on the other. In 
Tamale, where arguably both the desire to induce an indirect rule framework and the 
desire for economic development were most concentrated, this contradiction was 
perhaps most apparent, and as result, the legislation was most extreme. The result 
was that Tamale’s traditional focus was profoundly undermined.  
The rapid growth of Tamale’s population during the 1920s led to an increase in 
the competition for land, whilst the (re)introduction of the Gulkpe-Na prioritised the 
need to uphold and strengthen his public legitimacy. Despite increasing competition 
for land in Tamale, the land market in Tamale was subject to the same strict, non-
market controls as the rest of the Northern Territories. The Attorney-General, R. W. 
H. Wilkinson, noted that ‘the only distinction now appearing in the draft Ordinance 
between urban and rural lands is that contained in section 16; namely with respect to 
the appropriation of rents’.
16
 As Tamale’s land became increasingly a commercial 
asset, questions about rights to allocate land became more complex. Within colonial 
circles, the fear – that by appearing to be controlling land, they undermined the 
authority of the chiefs – was genuine. This was especially the case in Tamale, where 
the authority of the newly-introduced Gulkpe-Na still needed to gather momentum. 
Owing to such fears, the ultimate control by the colonial administration over 
Tamale’s land came about as a result of an administrative error, rather than by 
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design. In April 1930, it was noted by the DC for Tamale in a note to the Chief 
Commissioner that: 
The following is the position regarding Tamale Town Land. In 1922 … In 
preparing the schedule for Tamale, the Chief Commissioner asked for a plan of 
Tamale shewing the land occupied by Government. What he got, so it seems, 
was a plan of Tamale accompanied by a schedule of Government buildings. This 
was sent to the Surveyor General, who, not unnaturally in ignorance of Tamale, 
took it for what it purported to be, a plan of Government land. The whole of 
Tamale was thus certified as being Government land.
17
 
The revelation set off a series of objections within colonial circles. The Chief 
Commissioner wrote: ‘As there is no moral right for claiming more land than was in 
use for public service we now have to rectify the mistake’.
18
 He noted further: ‘It 
will be observed that the whole of the Township has been acquired and I venture to 
think such an acquisition is not in accordance with Government policy’.
19
 Half a 
year later in November 1930, with the matter still not settled, the Chief 
Commissioner dispatched a letter to the Acting Commissioner for Land, Mr. 
Stacpoole, in Accra stating: ‘I feel sure you will see how ridiculous the present 
situation is, and give early instructions permitting your representative to act on my 
requests without reference to the Provincial Surveyor’.
20
 
Although it was initially felt imperative on moral grounds – and of course, on 
account of the policy of indirect rule – to rectify the administrative error, and plans 
were made to do so, the initiative began to stagnate when Mr Stacpoole, the Acting 
Commissioner of Lands, replied:  
whilst not entirely disagreeing that such an enquiry as suggested by the Solicitor-
General is desirable, I suggest the undesirability of throwing a doubt upon the 
appreciation by the Chief Commissioner of his special responsibility, a doubt 
which might I anticipate conceivably be exploited to such a degree as would 
                                                 
17  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 19/1/4, (Lease of Government Lands), ‘Note by Chief 
Commissioner, 1930’. 
18  Ibid. 
19  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 19/13/14, (Estates Crown Land Tamale), ‘Correspondence, Chief 
Commissioner, 1930.’ 
20  Ibid. 
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Stacpoole advised further that, at least for the time being, no action should be taken. 
He suggested that any measures to rescind the legislation that entitled the ‘Crown’ to 
the ownership of all of Tamale should wait until the Land Ordinance of 1934 was 
gazetted. However, the condition that Tamale in fact belonged to the Crown turned 
out to be convenient, especially as Tamale was growing rapidly and claims to land 
were increasingly contested. By 1933, one year prior to the publication of the Land 
Ordinance of 1934, the government’s legal possession of all of Tamale’s land had 
become a matter of policy. The Commissioner of Lands wrote to the treasurer, 
stating as a matter of policy: ‘The whole of Tamale within the town boundaries is 
the property of the Crown’.
22
 
That the colonial government thus controlled Tamale’s land was not only an 
academic matter. On the contrary, the colonial government exercised its control over 
land in Tamale, even if it did so (at times) reluctantly. In the previous chapter, two 
such examples were highlighted. But there were many. Yakubu Dagomba, a resident 
of Tamale, who claimed to be the owner of house 46 in Ward D,
23
 wrote to the 
District Commissioner for Tamale, claiming that ‘my late father (Mahama) was the 
owner of the above house. He built the said house with his own money without 
anybody’s assistance’. He requested that the colonial administration evict Derimann 
Gangbaraga, who was residing in the house. He wrote: ‘(I) humbly beg to appeal 
you to quit the said Derimann Gangbaraga because I inherited the said house after 
the death of my father’.
24
 The colonial administration immediately agreed and set 
about evicting the tenant. The Dakpema, on hearing the settlement of the case in 
favour of Yakubu Dagomba, wrote an exhaustive appeal to the District 
Commissioner on behalf of Derimann, stating that, ‘The above house was not 
                                                 
21  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 19/13/14, (Estates Crown Land Tamale), ‘Dispatch to Chief 
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belonged to the late Mahama as according to the explanation given to you by those 
people who came to your office’.
25
 The Dakpema claimed: 
The house was built by my grandfather and handed over to one Afa Imoru for 
him to stay in and live there … after his death the house was inherited by one 
Afa Yakubu Gangbaraga being the younger brother, but Afa Yakubu was having 
his own which he cannot leave it to stay in another house. For this reason Afa 
Yakubu has promised the house to one of his nephews Derimann Gangbaraga. 
Derimann was trader and does not stay at home at all. To keep the house in good 
order, Yakubu has allowed strangers to occupy the house and keep it clean. At 
last the late Mahama arrived from Salaga and preparing to build house and stay 
in Tamale. He was in search of a good site when he was told by some people that 
he shouldn’t bothered to build a new house but could try to approach Dakpema 
Nsungna and beg a house which belonged to Afa Yakubu Gangbaraga as at 
present there is no permanent man staying there except strangers. He did so 
according to their advice by sending a small present consisted of 12/- cash, 100 
kola nuts and one pair of sandals according to custom. Dakpema told him that 
the house does not belong to him but Afa Yakubu. He (Dakpema Nsungna) sent 
one of his boys with the present in accompany with Mahama to Afa Yakubu to 
beg the house. Afa Yakubu could not refused the Dakpema’s orders accepted the 
present … Mahama to stay in with the understanding that the house can be 
restored to him at any time he asks for it. The terms were accepted. Yakubu 
Gangbaraga died 6 years ago. Derimann was all this time stay abroad until in 
1948, he came home. He did not forget to mention about the restoration of his 
house to him. During this time Mahama was seriously ill and fortunately he died 
few days after. Derimann waited until after the performance of Mahamas funeral 
when he reported the matter.
26
 
In the end, the Lands Commissioner, Mr Barker, settled the issue. He wrote a report, 
which stated that 
There are no records in this office to show that the house and the land in question 
now marked D46 belongs to the Dakpema, nor Mermani, nor Afa Imoru. I am 
informed that Afa Imora Dagomba stayed in Tamale for a couple of years and 
that he possessed a small house of 4 rooms on the land in question … after 
Imrou’s death the whole house became dilapidated and the later Mahama 
Gbanzaba asked Dekpema Nsungna for the dilapidated house and the land. 
Mahama began building during this time the present Dakpema and Derimann 
were all in Tamale but they neither came to see Mahama nor showed any interest 
in the house and land, and Derimann stayed elsewhere in Tamale.
27
 
                                                 
25  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 19/1/17 (Ward D), ‘Letter to Dakpema, Derimann Gangbaraga, 
House No. 44, Ward D, 12th July, 1949’. 
26  Ibid. 
27  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 19/1/17, (Ward D) ‘Report of House No. 46, Ward D, written by 
Commissioner of lands, Barker. 13th July, 1949’. 
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Barker finally suggested that ‘neither the Dakpema, nor Dermani has claim to the 
house and the land i.e. if the house really belongs to the grandfather of the Dakpema 




With that the matter was closed, and the land was officially leased to Yakubu 
Dagbomba. These were not simply disagreements about land. They were discussions 
about authority: Who was in charge, why, and how. The power of the colonial 
administration to settle such claims within a judicial system in which the colonial 
administration possessed the legal right to make such decisions (albeit enshrined in a 
land policy which was the result of an administrative error) had consequences for 
the constitution of traditional authority in Tamale. Certainly, it undermined 
Tamale’s traditional focus.  
The redevelopment of Ward D  
‘Rethinking colonial power requires a more imaginative anthropological approach – 
shifting in a sense, from the plan itself to planning as social process’.
29
 The plans to 
redevelop Ward D and the manner in which the initiative was undertaken reveal 
much about the practice and constitution of authority in Tamale during the period of 
indirect rule. This analysis of the redevelopment of Ward D exposes contradictions 
in ‘the colonial rhetoric between preserving the past, promoting economic 
development and protecting Africans from the traumas of modernity’.
30
 The case of 
Ward D exposes Tamale’s lack of traditional focus, institutional multiplicity, and the 
resulting legal plurality. Lund suggests that in analysing land-tenure conflicts, it is 
useful to distinguish between three types of confrontation: A confrontation between 
different land users over access to land; a confrontation between different political 
authorities over the jurisdiction to allocate land access rights; and a confrontation 
between land users and the politico-legal authorities over the extent of the 
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jurisdiction of authorities to allocate land.
31
 In analysing the redevelopment of Ward 
D, these three confrontation levels are taken into account. 
The land on which Ward D was situated was unique in many respects. In addition to 
being adjacent to the Lorry Park and in close proximity to the central market, Ward 
D was conveniently situated on the north–south road through Tamale, providing 
thus, in commercial terms, an ideal location. ‘If there should be any facilities 
afforded for such extensions they should be within the vicinity of the main market 
and the lorry park and this in my view is the Ward D new layout’.
32
 Furthermore, by 
being situated adjacent to the north–south road, Ward D provided a ‘shop front’ for 
Tamale. However, despite its undoubted commercial value, Ward D was also the 
oldest settlement in Tamale. It was to the Dagomba residents of Tamale what the 
‘Zongo’ was to the Hausa community and the ‘Moshi Zongo’ was to the Moshi 
community. Of the 43 plots affected by the redevelopment programme, 40 were 
leased to Dagombas, and only 3 were leased to non-Dagombas.
33
 There were other 
Dagomba-dominated wards in Tamale, but Ward D, being the original settlement, 
was the most overwhelmingly so. Ward D appears on the 1912 map of Tamale as 
the only occupied land in Tamale, prior to the founding of an administrative 
headquarters in 1907. The Central Mosque was also located within Ward D, and the 
both the palace of the Gulkpe-Na and the palace of the Dakpema lie adjacent to 
Ward D (but not in it, and thus not subjected to threats of eviction as a result of the 
redevelopment). Ward D thus emerged as a site where traditional claims to land (as 
formulated by the colonial administration) were challenged by the commercial 
interests of the colonial state. 
In the 1940s a scheme to redevelop Ward D had been put before the Northern 
Territories Health Board (NTHB). The redevelopment of Ward D was born largely 
                                                 
31  Lund, C., ‘Struggles for land tenure and political power: On the politicisation of land 
tenure and disputes in Niger’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 40 (1998) 
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32  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/240, (Tamale New Layout Ward D), ‘Note by District 
Engineer, Mr. Cuppy, to C.C.N.T., September 23rd, 1948’  
33  See Annex for ethnic breakdown of Wards in Tamale.  
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out of a lack of commercial facilities within Tamale. In September 1948, one official 
noted: 
The town of Tamale is growing rapidly and will continue to do so in the 
foreseeable future, both as regards population and trade – as a result of 
development in all directions both government and commercial ... At present 
there are no more plots available in the main commercial area for leasing to big 
trading firms who wish to expand their business e.g. the C.F.A.C., or who desire 
to extend their activities to the Northern Territories, such as the S.C.O.A. and 
some reputable Syrian or Lebanese Traders of Accra and Kumasi.
34
 
By the 1940s, Ward D was densely populated and had become rather dilapidated. 
Dickson notes that by the end of the 1930s, ‘Tamale had assumed the drabness of a 
single-storeyed ironed-roofed township’.
35
 The scheme involved first the relocation 
of residents to a new ward which was to be built especially for the purpose, Ward J, 
and the building of six new commercial plots, D1 to D6. On 25 May 1946, the 
NTHB passed the scheme, and ten days later, on 5 June 1946, the Acting Chief 
Commissioner, O. C. Butler, wrote to the District Engineer at the Public Works 
Department, regarding the ‘redevelopment’ of Ward D, that ‘the new layout of the 
above mentioned Ward (Ward D) ... (has been) approved by the N.T.H. (Northern 




 Once the layout was 
superimposed onto existing copies of the Tamale Town sheets, he said quite simply, 
‘(t)he scheme will ... be explained to the Chief and the owners of buildings now 
standing on the plots’.
37
 
Several foreign firms applied for the new plots. Some southerners also applied 
for the plots (notably two businessmen, Kwaku Atakra and Kwabina Tufuor), and 
from the north, R. B. Braimah, a Gonja transport owner and later a prominent CPP 
member, and Nassam Dagomba, a tailor who owned the leases for plots D12 and 
D13 (which would be affected by the redevelopment scheme) applied for one of the 
new commercial plots to be built. The selection process was not particularly 
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transparent, and archival sources shed little light on the selection criteria. But it may 
be deduced that ‘grandeur’ was at least one of the criteria. The redevelopment of 
Ward D was not merely a redevelopment project; it was a vision for Tamale and for 
the Northern Territories generally. The project emphasised obsessively the 
requirement for the erection of ‘high-quality’ buildings. The CCNT wrote to the DC 
for Tamale: ‘It is hardly necessary to remind you that the new plots ... should be 
allocated with great care i.e. to only Commercial Firms or traders with reputable 
financial resources who will be able to erect substantial buildings’.
38
 As a result, 
Braimah, Nassam Dagomba, Kwaku Atakra, and Kwabina Tufuor were not allocated 
plots. All plots were allocated to foreigners (Lebanese traders and colonial trading 
firms). The only correspondence archived is that of Nassam Dagomba. He wrote to 
the colonial administration, stating that he would, instead of vacating his premises, 
‘erect a better house according to a design which … will meet with the approval of 
Government’.
39
 He wrote further that he ‘shall pay with a willing heart the necessary 
rent that shall be imposed in respect of the said plots … and maintain the said piece 
of land together with the buildings thereon … to the satisfaction of the 
Government’.
40
 Nasam Dagomba wrote two letters without reply. After his third 
letter, he received a reply that stated simply that he would not be permitted to remain 
on the leased land in Ward D. But Nasam Dagomba, the southerners, and R. B. 
Braimah probably did not form a part of the ‘vision’ which the redevelopment of 
Ward D was intended to encapsulate: large foreign-owned firms, occupying grand 
buildings, located at the entrance to Tamale.  
It was decided finally that Mr Kassardian, a Lebanese businessman, would be 
allocated D1 in order to build an underground petrol tank and petrol pump; the 
Compagnie Francaise de LÁfrique Occidentale (CFAO) would occupy D2 for the 
purpose of a motor and fitting shop; Paterson Zachonis, a Scottish-Greek entity, 
would be allocated D3; a Syrian trader, Abudu Ghanem, would be allocated D4; and 
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the Societe Commercialle L’Quest Africain (SCOA) would occupy D5 and D6. In 
time, some would fall away and be replaced by others, but the character of the 
allocations would stay the same: All those allocated plots were ‘strangers’.  
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The politics of urban space in Tamale: The case of Ward D 
The redevelopment of Ward D really exposes the manner in which Tamale’s 
complex political matrix functioned. The role of chieftaincy in the plans to 
redevelop Ward D is peculiar, largely owing to its silent character.  











Source: PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/240 ‘Tamale, New Layout, Ward D’. 
Indirectly, Tamale’s chiefs played a slightly sinister role. That the authority of the 
Gulkpe-Na was legitimised largely by Yendi and the colonial administration, meant 
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that he was inclined to tow the line, as long the Ya Na and the colonial 
administration did not disagree with one another. That aside, that the colonial 
administration would have their way with Ward D served as a tremendous financial 
advantage to the Gulkpe-Na. To lease large commercial plots to foreigners (instead 
of Dagombas who paid only peppercorn rents) had advantages that can hardly be 
ignored. The building of valuable commercial properties would increase the rents 
paid to the native treasury substantially. To openly declare this desire, however, 
would have meant further weakening the Gulkpe-Na’s already fragile standing 
amongst Tamale’s Dagombas. However, through the Tamale Town Board, he could 
exert some implicit influence over the outcome of the dispute. Indeed, after passing 
through the NTHB, the plan was ratified by the Tamale Town Board, of which the 
Gulkpe-Na was a prominent member. A letter to the CCNT noted: ‘I feel that they 
(Tamale Town Board) have been influenced by vested interests … you will see from 
the plan … the Gulkpena and all the homes in his neighbourhood are not affected’.
43
 
Indeed, the residence of the Gulkpe-Na lay just outside of the area which was to be 
redeveloped.
44
 The Dakpema did not involve himself directly in the plans to 
redevelop Ward D, although he appears to have given his support to the Limam of 
Tamale’s Central Mosque, who in turn represented the leaseholders who were to be 
affected by the redevelopment plans. Of course, everything that strengthened the 
position of the Gulkpe-Na was a disadvantage to the Dakpema. But the Dakpema 
was also required to be strategic, for fear of the wrath of the colonial administration. 
The positions of both the Gulkpe-Na and the Dakpema were so tenuous within 
changing colonial methods (see Chapter 6) that they conducted a kind of cold war, 
siding indirectly with various parties but not directly confronting one another. The 
Limam, on the other hand, stepped into the void left by chieftaincy in the discussion 
about Ward D. On being informed of the plans to redevelop Ward D and move 
residents to a new ward, Ward J, the Limam wrote a letter, through the Dakpema, to 
the DC for Tamale. He noted: 
                                                 
43  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/240, (Tamale New Layout Ward D), ‘Letter to C.C.N.T, 19th 
October, 1948, Not possible to make out author’ 
44  See maps above. The red circles indicate the site of the Gulkpe-Na’s palace.  
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... we were called by your Worship and you informed us that most of our houses 
on Ward D would soon be demolished; and our plots would be given to aliens to 
build stores. We beg to state that most of our homes on that Ward D were built 
by our forefathers, before the white man. He came as a friend but not as a 
conqueror. He came to build and not to destroy ... if plots would be used by 
Government to build Post Office, Treasury, Hospital, or School which would be 
beneficial to our country would be welcomed. But as it is Government is driving 
us away from our forefathers’ soil and giving it to aliens to build stores. This is 




The legal status of Tamale’s land as ‘Crown lands’ provided a considerable measure 
of legal security. It was noted for instance that ‘… feeling against eviction is 
considerable though legally the applicants … have no case’.
46
 Attempts were made 
to appease traditional leaders. If only for reasons of public relations, it was better to 
have the consent of the Limam and other residents of Ward D, rather than relying on 
legalities. The DC for Tamale wrote in a letter to the CCNT that ‘I would like to 
meet the 43 lessees concerned at Tamale, in a final attempt to persuade them to 
agree voluntarily to move from their present plots’.
47
 He went on to state, however, 
that ‘(i)f they cannot be so persuaded it seems that they must be evicted’.
48
 
As the Limam had voiced, on behalf of the residents of Ward D, objections to the 
plans to redevelop Ward D, the colonial administration sought a compromise with 
the Limam. In return for the Limam’s public approval of the redevelopment scheme, 
he was offered a residence adjacent to the Central Mosque in Ward D.
49
 On 12 May 
1949, the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories wrote to the DC 
for Dagomba, stating that ‘(i)t is gratifying to learn ... that by compromising with the 
Limam we shall have no serious opposition ... The Limam is to be offered one of the 
two plots immediately behind the mosque for his own dwelling’.
50
 With the 
                                                 
45  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/240, (Tamale New Layout Ward D) ‘Letter through Dakpema 
to District Commissioner, Tamale, 26th February, 1947’. 
46  PRAAD (Tamale) NRG 8/1/240, (Tamale New Layout) ‘Letter by Acting Senior District 
Commissioner, Dagomba to C.C.N.T’. 12th December. 1948’ 
47  Ibid. 
48  Ibid. 
49  See map above. 
50  PRAAD, Tamale NRG 8/1/240 (Tamale New layout Ward D) ‘Letter by C.C.N.T. to 




approval of the NTHB in May 1946 and the approval of the Limam three years later 
in May 1949, the colonial administration felt the project could commence without 
further opposition. The Chief Commissioner wrote: ‘I now feel that this matter 
should drift no longer and that definite steps should be taken to put the scheme into 
operation ... I therefore have to ask that all lease holders in Ward D may be advised 






The administration of land in the Northern Territories was designed so as to limit the 
amount of compensation to be paid by the colonial administration. Compensations 
were effectively intended as public relations tools, but public relations tool should 
not incur too great a cost. The compensation payable for the redevelopment of Ward 
D represents perhaps the biggest lump compensation with which the colonial 
administration was faced. Interestingly, the Native Authority offered to pay the 
compensation, which raised questions within colonial circles about what socio-legal 
ramifications the payment of compensation might have. Again, employing Lund’s 
theorisation that ‘the process whereby rights over land … are settled and contested, 
are fundamental to how public authority is established and challenged … ’,
52
 this 
subsection employs the matter of compensation in order to highlight the importance 
which the colonial administration placed on controlling land in Tamale.  
The initial line taken by government was that the legal framework regarding land in 
the Northern Territories did not require the payment of compensation within 
Tamale, as it was ‘Crown lands’. On the matter of compensation, the Chief 
Commissioner noted: ‘The Government would be acting within its legal rights if it 
were to disclaim liability to pay compensation ... ’.
53
 This position (to rest on legal 
rights, and thus pay no compensation) was challenged from within the colonial 
administration itself.  
                                                 
51  Ibid. 
52  Lund, Local, 3. 
53  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/240, (Tamale New layout Ward D) ‘Letter from C.C.N.T to 
Colonial Secretary, 30th January, 1950’  
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espite the legal framework, for the sake of sentiment it was felt to be strategically 
desirable to pay at least some compensation. Regarding the resistance offered by the 
residents of Ward D, the District Engineer wrote simply and unproblematically to 
the CCNT: 
In my experience these objections are invariably raised at the initial stage of any 
scheme that involve moving of a portion of the population ... But immediately 
(after) adequate compensations were paid for houses that had to be demolished 
and in addition new (plots) were granted to all dispossessed persons free of any 
rents, these oppositions melted away with great rapidity.
54
 
The government finally agreed that it would pay a total compensation of £1,838 to 
the 43 leaseholders affected by the redevelopment plans. However, in May 1949 the 
CCNT wrote to the Commissioner of Lands, telling him that ‘(i)n this respect (of the 
compensation) the situation has now altered. The Native Authority has decided to 
pay the compensation and cost of demolition in full and to recoup itself from the in-
going tenants’.
55
 By paying the compensation and recouping the rents, the Gulkpe-
Na, through the Native Authority, laid claim to the land, the most commercially 
attractive and financially desirable land in Tamale. Initially, the Chief Commissioner 
supported the idea that the Native Authority pay the compensation, as it appeared to 
him that ‘this seems to simplify matters as it will not now be necessary to approach 
Government for the necessary funds’.
56
 Stacpoole, the Commissioner of Lands 
based in Accra, however, did not agree with the view of the CCNT. He wrote in a 
letter to the Colonial Secretary: 
The Native Authority has no locus standi. To permit the Native Authority to 
participate in the Scheme in any way would be a dangerous precedent … this 
project concerns Government primarily in its capacity as landlord and as such 




                                                 
54  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/240 (Tamale New Layout Ward D) ‘Note by District 
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55  PRAAD, Tamale NRG 8/1/240 (Tamale New layout Ward D) ‘Letter by C.C.N.T. to 
District Commissioner Dagomba, 12th May, 1949’. 
56  Ibid. 
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The acting CCNT wrote back: ‘I have to thank you for your advice … which I 
propose to follow’.
58
 The colonial administration and the Native Authority were not 
the only ones who wanted to claim the right to pay compensation and the rights that 
flowed there from. On 2 August 1949, the DC for Tamale wrote to the CCNT: ‘Mr 
Kassardjian called regarding his plot in Ward D. He is prepared to pay compensation 
himself to the evicted tenants, as he is in a hurry to enter the plot he has applied 
for’.
59
 The CCNT wrote back stating that he should not allow Kassardjian to pay 
compensation. He wrote that Mr Kassardjian ‘was 4
th
 applicant for Plot 1 and 
unlikely to get it even if he could persuade present owners to sell buildings directly 
with a view to transferring leases’.
60
 Mr Kassardjian did secure plot D1, but was not 
permitted to privately pay compensation for it.  
The discussions about who would pay the compensation (and who would not) were 
also essentially discussions not only about the control of land, but also about 
authority in Tamale. The institution which ‘won’ the right to pay compensation to 
the outgoing residents of Ward D gained control over perhaps Tamale’s most 
valuable asset: The piece of land running along the Great North Road. Furthermore, 
the compensation was to be recouped through the rents paid by the businesses which 
were to occupy the new commercial lands. Thus, whoever gained control of Ward 
D, would also, as landlord, not only derive direct financial benefits but also gain at 
least some leverage within the commercial domain. The colonial administration 
heeded Stacpoole’s advice and applied for funding from Accra (the sum of £1,838) 
under the heading ‘slum clearance’.  
Although it had been proposed, on receiving monies for compensation, that residents 
could be evacuated by March 1951, by September 1950 almost nothing had been 
done to prepare Ward J for the resettlement. ‘Ablutions’, for instance, were not yet 
complete, and as the clearance of Ward D had been financed under slum clearance, 
                                                 
58  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/240 (Tamale New Layout Ward D), ‘Letter from CCNT to 
Commissioner of Lands. 15th June, 1949’. 
59  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 19/1/17 (Ward D), ‘Letter from DC Tamale to CCNT. 2nd 
August, 1949’. 
60  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 19/1/17 (Ward D) ‘Letter from CCNT to DC Tamale. 2nd August, 
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it was counter-productive to create a new slum elsewhere in Tamale. The Assistant 
District Commissioner wrote to the CCNT stating that, ‘I am disturbed by the 
possibility of forced evictions … only when roads, surface water drains, latrines and 
water are available in Ward J, should the people of Ward D be evacuated’.
61
 Almost 
a year later, the DC for Tamale wrote a scathing letter to the CCNT, stating that 
‘Government has sponsored the scheme as a measure of slum clearance, which 
makes the provision of alternative services of even greater necessity ... the 
development of Ward D depends very much upon the development of Ward J’.
62
 On 
7 October 1951, a Health Board meeting decided to suspend the relocation of people 
from Ward D. It suggested that ‘the future expansion and development in Tamale 
Town cannot be contemplated until an improvement in the water supply system is 
achieved’.
63
 The redevelopment of Ward D was thus once again suspended. Writing 
to the manager of the SCOA, the DC notified him that ‘(o)wing to unforeseen 




In October 1952, the scheme to redevelop Ward D was again taken up by the 
colonial administration. On 14 November 1952, the residents of Ward D, almost five 
years after the initial protest, were once again told that they were to vacate their 
premises within six months. The Limam of the Central Mosque, Malam Abdulai, 
again represented the residents of Ward D. He wrote to the relevant authorities, 
including the Chairman of the Town Sanitary Board, the Chief Regional Officer, 
Northern Territories, the Gulkpe-Na, and the Ya Na in Yendi:  
Much we appreciate the improvement of Tamale town, but we feel that it is not 
just for Government to ask its people to leave their homes to where we know not, 
for another group of people to come to occupy the very spot ... I must point out 
that the land is traditionally owned by the people, and that any action that is 
                                                 
61  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/1/240 (Tamale New layout Ward D), ‘Letter from Assistant 
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taken to deprive them of the land will be taken seriously ... the Northerner ... 
finds it a disgrace to leave his Father’s house to go to ruins. We will be 
committing ourselves to this very charge if we are to allow ourselves to be 
driven out from the homes of our Ancestors’.
65
  
He concluded: ‘On behalf of my people, I ask that the whole question affecting this 
Ward be reconsidered’.
66
 Once again, administrators referred to the legal position of 
Tamale. The Permanent Secretary wrote to the Chief Regional Officer of the 
Northern Territories, reminding him that ‘(t)he land is in fact Crown land and the 
occupants are only holding on yearly tenancy agreements’.
67
 Finally, on 10 August 
1954, the Chief Commissioner for Lands wrote to the District Valuer at Tamale, 
requesting, on account of resettlement difficulties, that ‘The proposed new layout 
can be removed from the records’.
68
 During the 1960s, when Nkrumah’s policies 
had even less regard for ‘traditional’ authority than the colonial administration at 
least pretended to have, Ward D was cleared, and new, commercial plots were built. 
The complexions of the redevelopment of Ward D in its entirety reveal a convoluted 
power matrix within colonial Tamale under indirect rule. The colonial 
administration sat relatively at apex of Tamale’s power structure, and their primary 
ambition was economic development. However, the desire to be seen as respecting 
‘custom’ forced the colonial administration to create continually a veneer of respect 
for ‘indigenous’ authorities. The importance the colonial administration placed on 
having the Gulkpe-Na and the Limam ‘on-board’ should not be underestimated, 
even if it was well known that having such institutions ‘on-board’ said very little 
about the sentiments of the people they represented. As Thomas Spear notes, ‘… 
administrative transgressions risked undermining the legitimacy of colonial and 
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The upward accountability of local elites is another feature of Tamale’s power 
matrix. The institutions which existed to protect the interests of the residents of 
Ward D, the Gulkpe-Na and the Limam, both sided rather unsympathetically with 
the colonial administration. Both institutions evidently felt they had more to gain by 
siding with the colonial administration than with the interests of the residents of 
Ward D.  
Conclusion  
The implication of the ‘Dual Mandate’ was problematic in Tamale. On the one hand, 
the colonial administration in Tamale, especially after the ‘Battle of Watherston 
Road’, desired to create a ‘customary’ domain in which colonial participation would 
be as ‘indirect’ as possible in order not to undermine the authority of chiefs. On the 
other hand, there existed also the desire to control the commercialisation of Tamale, 
including Tamale’s land. Indeed, the tension between the political priority of 
introducing indirect rule on the one hand, and the economic priority of controlling 
Tamale’s growing economy on the other, is seen in Tamale most profoundly in the 
manner in which land was legislated and controlled. The desire to control land (in 
order to encourage commercial initiatives, amongst other things), contradicted the 
desire to uphold the authority of the Gulkpe-Na. Nowhere was this more apparent 
than in Ward D. This chapter attempted to illustrate Tamale’s power structures by 
unpacking the redevelopment of Ward D. The chapter exposed a number of 
characteristics of Tamale’s authority matrix. There was an alliance between local 
traditional elites and the colonial administration. This largely undermined the 
legitimacy of the Gulkpe-Na. In instances in which the authority of the Gulkpe-Na 
was compromised, the colonial administration sought other concentrations of 
authority – in the instance of Ward D, the Limam, thereby undermining further 
traditional authority. The matter of compensation reveals the extent to which the 
colonial administration prioritised control over land and land markets. Foreign 
                                                 




businessmen also attempted to make claims to certain plots of land. In the end, the 
colonial administration failed at both its objectives: The redevelopment of Ward D 
was not achieved during the colonial period, and chiefly authority was undermined 
(the Limam had to represent the residents of Ward D, as the Gulkpe-Na had 
sanctioned the redevelopment scheme through the Tamale Town Board). The case of 
Ward D shows that the ramifications created by contradictory objectives – and 
confused ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ authority – resulted in precisely the kind 
of alienation which the land ordinances in the Northern Territories had been 
designed to prevent, and consequently resulted in a weak native authority in Tamale, 























New developmentalism in the 
Northern Territories: The place of 
Tamale 
Introduction 
Tamale emerged as a town with a strong military character after WWII. Not only 
was more than 15% of the town’s labour employed in the military and military 
institutions
1
, a large number of ex-servicemen who had served during the war also 
settled in Tamale. Tamale’s ex-servicemen, in possession of money, (in the form of 
gratuities) invoked profound socio-economic and socio-cultural transformation in 
Tamale. Largely as a result of the new injection of cash, Tamale’s cost of living was 
estimated to have risen by between 200-300 per cent
2
, the largest increase in the 
Gold Coast. It was reported that Tamale was the most expensive town in which to 
live in whole of the Gold Coast, including both Accra and Kumasi. There were 
increases in alcohol-related complaints, theft and other crimes. Marriage became a 
more contested terrain, as ‘girls’ complained about, and resisted, arranged 
                                                 
1  Population census for the Gold Coast and its protectorates for the year 1948. 




marriages, and wives, complained about the lack of ‘chop money’ they received 
from their husbands. There was an increase in the number of divorces. Many of the 
complaints related to ex-servicemen. These characteristics of Tamale’s post-war 
landscape have been obscured, this chapter argues, by the fact that the Accra riots of 
1948, which spread to many of the Gold Coast’s (including Asante) urban centres, 
did not spread to Tamale. Until fairly recently, the Accra riots (seen by most as the 
centrepiece of Ghana’s independence historiography) were perceived to have grown 
out of a protest by ex-servicemen against high prices. As a result, it appeared that, as 
the Accra riots did not spread to Northern Territories, one or both of these 
conditions (price increases and the presence of a significant number of ex-
servicemen), must have been absent in Tamale in 1948, when the Accra riots broke 
out. The following chapter argues that, in contrast to a number of previous authors, a 
large number of ex-servicemen settled in Tamale, and transformed Tamale’s socio-
economic landscape. Tamale’s post-war, socio-economic transformations were 
taking place in the context of a new colonial method and purpose; post-war ‘new 
developmentalism’. However, the chapter argues, in line with an argument presented 
by Jeff Grischow, that, in the Northern Territories, despite the introduction of ‘new 
developmentalism’ elsewhere, the colonial emphasis on the preservation of African 
social structures outlived the demise of indirect rule. The result was a continuation 
of the uneasy relationship between Tamale’s urbanisation, and the larger colonial 
political and economic framework in Dagbon and the Northern Territories. The 
chapter also provides an important context for the following chapter (Chapter 7), 
which unpacks Tamale’s internal local politics in the lead up to independence. 
‘New developmentalism’ in the Northern Territories? 
On the level Britain’s African colonial possessions, post-war ‘new 
developmentalism’ has been analysed in fine detail by Frederick Cooper.
3
 
According to Cooper, the British government emerged from the war with an entirely 
new position not only vis-à-vis the other ‘Great Powers’, but also with regards to its 
own electorate. Economic and political contexts had entirely changed. The result 
                                                 
3  Cooper, Decolonisation, 203. 
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was a drastic change in colonial policy and objectives. Bill Freund notes that ‘WWII 
marked a basic break in colonial and managerial thought about Africa with regard to 
labour.’
4
 The war left Britain with an enormous Dollar debt. The Labour Party, 
which came to power in July 1945, was faced with a two-pronged problem; Britain 
lacked the raw materials to produce British commodities which could earn Dollars 
to pay back the debt, and also lacked the foreign currency to purchase raw materials 
to kick-start British production (and reduce unemployment). Thus, to solve its post-
war economic crisis, Britain needed to find a way of purchasing raw materials 
within the sterling zone, in order to produce British goods, to sell to the Dollar 
countries. In that way, the labour government could boost British production 
(increase domestic employment), and reduce the dollar debt. ‘Africa’s primary 
products offered a likely source of Dollar earnings, as well as the most likely means 
of supplying Britain with raw materials without having to buy them in hard currency 
markets’.
5
 As a result, the economic focus on the colonial possessions in Africa was 
never more intense than in the post-war period.  
Cooper’s analysis of ‘new developmentalism’ defines it as similar to that formulated 
by Chamberlain at the turn of the twentieth century. Chamberlain had stated that, 
‘(i)t is not enough to occupy great spaces of the world's surface unless you can make 
the best of them. It is the duty of a landlord to develop his estate.’
6
 In Chamberlain’s 
vision, as in the case of ‘new developmentalism’, economic transformations 
occurred simultaneously to the upheaval of ‘inherently inefficient’ African social 
structures. According to Cooper, a core component of the new colonial method was 
large-scale mechanisation, especially in the agricultural sector, and investment in 
infrastructure, notably railways and roads. The scale of economic transformation 
required land planning instead of mixed farming, which in turn required local 
government instead of native authorities. Thus, under ‘New Developmentalism’, 
local government replaced native authorities. Local authorities were not only a move 
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away from African social structures, they were also, as Grischow notes, ‘designed to 
absorb school leavers into village politics and prevent them from joining the 
nationalist politics of Ashanti and the Colony’.
7
 This was especially important in the 
southern parts of the Gold Coast, including Asante, which, in the years after WWII, 
became an explosive site of political, social, and cultural activity.
8
  
Indeed, apart from boosting British access to raw materials, ‘New 
Developmentalism’ was intended to address concerns about the rise of anti-colonial 
African nationalism amongst the African intelligentsia. The fear of anti-colonial 
nationalism arising out of WWII had been voiced as early as 1939 when a British 
member of parliament warned West African governors:  
‘It may be that one of the results of the war will be to stimulate the political 
consciousness of Africans and to give emphasis to the demand for a quickened 




As a result, ‘self-government’, and ‘raising the standards of living of African’s’, 
formed important aspects of the discourse of ‘new developmentalism’. But Britain’s 
post-war relationship with the African intelligentsia, in the Gold Coast, as elsewhere 
in Africa, was a complicated one: on the one hand, post-war ‘new 
developmentalism’ claimed to be in search of men who could fulfil the ‘self-
government’ rhetoric embedded in the new post-war development ideology, but on 
the other hand, the British policymakers feared anyone who embodied ‘modern’ 
African life, had political support, and could potentially lead the Gold Coast towards 
‘self-government’.  
The complexities of the relationship between the colonial administration and the 
African intelligentsia were also reflected in the relationship between the colonial 
administration and African urban centres. Prior to WWII, colonialism sought to 
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protect Africans from the traumas of modernity’ by preserving the past.
10
 In this 
sense, urban life had been problematic, and cities such as Tamale, were regarded 
largely as unfortunate by-products of colonial domination. In contrast, under the 
post-war ‘new developmentalism’, urban centres were no longer considered 
aberrations of African life. Sydney Caine of the Colonial Office remarked in the 
post-war period that ‘I have a strong impression that many social evils of 
urbanisation are developing in Africa because of an unwillingness to admit that the 
urbanised, de-tribalised native has come to stay and must be properly provided 
for’.
11
 In many respects, ‘new developmentalism’ propagated an abhorrence of the 
‘backwardness’ of rural African social systems, and urban centres, to a large extent, 
represented the kind of commercial existence which post-war ‘new 
developmentalism’ was essentially all about. But there was the simultaneous fear 
and deep suspicion of urban centres as sites of dangerous anti-colonial sentiments. 
The threat of anti-colonial nationalism gaining traction was considered an urban 
problem. In this way, urban centres were narrowly defined; they were places in 
which anti-colonial nationalism festered, needed to be controlled and, if possible, 
contained. Conversely, spaces without a certain level of anti-colonial nationalism 
were not regarded as true urban centres.  
Cross-referencing Cooper’s analysis of ‘new Developmentalism’ with the 
historiography of the Northern Territories is, however, an uneasy exercise. Although 
local government did replace native authorities, the break with indirect rule in the 
Northern Territories is in no way as clean as Cooper’s analysis suggests. In this 
light, Jeff Grischow challenges Cooper. Grischow argues that: 
Cooper fails to observe that the shift (from indirect rule to new 
developmentalism) occurred in response to a previous period of development 
centred around indirect rule ... the focus on African community outlived the 
demise of indirect rule.
12
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Grischow notes, in contrast to Cooper:  
‘Unlike Chamberlain however, colonial officials in the 1940s remained 
concerned with the preservation of African community and clung to the idea of 
economic development without social transformation’.
13
  
The resolution of this point is important. Did ‘new developmentalism’ aim to 
destroy African social structures for the purposes of economic transformation, or 
were African social structures preserved within the new colonial economic 
emphasis? The divergence between the argument presented by Cooper and that by 
Grischow probably has something to do with perspective. On the level of empire, it 
is difficult to refute Cooper’s argument, with wave-upon-wave of broad colonial 
citations in his text. But Grischow’s specific geographical focus and a number of 
concrete cases, most notably the Gonja Development Project, in which attempts 
were made to relocate 80,000 people wholesale (village by village) from the area 
around Zuarangu to the uninhabited area around Damango, provide a very 
compelling argument for the Northern Territories specifically.
14
 The north’s raison 
d’être within the ‘new developmentalism’ was to produce foodstuffs for the south in 
sufficient quantities so as to drive down food prices in the south, and thereby 
stabilise union and consumer action in Accra and other urban centres. The large-
scale mechanisation required for the production of raw materials in order to 
stimulate British production was not directly relevant in the Northern Territories. 
The intended economic transformation in for instance, the cocoa sector, was not 
comparable to that intended for the production of yams. The creation of the Northern 
Territories Council (NTC), a council of chiefs, in 1946 is evidence of this. So too is 
the outcome of the Coussey Committee which ensured a large ‘traditional’ presence 
within local government structures in the Northern Territories (see Chapter 7). The 
evidence suggests that colonial structures in the Northern Territories thus did not 
change profoundly with the introduction of ‘new developmentalism’.  
                                                 
13  Grischow, Shaping, 168. 
14  Hargreaves, ‘Toward’, 205. 
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As Grischow notes, ‘the agrarian doctrine of development remained consistent after 
the war, but it assumed the guise of local government rather than indirect rule.’
15
 
The overall colonial structure continued to focus on chieftaincy as a legitimate 
source of authority, and land continued to be controlled communally, and Tamale, 
continued to exist as by-product of colonial administration.  
The organisation of labour and the Accra riots of 1948 
Authors of the 1970s and 1980s have noted that the protests that led to the Accra 
riots had started out as a show of dissatisfaction with high prices by a group of ex-
servicemen in Accra.
16
 Although the Accra riots quickly spread to other urban 
centres, including Kumasi, Cape Coast and Takoradi, they did not spread to Tamale. 
One northern colonial official noted, that ‘up here in the Northern Territories … 
public opinion is very sound and the people here … are sensible and law-abiding 
and do not easily get mislead’.
17
 The fact that the grievances of ex-servicemen were 
seen as the root cause of the Accra riots (coupled with the fact that riots did not 
spread to Tamale) has blunted discussions about the impact of ex-servicemen in the 
Northern Territories, including Tamale. David Killingray concludes: ‘In the 
Northern Territories, ex-soldiers appear to have had little, if any, economic or 
political impact’.
18
 Similarly, P.A. Ladouceur asserts that ‘rapid demobilisation after 
1945 did not have any significant effects on the North’.
19
 A closer examination of 
the Accra riots, however, one also conducted by Frederick Cooper, suggests that not 
ex-servicemen, but labour unions, were largely responsible for the Accra riots. 
Through the employment of Cooper’s reasoning for the outbreak of the Accra riots 
in understanding post-war Tamale, we not only reinsert ex-servicemen as a major 
force of change into Tamale’s historiography, we also delineate a number contours 
of Tamale’s socio-economic landscape. More specifically, the remainder of this 
chapter argues that a number of ex-servicemen settled in Tamale, and invoked 
                                                 
15  Grischow, Shaping, 170. 
16  See Ladouceur, Chiefs, 73. 
17  Ladouceur, Chiefs, 80. 
18  Killingray, D., ‘Soldiers, ex-servicemen, and politics in the Gold Coast, 1939-1950’, The 
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profound socio-economic and socio-cultural change. The flipside of this argument 
(and by linking it to the Accra riots) is that Tamale’s socio-economic landscape did 
not have powerful unions which could motivate the kind of action which, according 
to Cooper, initiated the Accra riots in 1948. There were no large, organised 
industries around which to build labour unions, such as the railway, mines or 
harbours, as was the case in Takoradi, Accra and Kumasi. This reveals an interesting 
feature of Tamale’s urban process; it was one which occurred without 
industrialisation or an organised labour force. The following subsection also 
provides an important context for Chapter 7, which seeks to unpack the introduction 
of party politics to Tamale’s in the lead up to independence.  
Until Cooper’s publication of Decolonisation and Africa Society: The Labour 
Question in French and British Africa, two conditions generally accounted for the 
Accra riots of 1948, namely ex-servicemen and high import prices. Although ex-
serviceman have been given a large place in the historiography of the Accra riots 
(which itself is regarded as the cornerstone of Ghana’s independence narrative), 
Cooper’s account of the riots suggests that their role may have been overstated. 
Cooper points out that the Colonial Office refused to regard the riots as a labour 
problem. This, he argues, explains why the colonial response was not wage 
increases but political concessions, which were in fact only a response to the United 
Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), who had promoted themselves on the back of the 
riots, rather than inspired them. In other words, although ex-servicemen had an 
undeniable stake in the Accra riots, the riots had more to do with the organisation of 
labour in urban centres than with the presence of ex-servicemen. A number of 
authors on the subject appear to fall into the same trap. 
Cooper notes that the Accra riots were born out of unionist action, most notably the 
railway and mine workers’ union. According to Cooper’s account, the resolution of 
the railway and mine strikes of 1947 occurred simultaneously with an outbreak of 
frustration amongst cocoa farmers who had been angered by the destruction of cocoa 
trees affected by swollen-shoot disease. Cooper notes, ‘then came the boycott of 
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urban commerce, which focussed on the sorest spot of all, the acute commodity 
shortage and galloping inflation’.
20
 Cooper continues:  
The boycott ended on 14
th
 of February, just when a group of ex-servicemen in 
Accra, encouraged by the UGCC were planning a protest march against the 
government’s failure to help them find jobs and the difficult conditions facing 
urban dwellers generally. They marched on February 28, the same day that price 
cuts that the boycott movement had negotiated went into effect. Apparently, 
people in Accra mistook the agreed upon cuts in the merchant’s mark up to be a 
50-75 percent cut in prices, and felt cheated when they learned the reality.
21
 
In contrast to Accra, Takoradi and Kumasi, Tamale’s economy was built upon 
different economic foundations, and was more or less void of powerful unions. 
Tamale had no railway, no mines, and no large-scale industry through which labour 
could organise. Tamale’s economy was held together by individual entrepreneurs, 
often ‘strangers’, petty-traders, a number of bar owners, foreign-owned market 
stalls, and the like. The charts below show a breakdown of Tamale’s population by 
sector. Large sectors such as services, commerce and agriculture were generally not 
well organised. Furthermore, formal sectors such as ‘Electricity, Gas, Water and 
Sanitary Services’ were small, and even if unionised, did not serve as a major 
political threat. Furthermore, many of those employed in the formal sector were 
southerners.  
That the Accra riots did not spread to Tamale was the result of the nature of 
Tamale’s economy. More specifically, Tamale’s economy did not lend itself to 
labour organisation. Formal employment was both small, and dominated by 
foreigners. Furthermore, such an analysis, introduces the possibility that ex-
servicemen may have been profound drivers of change, in contrast to arguments 
presented by Killingray and Ladouceur about the non-impact of ex-servicemen in 
the Northern Territories. The following subsection discusses the impact of WWII on 
Tamale’s economy and the impact of ex-servicemen who settled in Tamale in the 
period following WWII. 
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6.1. Tamale: Breakdown of people employed by sector, 1960 
 
Source: Population census of the Gold Coast and its protectorates for the year 1948 
Tamale and the war years  
On 26 August 1938, the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR) consisted of about 1,200 men, 
divided into 2 battalions: 1 GCR based at Kumasi and Accra and 2 GCR based at 
Tamale. The strength of 1 GCR was about 830. The second battalion, 2 GCR, was at 
half-strength and made up of the remainder of the 1,200 men (approx 370 men). As 
a response to the sentiment in Britain that war was now imminent, full mobilisation 
of the GCR began two days later on 28 August 1938. A month later in September 
1938, H. C. Norman, an agent working in the Gold Coast for Paterson Zachonis 
noted that when he ‘went up to Tamale for training … battalion was pretty much at 
full strength’.
22
 In February 1940 the War Office, which had taken control of all 
colonial armies, speculated that on the basis of having occupied Ethiopia, Italy was 
entertaining ideas of invading Kenya. In May 1940, the War Office notified officers 
                                                 
22  Lawler, N.E., Soldiers, airman, spies and whisperers: The Gold Coast in World War II. 
Ohio University Press, 2002, 34. 
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in West Africa that they, along with their troops, were destined for East Africa to 
support troops there. As a result, Gold Coast troops began boarding the Orion and 




6.2. Number of lorries crossing Yeji, 1926-1930 vs 1940-44 
 
Source: PRAAD (Accra) ADM 56/1/310 
 
 
On account, in part, of the Great North Road, Tamale was largely tied to the lot of 
Britain. Tamale was designed and functioned as the distribution centre for north-
south trade. Tamale serviced north-south trade, including vehicle repairs, 
accommodation, petty traders, etc. and its economy (and demographic) was a 
function of the volume of trade which passed through it. As an indication of 
slowdown of trade during the war years, in contrast to the period 1921-31, in the 
period 1931-48 Tamale returned its slowest demographic growth throughout the 
colonial period. Eades notes: ‘(t)he end of the war saw the economy in a depressed 
state. There had been an almost universal decline in real incomes during the 
hostilities, and the disruption of world trade had made many types of good 
unobtainable’.
24
 Furthermore, motorised transportation largely dried-up as lorries, 
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spare parts, and fuel were increasingly difficult to come by. It was noted in the 
Annual Report for the Northern Territories that motorised transport was ‘until 1946, 
virtually confined to officials’ vehicles and cars owned by government officers; 
there were a few dilapidated “market lorries” … due to a shortage of tyres and spare 
parts’.
25
 The number of lorries crossing Yeji Ferry during the period 1940-4 was less 
than for the period 1926-30. The chart below compares the number of lorries 
crossing Yeji ferry during the period 1925-9 with the number of lorries crossing the 
ferry during the period 1940-4. The number of lorries crossing the Yeji ferry during 
the period 1940-4 clearly fell below 1926-30 levels, suggesting also a sharp drop in 
trade during the war. 
The volume of European salt crossing Yeji ferry in the period 1940-4 was 59.7 per 
cent less than for the period 1927-31, while in the case of beer, the volume had 
fallen 85.61 per cent below 1927-31 volumes. The most drastic drop of all came in 
the trade in bullocks. Meat was an integral part of the northern economy. The 
majority of livestock that made its way south came from the French territories to the 
north. The variety of bullock bred in the French territories was considered superior 
to that bred in the Northern Territories. Since the 1920s, the British colonial 
administration worked, albeit unsuccessfully, to breed a bullock comparable to that 
of bullocks which came from the French territories. As an experiment, four bullocks 
were sent from the UK for the purposes of cross-breeding, but all four died en route 
to Tamale. Experiments were also carried out with transporting bullocks by lorry to 
Kumasi, as the death rate for on-the-hoof cattle at times approached 50 per cent. On 
22 June 1940, the Vichy Government took office in France, which raised serious 
fears about, amongst other things, the supply of bullocks. The northern border was 
indeed eventually closed, and the impact on the meat supply of the Gold Coast was, 
as predicted, profound. J. H. Stewart, Director of Veterinary Services, wrote that the 
Gold Coast ‘is thrown on its own resources for livestock … and these are inadequate 
… livestock was imported from French West Africa; with the … advent of the 
                                                 
25  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/3/222 (Annual Report for the Northern Territories, 1955). 
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Vichy government, these have been cut off’.
26
 As a result, the number of bullocks 
crossing Yeji ferry during the years 1940-4 was very low in comparison with the 
late 1920s. The chart below compares the number of bullocks crossing Yeji ferry for 
the years 1926-30 with the period 1940-4. Between 1926 and 1930, almost 35,000 
bullocks crossed Yeji ferry. Between 1940 and 1944, the figure stood at less than 
5,000.  
6.3. Cattle crossing Yeji, 1926-1930 vs. 1940-1944 
 
Source: PRAAD (Accra) ADM 56/1/310 
 
 
The lack of lorries, spare parts, and fuel also meant that Tamale largely lost its 
monopoly of the north-south trade route. Goods were no longer funnelled from the 
north to Tamale and then to the south by lorry, or vice versa. Tamale’s demographic 
growth responded correspondingly: It returned its slowest demographic growth 
during the colonial period. In contrast to the population growth during the period 
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1921-31, when Tamale’s population almost trebled from 4,000 to almost 13,000, 
during the period 1931-48 Tamale grew from 12,901 to only to 16,055, a year-on-
year growth of 1.4 per cent, compared with 23 per cent for the ten years from 1921-
31. WWII and Tamale’s economic and demographic reaction to it revealed how 
tenuous Tamale’s economic significance was: Without the lorry, Tamale threatened 
to return to the village it had been prior to 1907. WWII was a meagre period for the 
Northern Territories. Most colonial resources were directed towards the war effort, 
which in the case of the Northern Territories meant that labour directed to the 
priority industries in the south was encouraged to register as soldiers. The northern 
trade-economy was affected especially by the shortage of motor cars, spare parts, 
and fuel. Indeed, the volumes of many of the motorised trades were in 1944 
significantly lower than they had been in 1925. The period saw a shift towards 
alternative trades, especially those which had been prominent in the period before 
the introduction of motorised transport, and the slowdown in trade also meant a 
slowdown in Tamale’s demographic growth during the 17 years between 1931 and 
1948. It was thus in the context of a stagnating local economy that ex-servicemen, 
with new skills and new expectations, and most importantly, gratuities, settled in 
Tamale after being discharged.  
Ex-servicemen: Drivers of change in Tamale 
As was the case during WWI, a significant portion of the soldiers enlisted during 
WWII came from the Northern Territories. Ladouceur states that ‘of the 63,038 
Gold Coast Africans in the British forces during the Second World War, probably a 
high proportion – at least half – were of Northern origin’.
27
 This statistic is more 
significant once relative total populations are taken into consideration: in 1948 the 
total population of the south
28
 (three million) was three times greater than the total 
population of the north (1 million). After the war, most soldiers returned ‘home’,
29
 
as Killingray and Ladouceur have noted. Both equate ‘home’ simply with the north, 
                                                 
27  Ladouceur, Chiefs, 68. 
28  ‘The south’ as defined here includes both the colony and Ashanti. According to the 1948 
census, the population of the colony in 1948 was 2,217,416 and of Ashanti was 817,782. 
The Northern Territories, including part of Togoland, had a population of 1,076,482. 
29  Killingray in particular seems to define ‘home’ as simply being ‘the north’.  
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and the north with agrarian livelihoods. However, the Ya Na noted that ‘they (ex-
servicemen) preferred life in the bigger towns’.
30
 Furthermore, a report on the 
conditions of labour stated: ‘There are, in Tamale, a considerable number of ex-
servicemen who are doing nothing’.
31
 The chart below is sourced from the 1948 
population census (Figure 6.3). It compares the male population, broken down by 
age category for Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale. It indicates that a significant number 
of young adults settled in Tamale directly after the end of WWII. In 1948, 3 years 
after the war had ended, once the war effort had been significantly reduced, 15.4 per 
cent of Tamale’s population was still employed in the ‘army or other military 
institutions’.
32
 As a result of both large injections of population and money, in the 
context of a relatively stagnant economy, not only did Tamale’s population swell 
profoundly – so too did inflation. The report on the condition of labour published in 
1947 estimated that Tamale’s cost of living rose by 300 per cent over pre-war levels, 
compared with 75 per cent in Accra and Kumasi, and Tamale became the most 
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6.4. Male population by age: Tamale, Kumasi, and Accra, 1948 
 
 
Source: 1948 Census of the Gold Coast 
 
 
In the chart above, all three cities display a fairly anticipated pattern for Gold Coast 
urban centres: Significant spikes for the working age of men, 16-45. Tamale, 
however, differs from both Accra and Kumasi in two noteworthy respects: Firstly, 
Tamale displays a significantly higher proportion of boys ‘under 1 year’, and 
secondly, it displays a relatively lower portion of males in the category 1-16 years. 
Because this census was taken in 1948, males in category ‘under 1 year’ were born 
after the war, and the relatively high number in Tamale suggests that more young 
adults settled in Tamale in the years immediately following the war than in Kumasi 
and Accra. The oldest male in the ‘1-16 years’ category would have been 13 years 
old when the war ended and thus not have taken part in the war. Tamale’s male 
population, broken down by age, is unique on account of the fact that a large number 
of young men settled there after the war, many of whom were ex-servicemen. Many 
of the ex-servicemen with northern origins settled undoubtedly settled in Accra and 
Kumasi. But Tamale was a northern town, and as a result, it is plausible that a 
number of ex-servicemen were inclined to settle there instead of Kumasi and Accra. 
Tamale was a largely Muslim settlement, and in many instances, perhaps apart from 
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Hausa’s and Moshis, the networks of ex-servicemen were more developed in 
Tamale than in Kumasi and Accra. However, the numbers of ex-servicemen, and the 
identifiable unit they represented, must be seen in relative terms. Unlike in Accra 
and Kumasi, the potential for the organisation of labour in Tamale was limited, and 
unions either did not exist or were too small to possess any real political clout. 
Furthermore, the previous section has shown how meagre Tamale’s local economic 
growth had become due to the war. It was in this context that a relatively large group 
of ex-servicemen, armed with gratuities that represented a real and profound 
injection of cash, settled in Tamale.  
The most direct impact of ex-servicemen on Tamale’ dormant economy was to 
create inflationary pressures. Although inflation was high everywhere during the 
years immediately following the war, Tamale was by any measure exceptional. 
Prices in Accra and Kumasi were estimated to have risen between 50 and 75 per 
cent.
34
 In comparison, it was noted of Tamale that ‘Tamale (is) one of the most 
expensive towns to live in the whole of the Gold Coast’.
35
 The report listed all the 
trappings of a highly inflationary economy: The emergence of a ‘flourishing black 
market’, ‘growth in population’, ‘supply shortages’, and a ‘large amount of money 
in circulation’. As a result of the Accra riots, price controls were introduced. Within 
the Gold Coast, that meant prices were standardised, except for a transport 
differential of a maximum of five per cent.
36
 The implementation of the price 
controls in Tamale was difficult, at least in part due to high levels of illiteracy. In the 
last three months of 1948, ten people were arrested for not displaying the price-lists 
in their stores.
37
 But petty traders and market women were not the only ones abusing 
the price controls. One government clerk laid an accusation against the UAC. He 
noted of the UAC, ‘instead of this firm (UAC) displaying its wares (cotton prints) on 
the shelves, for any plebeian to purchase, (it) hides them in the wholesale and 
appoints a day for the sale. As a result, the buying media of the inhabitants is let 
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35  Ibid. 
36  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/15/5 (Trade Price Controls). 




loose on this day’.
38
 He continued: ‘words would but beggar if I determine to 
describe the scene on such days; children, men and women elbow one another’s way 
… ’.
39
 The shortage of supplies in Tamale, along with the presence of monies 
generated by the gratuities of ex-servicemen, drove up prices in Tamale, despite the 
price controls. The gratuities received by ex-servicemen posed a structural problem 
to Tamale’s local economy. One report noted that a ‘considerable number of ex-
servicemen in Tamale … are getting rid of their money in no mean fashion … A 
very large sum of money has been withdrawn from the post office in this area, 
estimated at about ₤70 per man. A lot of this has been squandered ...’.
40
 The high 
prices invited more abuses of Tamale’s price controls. Syrians were trading cloth 
sourced at Kumasi in Tamale at well above the statutory price.
41
 They sold like ‘hot 
cakes because they cannot be got from any of the firms in Tamale’.
42
 One journalist 
wrote ‘… a piece of ordinary print costs ₤5 here (Tamale) although the same cloth 
costs 30s in Kumasi’.
43
 Certainly, cloth was not the only good to be exploited. Flour 
was reportedly sold in Tamale at ₤2 15s per bag, while the price control for Tamale 
was set at 36s per bag.
44
 The DC for Tamale wrote to the CCNT, saying that it may 
well be that ‘shop assistants save available stocks of scarce goods, such as sugar, for 
their friends, and these people may be the ones, who … are receiving more than 
their share’.
45
 One reporter referred to Tamale as ‘the most notorious profiteering 
Town in the Gold Coast’.
46
 While Syrians and a number of southern businessmen 
were cornering the markets of a number of goods, selling much of it illegally in the 
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south (under the price controls this was illegal), the colonial trading firms introduced 
a passbook system, whereby regular customers could deposit sums of money, 
usually not less than £50, and obtain goods up to the value of the deposit. Not only 
was this a way of lending money, the passbook system introduced by expatriate 
trading firms worked again to hand the market over to a select few who could afford 
to pay £50, many of them Yorubas. As an indication of how much £50 was, in 1949 
any amount over £3 withdrawn from the post office had to be sanctioned by the Post 
Office Bank in Accra.
47
 The result was general hostility towards the trading firms, 
who were accused of purposefully limiting the distribution of cloth to a few 
suppliers in order to take advantage of low supply levels.
48
  
The implications of Tamale’s profiteering, inflationary, and speculative economy, 
driven in part by ex-servicemen was, acute supply shortages, especially of foodstuffs 
but also of cloth and other consumer goods. Seidu Dagomba, a Mallam in Tamale, 
noted in a complaint to the DC: ‘We are dying in the hands of those people who 
seem to call themselves rich people’.
49
 His claim was that people who possessed 
sufficient money were holding up food in order to drive up prices by further 
squeezing supply. He wrote that the intention of ‘people who seem to be rich in 
Tamale’ was to ‘buy lots of rice, Guinea-corn and all kinds of food stuffs in Tamale 
and keep this food until food becomes scarce when they will retail it with double 
profit. This kind of food trading is bringing the shortage of food to Tamale.’
50
 Irvine 
Gass, DC for Tamale, pointed out that ‘general opinion considers that the annual 
shortage is entirely due to lack of rain’.
51
 Gass, however, disputed this explanation. 
He noted that ‘(t)here is scarcely a square yard of farmable land in Tamale 
uncultivated’.
52
 According to Gass, ‘the problem is economic rather than climatic’.
53
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Gass suggested that with ‘the spread of education there is an increasing flow of 
individuals from the rural areas to the towns, which resulted in a greater demand for 
food in the latter without a corresponding rise in production from the former’.
54
 Gass 
concluded: ‘A dry season aggravates the situation but receives the whole of the 
blame when the shortage is more acute than usual’.
55
  
The tension between civilians and ex-servicemen was not limited to the allocation of 
scarce resources. The DC for Tamale noted in April 1947 that he had ‘a deputation 
of some 20 soldiers, placing a protest of their innocence on record after fracas 
between serving soldiers and the discharged soldiers with the police’.
56
 There were 
other examples of conflicts between civilians and the military institution, of a less 
physical nature, but perhaps not less contested. The Tamale Youth Association, for 
example, complained that ‘(m)ost of us reside near the regimental lines and when 
our sheep, goats, cows, horses and fowls go out to feed and graze the soldiers follow 
and detained them’.
57
 The DC for Tamale complained to the Certifying and Testing 
Officer: ‘I asked you some weeks ago to stop using the Football Ground and Parade 
Ground for testing lorries’.
58
 Such incidents were typical of Tamale during this 
period. These altercations between military and civilian elements were often 
articulated in spatial terms, but they represented a deeper structural cleavage 
between those who had joined the GCR and been to East Africa, Burma, or 
Cameroon, and experienced post-industrial society, and those who had not.  
Ex-servicemen in Tamale also initiated a number of socio-cultural transformations. 
In 1947, the DC for Tamale noted that ‘(a) young man (Mr Sagoe) recently out of 
the Army came to town this month to start a cinema. He had his own projecting 
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apparatus and had rented some films … ’.
59
 The films he had brought with him were 
‘Trails of the Vigilantes’, ‘The Naughty Nineties’, ‘Music for Millions’, and 
‘Destination Tokyo’. Packham noted that Mr Sagoe ‘reckons he can make money 
out of it in Tamale. I reckon he can too’.
60
 Not only is the commercial initiative of 
Mr Sagoe interesting as a socio-cultural influence: The fact that such initiatives were 
seen to have a good chance of succeeding in Tamale says something very specific 
about Tamale’s society, namely, that it was at least felt to possess a significant 
cosmopolitan component. This was of course only a superficial indication of deeper 
changes taking place within Tamale’s social fabric, but the implications were 
significant. From the late 1940s, discourses began to appear which challenged a 
number of customary institutions. Especially the ‘traditional’ understanding of 
marriage seemed to be subject to challenges. Archival sources indicate a sharp 
increase in the number of matrimonial disputes in the period after the war. The war 
had separated men from their wives for long periods. In some instances, soldiers 
returned to find that their wives had found new partners. In other instances, women 
were dissatisfied by the financial contributions their husbands had made to their 
well-being during the war. It was customary that women (wives) who were left 
behind by soldiers despatched to Burma or East Africa were given monies by those 
soldiers to support themselves (‘chop money’). Chop money acted also as a kind of 
deposit. It became the practice to reclaim ‘chop money’ if a woman found another 
man while her husband was away on duty. In September 1946, Madam Hawa Basare 
wrote to the DC stating that she had married her husband, Musa Fulani, ‘now an ex-
soldier’, in 1939, and that in 1942 when he was sent to Burma, he agreed to pay her 
₤1 per month ‘chop money’. Hawa Basare claimed that when her husband returned 
from the war in 1946, she returned the ₤26 he had paid her during the war, money 
which she saved while working as a tailor in Tamale. In this way Hawa Basare 
bought herself separation from her ex-husband. She complained only when her 
husband came and collected many of her possessions. Interestingly, the ‘buying out’ 
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of matrimonies had emerged as accepted practice in the post-war period, as is clear 
from the example of Hawa Basare. There were also instances in which soldiers did 
not pay the ‘chop money’ during the war. This too had implications for marriage 
formulations. One case was that of Awenniyelay Grunshi, wife of Sgt. Amadu 
Grunshi of the 1
st
 GCR stationed at Tamale. After Sgt. Amadu Grunshi was sent 
‘overseas’, his wife went to Accra and admitted to engaging in prostitution in order 




In June 1952, Asinah Moshie, a Moshi woman from the Moshie Zongo (Ward A), 
wrote to the DC for Tamale stating that,  
I have entirely refused to marry Bukari who is residing at Sabonjida, Tamale, 
N.T.’s. I was staying with my mother called Mamunata residing at Moshie 
Zongo, Tamale, N.T’s where a certain man called Warder Yamba of H.M. 
Prisons at Tamale saw me and he had a desire to marry me. He asked me as to 
whether I have a husband but I replied to the negative. I further told him that I 
was given to one Bukari for marriage by my father, now deceased, but in view of 
the fact that I was not consulted of the marriage by my father and I refused 
marriage … I beg to state that I am living with Warder Yamba in Cape Coast as 
wife and husband, because I love him.
62
 
Conventional urban externalities also became increasingly prevalent during the 
1950s. There was, for instance, a noteworthy increase in the number of alcohol-
related complaints in Tamale. Emma Aryeetey, a petty trader in Tamale, wrote to the 
Assistant District Commissioner, Tamale on 23 April 1952, to complain: 
I have a husband who is a tailor and who has taken upon himself to go drinking 
leaving his work and peoples things, and at anytime I call him to advice him, he 




These types of urban discourses seemed to spread beyond marriage. Al Haji Sani, of 
house number 87 in Ward A, complained on 27 March 1952: 
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I have the honour most respectfully beg to quit one Codjoe Fitter from my house 
… he is fond of getting drunk and riding his motor cycle into the house. The 
house is full of children and grown up … to protect the lives of the inmates, I am 
asking him through you to quit my house without further delay.
64
  
The number of cases involving ‘theft’, for instance, increased. Gass noted in 1947, 
shortly before being replaced by Packham, ‘for the first time for years there have 
been a number of cases of theft from European Bungalows’.
65
 Packham reported a 
series of fires in the Moshi Zongo. On enquiry, he was told by police that the fires 
were ‘due to grudges among house-owners’.
66
 Whether or not this assessment from 
the police is true or not is less important than the fact that it was regarded as a 
plausible suggestion. Criminality not only increased, it also became more varied. 
Packham heard in his court a notorious case involving a Prison Warder who was 
caught gambling with prisoners. There was also a case of a Dagomba trader who 
was ‘peddling Lysol as a panacea for all ills’.
67
 Tamale’s urbanism also provided 
increasingly a refuge for those marginalised by rural traditional norms and values. 
The DC for Tamale noted in his diary: ‘Quite a number of lunatics wandering 
around Tamale … M.O. suggests sending them back to where they came from … 
Not a bad idea, perhaps, except that there can be no compulsion and no means of 
making them stay put’.
68
  
There were still other manifestations of Tamale’s increasingly urban character, 
especially in relation to the outlying rural areas. During the 1940s, people who had 
fallen foul of traditional norms and values sought refuge in Tamale. For instance, 
women accused of witchcraft, women who had been forced into marriage, often to 
chiefs, and those accused of insanity, sought refuge in Tamale. Women who sought 
the ‘protection of the flag’ became such a frequent sight at the base of the flagpole 
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(flying the Union Jack) outside the CCNT’s residence that they became referred to 
as ‘flag girls’, and there were discussions about how best to manage the influx of 
such cases. In Tamale, ‘traditional outcasts’ found at least some protection.  
Not only was Tamale’s socio-economic landscape increasingly subjected to urban 
pressures, Tamale’s demographic growth accelerated exponentially after 1948. 
Whereas it had grown from a little under 12,000 in 1931, to 16:055 in 1948, it grew 
to over 48,000 in 1960. Whilst Tamale’s population breakdown by sex shows a 
typical gender demographic for northern towns – more women than men between 
the ages of 16 and 44 on account of north-to-south labour migration by a large 
number of men between 16 and 44 – in the case of Tamale the disparity was far less 
pronounced than other northern town. Tamale had thus, by 1960, established itself 
firmly as a destination of northern labour.  
6.5. Tamale, population breakdown, men & women, 1960 
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6.6. Yendi, population breakdown, men & women, 1960 
 
Source: Population Census of Ghana for the Year 1960 
 
6.7. Wa, population breakdown, men & women, 1960 
 







6.8. Bawku, population breakdown, men & women, 1960 
 
Source: Population Census of Ghana for the Year 1960 
Furthermore, Figure 6.10 below shows also that the spike of Tamale’s the working 
men (between the ages of 16 and 44) relative to other ages, and very young children 
(between 0-14), was more pronounced in Tamale than in other northern towns.  
6.9. Tamale, Yendi, Wa and Bawku; population by age, 1960 
 
Source: Population Census of Ghana for the Year 1960 




The chapter has made two interrelated arguments. The first is simply an 
acknowledgement of Grischow’s observation that the colonial emphasis on the 
preservation of African social structures in the Northern Territories outlived indirect 
rule, which was replaced by ‘new developmentalism’ after WWII. This explains 
why the introduction of ‘new developmentalism’, which claimed to have little regard 
for African social structures, did not have the affect of integrating Tamale into the 
colonial political economy, as might have been anticipated. The result was that 
Tamale was as ill-fitting within colonial structures in the post-war period, as it had 
been during the period of indirect rule. The second part of this chapter argues that, 
largely on account of the presence of ex-servicemen, Tamale underwent a profound 
transformation during the immediate post-war period. By employing Cooper’s 
analysis of the Accra riots (that they were the result of unionist action, rather than 
ex-servicemen), more acknowledgement may be given to the role of ex-servicemen 
in Tamale’s historiography is possible. That ex-servicemen were not direct drivers 
of political change, should not be used to suggest that that they had no impact at all. 
On the contrary, ex-servicemen formed the major driver of change in Tamale in the 
post-war period. Furthermore, again with a view to Cooper’s analysis of the Accra 
riots, the fact that the Accra riots, did not spread to Tamale, despite spreading to a 
number of other urban centres, reveals something about the Tamale’s socio-
economic landscape. Tamale’s labour was not organised, as it was in other urban 
centres. There were no major industries around which labour could organise. This 
had implications also for the manner in which party politics was introduced to 

















 ‘… a town of little importance…’: 
Tamale towards independence 
Introduction  
This chapter is interested in developments in Tamale within the context of Ghana’s 
path to independence. The period 1948-60 was one in which, as in the 1920s, 
Tamale’s population grew significantly. Furthermore, by 1960 only 60 per cent of 
Tamale’s population was Dagomba.
1
 Not only did Tamale’s population grow 
significantly, it also took on a far more ethnically heterogeneous character than 
hitherto. Like Tamale’s demographic, Tamale’s institutional anatomy also 
underwent significant transformation. The introduction of party politics and a 
number of ‘secular’ institutions transformed Tamale’s socio-political landscape. 
These changes prompted a number of political realignments in Tamale. The 
horizontal and vertical dimensions between the legitimacy of the Gulkpe-Na and the 
Dakpema, the colonial administration, Muslim and Christian elites, ethnic headmen, 
southerners, and finally, new ‘secular’ political apparatuses such as the Tamale 
Urban Council (TUC) in 1952, dimensions in which alliances were based on a 
mixture of personal relationships, and local and traditional objectives, created a 
complex, contested, and often contradictory political landscape. The complexity of 
                                                 




Tamale’s political landscape, especially in relation to that of Dagbon and the north 
more generally, resulted in the isolation of Tamale’s local politics from the broader 
political structures of Dagbon and the Northern Territories. Tamale’s inward-
looking political dynamic, this chapter argues, was exacerbated by, in some 
instances, tensions between local political lines, as well as national, regional, and 
traditional cleavages. In short, this chapter argues that Tamale’s isolation from 
northern politics more generally is in part the result of the complex and contested 
internal political stratifications and alignments as they developed in Tamale, and in 
part the result of how the local political alliances arising therefrom related to 
divisions within the political structures of Dagbon and the north.  
A note on political configurations in the Northern Territories  
It is tempting to analyse Ghana’s independence in terms of dichotomies. The NTC 
was, for instance, a political organ with its roots firmly entrenched in traditional 
political systems and thus also worked to maintain those systems. The Northern 
People’s Party (NPP), formed in the run-up to the 1954 election, shared an almost 
identical leadership to that of the NTC and thus also adopted chieftaincy as a core 
political priority. The CPP, on the other hand, has been remembered as a party 
opposed to chieftaincy.
2
 These are neat distinctions that provide at least some 
indication of the broad political lines of Ghana’s independence. But on the local 
level, such broad lines were frequently undermined. As a result, the broad lines of 
Ghana’s independence politics threaten to obscure more than they expose in a study 
of local politics. A number of northern chiefs supported the CPP, despite the 
primarily anti-chieftaincy sentiment within the CPP. In Builsa, A. Afoko, the brother 
of the Sandemanab, the paramount chief in Builsa, won the constituency in 1954 as 
a CPP candidate, largely on account of his brother’s support. In southern Navrongo 
another CPP candidate, L. R. Abavana won owing to his influence over the chief of 
Navrongo, while in Navrongo North, C. K. Tedam (NPP), the brother of a sub-
divisional chief, the Pagapio, won the constituency. In such instances, perhaps it 
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may be argued, patrimonial systems overrode rational, political decision-making 
procedures. These kinds of political ironies were to be seen in many places across 
the Gold Coast and its protectorates. Furthermore, after each election, many 
politicians ‘crossed the floor’, further blurring the local political lines of Ghana’s 
independence. Politicians who championed NPP causes later became prominent 
members of the CPP. A large number of ‘independents’ during the 1954 elections 
further confuse potential dichotomies. The political patron phenomenon was clear 
everywhere in the Northern Territories, and certainly in many constituencies such 
systems had a profound impact on the election outcome. In Tamale also there is 
evidence of these kinds of political relations. Where possible, every attempt has 
been made to highlight personal linkages within the political arena. To 
overemphasise such relations may, however, work to discredit Tamale’s electorate. 
Care is thus taken not to overstate the influence of such relationships. 
Institutions, actors, and events: The emergence of traditional 
trajectories in northern politics 
Ghana’s independence from colonial rule involved a complex plethora of 
committees, commissions, councils, authorities, and assemblies. An overview of the 
birth, death, and operation of the various political apparatuses is (perhaps 
unfortunately) necessary in order to contextualise both northern and Tamale’s local 
politics in relation to independence. On a national level, this bureaucratic maze has 
been studied perhaps most comprehensively by Dennis Austin, while P. A. 
Ladouceur has done so from a northern perspective. Martin Staniland dedicates 
several chapters of his book, The Lions of Dagbon, to understanding the place of 
Dagbon within the nationalist politics which took Ghana towards independence. The 
following overview rests primarily on their work.  
The birth of the Northern Territories council 
The conservative, pro-chieftaincy element of the north’s political structure was born 
first out of the NTC, established in 1946. Following WWII, the colonial 
administration found calls for constitutional change increasingly difficult to ignore. 




representation on the Legislative Assembly. In this vein, in January 1945, the 
Governor of the Gold Coast proposed the formation by the chiefs of a Northern 
Territories Joint Council, ‘to settle among yourselves those problems which are 
common to you all and to select from amongst you representatives for the central 
legislature’.
3
 On 16 and 17 December 1946, the NTC had its first meeting. For the 
colonial administration, chiefs represented the ‘natural rulers’, and it was thus hardly 
surprising that the creation of a regional council, initiated by the colonial 
administration itself, would have an overwhelmingly chiefly character. Members of 
the NTC were selected by the Native Authorities – remnants of indirect rule, which, 
as we have seen in previous chapters, had chieftaincy as its cornerstone. The NTC 
was the highest ‘native’ institution in the Northern Territories and, in the years 
which followed, largely dictated the trajectory of northern involvement in the 
nationalist politics of independence. Unsurprisingly, it positioned itself as staunchly 
pro-chieftaincy. Furthermore, the leadership of the NPP, formed seven years later in 
1953, was almost identical to that of the NTC. The shift from regional council to 
political party ensured, as mentioned previously, that northern chiefs were 
represented within the development of Ghana’s nationalist politics. In the 1954 
election, the NPP won the second-highest number of votes, behind only the CPP, 
and thus, in line with the British parliamentary system, formed the official 
opposition. This laid the foundation for the broad lines of Ghana’s independence – 
non-chieftaincy vs. chieftaincy, and, broadly, south vs. north.  
The process of liberating Ghana from colonial rule started in proper in February and 
March, 1948, with the outbreak of the Accra riots. The immediate causes of the riots 
were two inter-related issues: The plight of cocoa farmers in the areas affected by 
swollen-shoot disease, and the increase in real prices of imported goods. What 
started out as a peaceful march turned violent when police opened fire on the crowd 
outside Christianborg Castle, killing several protestors. In response, the residents of 
Accra rioted. Before long, riots broke out in other urban centres, including Kumasi. 
After quelling the riots, the colonial administration launched the Watson 
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Commission to investigate the causes of the riots. The Watson Commission found 
that the constitution required reform. More specifically, the Legislative Assembly of 
the Gold Coast was to have greater African representation. The ‘Accra riots’ did not 
affect the Northern Territories, including Tamale. The CCNT noted: ‘up here in the 
Northern Territories … public opinion is very sound and the people here … are 
sensible and law-abiding and do not easily get mislead’.
4
 That the north, including 
Tamale, showed no interest in expressing severe dissatisfaction in the form of riots 
as the rest of the colony did, not only reveals something about the political 
relationship between north and south, it also had profound implications for the 
trajectory of northern involvement in the national political arena. Northern politics 
was not born out of mass civil dissatisfaction and unrest, expressed as a political 
statement, as was the case in the Asante and the Coast. The result was that the 
trajectory towards ‘self-government’ set out by the colonial administration was not 
significantly challenged within the existing colonial political apparatus. The vision 
of the colonial administration, as mentioned above, saw chiefs as the ‘natural rulers’, 
reflected also in the composition of the NTC.  
Following the riots, the Watson Commission of Enquiry was established to look into 
the direct causes of the Accra riots. What was needed, it found, was a new 
constitution which provided for more African representation on the Legislative 
Council. Thereafter, the Coussey Committee was launched to set out more concrete 
steps in order to reformulate the constitution. The CCNT, W. H. Ingrams, asked the 
NTC to put forward four individuals to serve on the Coussey Committee, while the 
fifth would be selected by Ingrams himself, formally ending the policy of isolating 
the north from events in the south.
5
 Including the five Northerners, all forty 
members of the Coussey Committee were African. Through the Coussey 
Committee, the north contributed directly to the formation and content of a new 
constitution. Importantly for this chapter, the manner in which the north entered the 
national political framework was within the parameters of strong, pro-chieftaincy 
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sentiments, guided initially by the NTC, an institution very much created in the 
vision of the colonial administration. 
The Coussey committee  
The fact that the northern representatives on the Coussey Committee were selected 
by the NTC meant, unsurprisingly, that all five had either an affiliation to 
chieftaincy or to the colonial administration, or to both. Two chiefs were nominated, 
Yakubu Tali (the Tali Na from Dagomba) and J.A. Karbo (the Lawra Na, from the 
North-West). The other two selected were J.A.A. Salaam, an Achimota-trained 
teacher, and N. Yenli, an Assistant Agricultural officer in charge of the Agricultural 
Training School at Tamale. Finally, Ingram selected J.A. Braimah, also a chief (the 
Kabachewura), from Gonja. Braimah had been clerk to the Gonja Native Authority 
since 1933. Three of the five northern members of the Coussey Committee were 
thus themselves chiefs, while the remaining two, although not chiefs, had built 
careers within the colonial administration, which itself had for many decades 
promoted chieftaincy as the natural authority of African societies.  
The paradigm which came to define much of the north’s involvement in national 
politics in the lead-up to Independence was dominated by a number of primary 
concerns. For the five Northern representatives on the Coussey Committee, all 
recommendations set forward by the members of the committee were studied within 
the gap between the level of development in the south compared with that of north. 
The northern members of the Coussey Committee were afraid to rush towards 
independence and argued that the gap between the north and the south needed to be 
closed before independence was granted. The inclusion of the north in the 
proceedings of the Coussey Committee thus posed a unique challenge for the 
committee: The committee had to find ways in which the new constitution could 
cater, on the one hand, to the progressive forces in the south, and on the other, the 
conservative sentiments which were pervasive in much of the north.  
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7.1. Constitution of regional councils: North vs. South 
 
*  The chart above reveals a majority for members of the NTC elected by 
traditionally based bodies (grey shaded area), in contrast to southern regional 




In order to incorporate northern sentiments into a constitution designed largely by 
and for progressive southerners, a large amount of flexibility was required. Thus, for 
instance, the Coussey Committee recommended the creation of regional councils, 
which – except in the case of the Northern Territories – would not be based on the 
existing territorial councils.
6
 The consequence was that whereas in the south the 
membership of the new regional councils would consist of two-thirds directly 
elected members and only one-third nominated by traditional elements, in the 
Northern Territories the regional council would consist of the seventeen members 
nominated by the NTC and only ten directly elected members. The members of the 
NTC were, as has been mentioned previously, aligned to chieftaincy. As a result, 
                                                 




while in southern regional councils traditional elites held only a minority, in the 
Northern Regional Council such traditional elites held a 17-to-10 majority (see 
Figure 7.1 below). In the north, therefore, the recommendations of the Coussey 
Committee reasserted chieftaincy at the apex of the north’s regional hierarchical 
structure, in contrast to the developments in the structures of southern politics. This 
is more evidence of Grischow’s argument that the emphasis on the maintenance of 
African social structure outlived the demise of indirect rule in the Northern 
Territories.  
Furthermore, the Committee recommended that Native Authorities be abolished and 
replaced by a system of State Councils (SCs) and Local Authorities (LAs). SCs were 
mandated to preside over traditional issues, while LAs would assume responsibility 
for municipal initiatives. At least one-third of the members of the LAs would be 
appointees of the SCs, whilst up to two thirds would be elected.
7
 The flexibility of 
the new structure in terms of the division between secular and traditional actors was 
part of a design which sought to allow the north to continue to sail its pro-
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7.2. Coussey committee recommendations 
 
 The two major recommendations of the Coussey Committee are set out in 
this chart. The constitution of the Northern Regional Council was a replica 
of the NTC, while in the south, regional councils had a directly elected 
majority. The split between State Councils and Local Authorities is also 
illustrated. Both recommendations were designed in order to cater for the 
conservative forces in the north and, simultaneously, the progressive forces 
in the south.  
 
 
‘The bad boys have come … the bad boys have come’  
The pro-chieftaincy dominance of politics in the Northern Territories would have 
gone unchallenged had it not been for the simultaneous establishment of a CPP 
branch in Tamale in 1948. The CPP in Tamale challenged the dominant pro-
chieftaincy elements in the Northern Territories. As Paul-Andre Ladouceur states of 
the late 1940s:  
 … two very different types of politics were evolving in the Northern Territories, 
one based on the colonial administrative structure of indirect rule, the other 
derived from and allied with the nationalist politics of Southern Ghana. The 




while the latter, outside of the framework of the official politics was either 
ignored or subject to harassment and intimidation.
8
 
If the traditionally focused NTC embodied the former of Ladouceur’s ‘types of 
politics’ that emerged in the Northern Territories in the late 1940s, Ebenezer Adam 
perhaps embodied the latter. Ebenzer Adam was born in Tamale, the son of a 
carpenter working for the Public Works Department in Tamale. In 1939 Ebenezer 
Adam completed his penultimate year at Achimota College. On his journey back to 
Tamale for the school holidays, he stopped at Kumasi for two days to visit family. 
When he returned to Tamale, Ebenezer Adam reflects, “people were saying, ‘the bad 
boys have come … the bad boys have come’”.
9
 For reasons he did not yet know, he 
was ordered to appear in front of the Education Officer. He was told that his grant 
was to be rescinded on the grounds that he was “visiting Kumasi without a 
permit”.
10
 Adam was able to complete his schooling at Achimota as a result of 
private funding he had secured with the assistance of the headmaster of Achimota.  
How much this confrontation between Adam and the colonial administration had to 
do with the anti-colonial politicisation of Adam is not clear, but in the years which 
followed, a discernable resentment towards colonial domination manifested itself in 
a political career largely dedicated to decolonising the Gold Coast. In 1940, after 
completing his training at Achimota, Adam was sent to Kumasi to teach. He joined 
the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947 and in 1948, on the outbreak of 
the Accra riots, he was sent to Tamale to open a branch of the UGCC. Adam 
remembers of his arrival at Tamale that “although individuals knew of the UGCC, 
there was no party presence when I arrived in 1948”.
11
 He went in search of a 
support-base. Clerks who worked for the colonial administration, generally the most 
educated social strata in Tamale, almost all southerners, were not permitted to join 
political parties and were thus of little use to Ebenezer Adam. Adam thus assembled 
a series of “Fante, Ga, and other southern businessmen”.
12
 in Tamale and proposed 
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the opening of a branch of the UGCC in Tamale, with their support. Adam became 
the secretary of the new branch, while his uncle, R.S. Iddrissu, a transport owner 
also based in Kumasi, was elected chairman. An interesting feature of the UGCC 
branch in Tamale, and later the CPP branch, is that early on, although its leadership 
(Ebenezer Adam and R.S. Iddrissu) were very much local in terms of Tamale, the 
majority of its support came from foreigners. Both Adam and Iddrissu supported the 
new party founded by Kwame Nkrumah, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), in 
1949, and both transferred to and became prominent members of the CPP branch in 
Tamale.  
7.3. ‘Types’ of politics in the Northern Territories and Tamale 
 
* The two types of politics set out by Ladouceur. The table shows the contrasting 
dominance of each ‘type of politics’ in the Northern Territories generally (left-
hand side), and in Tamale (right-hand side).  
 
The Ewart committee 
Following the conclusion of the Coussey Committee in November 1949 and the 
acceptance of the recommendation to increase the African representation on the 
Legislative Council, an election for the Legislative Assembly needed to be held at 




working out the technicalities of the ‘delimitation of constituencies and the 
establishment of voting procedures, qualifications and disqualifications of voters 
and candidates etc’.
13
 The Ewart Committee was a working committee of the 
Legislative Council, and as no northerners were, at that stage, members of the 
Legislative Assembly, the north was not represented on the Ewart Committee. The 
Ewart Committee recommended that whereas in the south, direct elections were to 
be held, in the north, MPs would be elected by an electoral college. As a result, 
previous authors associate the Ewart Committee with a disenfranchising of the 
north.
14
 That the Ewart Committee disenfranchised the north is technically true – 
northerners were not given the opportunity to elect their national representatives 
directly – but the recommendations set out by the Ewart Committee for the north 
were directly in line with what the five northern members of the Coussey Committee 
had argued: owing to a general lack of education, northerners were not in state to 
elect MPs directly, and for the foreseeable future, chiefs would thus act as 
custodians of the people. In this vein, the Ewart Committee noted that in the north 
‘there appeared to be universal support for nomination’
15
 by an electoral college. 
The electoral college would consist of the 17 members of the NTC and another 104 
members, who were chosen on a population basis by the Native Authorities. The 
Chief Regional Officer (who replaced the CCNT) recommended that the new district 
council areas be made so as to correspond with the areas of the traditional units of 
Native Authorities. Furthermore, each of the new Local Authorities corresponded 
directly with that of Subordinate Native Authorities, just as under indirect rule. 
Finally, in Dagbon, the Ya Na was the president of the Yendi division’s Local 
Authority, which according to Staniland, ‘symbolised the continuing authority of 
chieftaincy’.
16
 The only challenge to the electoral college came from the Tamale 
branch of the CPP. They submitted a memorandum which indicated that they were 
vehemently against nomination by an electoral college and in favour of direct 
elections because, they felt, the process by which the electoral college was 
                                                 
13  Ladouceur, Chiefs, 75. 
14  See, for instance, Ladouceur, Chiefs, 75. 
15  Austin, D., Politics in Ghana, 1948-1960. Oxford. 1964, 232. 
16  Staniland, Lions, 128. 
    195        
 
constituted was strongly biased in favour of chieftaincy.
17
 But outside of Tamale the 
CPP had little traction. As a result, the CPP memorandum could be, and was, simply 
ignored. Both Ebenzer Adam and R.S. Iddrissu boycotted the nomination process. 




The electoral college was mandated to nominate the 19 northern seats on the 
Legislative Council. Thirty-four candidates challenged for the 19 available seats. 
The nominations of the electoral college took place largely along ethnic lines, and 
selections were made with more due regard for personalities than political 
convictions. Although the CPP did not officially put any candidates forward, two 
CPP members ran of their own accord (see list below). One of the two CPP 
candidates, E. A. Mahama, tied for nineteenth place with Seidu Wala, who was the 
Katua-Na of Katua, but the CCNT cast the deciding vote in favour of the Katua-Na. 
The Muslim Association Party (MAP) representative for Tamale, Alhadji Osumanu, 
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7.4. Northern candidates for legislative assembly 
Candidates                                             No.of votes 
Yakubu Tali 73 
J. H. Allassani 67 
J. A. Braimah 55 
Mumumi Koray 54 
J. B. Harruna 48 
L. R. Abavana 46 
A. Afoko 42 
S. D. Dombo 39 
Sumani Bukari 36 
Alhadji Osumanu 36 
Abudu Mumuni 35 
Ayeebo Asumda 34 
Jambaidu Awuni 33 
Bukari Yakubu 32 
Ayarna Imoru 31 
J. A. Ayinibisa 29 
Bagamsa Dimongso 29 
Alidu Kanton 29 
Seidu Wala 28 
 
* A list of the 34 men elected by the electoral college to represent the Northern 
Territories in the Legislative Assembly.  
 
Eight of the 19 elected members were chiefs in their own right. Five were prominent 
members of the NTC. The remaining members were teachers in native authority 
schools. They were elected largely because they were literate, but they did not 
necessarily posses any interest in national politics. The result of the political 
trajectory of the north was that after 1951 (as before), official northern politics was 
dominated by pro-chieftaincy elements. This outcome was the result of a chain of 
events starting with the formation of the NTC in 1946, but was greatly aided by the 
fact that in 1951 the north did not hold direct elections like Asante and the Coast, 
but relied on an electoral college whose constitution was based on Native 
Authorities (each one presided over by a chief, since the introduction of indirect rule 
in 1930) and the NTC (a council created on the initiative of the colonial 
administration and based on chiefly systems).  
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The 19 nominated northern members of the Legislative Assembly were seen initially 
to represent a united block, who broadly took up the same positions as the northern 
members of the Coussey Committee had done. The priority issues of the northern 
members of the Coussey Committee continued as the priority issues of the northern 
block in the Legislative Assembly. The northern block saw itself as essentially 
neutral, not aligned to any party; they considered their role as being the custodians 
of northern interests and thus to support an organisation which furthered those 
interests. Nkrumah was encouraged by the British Government to include the north 
in his cabinet because it was felt that to select only CPP members threatened to 
create northern hostilities and perhaps, in the extreme, secessionist tendencies. As a 
result, J. A. Braimah was appointed to the cabinet as Minister without portfolio, 
whilst J. H. Allasani became his Ministerial Secretary. Despite his nomination to a 
CPP-dominated cabinet, J. A. Braimah continued to assert in the assembly that he 
and other northern members of the Legislative Assembly would continue to adopt a 
neutral position regarding party politics.  
Thus, while Nkrumah and other CPP politicians based their program around 
independence at the soonest instance (‘Independence Now’), the northern block 
under Braimah continued to assert concerns about the widening economic and social 
development gap between north and south as a result of rushing towards 
independence. J. A. Braimah, who had subsequently been made Minister of 
Communications and Works, addressed the Legislative Assembly, warning that  
Those who would like to insert such a date … they will be paving the gloomy 
path of national suicide; they will be driving a wedge between north and south; 
they will be sounding the death-knell of national unity and destroying the hard 
won confidence of the north … 
19
  
The issue of chieftaincy continued to be of fundamental interest to the northern 
block, although at times it was simply taken for granted because each of the 19 
northern members of the Legislative Assembly had found his prominence, directly 
or indirectly, in the traditional system developed during the colonial period. Despite 
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the contrast of the political sentiments of the northern Members of the Legislative 
Assembly MLAs on their priority issues with CPP-based nationalist politics, CPP 
members continued to exert pressure on the northern MLAs to join the CPP party 
and found that some younger members of the northern block, especially amongst 
peoples where colonially endorsed chieftaincy had not worked in their favour, such 
as the Kusasi, were receptive to such invitations. Six of the 19 northern MLAs were 
soon CPP members, dividing the unity of the northern block within the Legislative 
Assembly. But this was not considered to be necessarily problematic by the northern 
block in the Legislative Assembly. What in the end broke the back of the idea of 
northern unity was ironically an integral part of its original existence: The Northern 
Territories railway. 
The question of the Northern Territories railway, laid to rest by the colonial 
administration in the early 1930s, had been resurrected through the NTC. J. A. 
Braimah had put the suggestion of the Northern Territories railway to the cabinet, 
who accepted it without much fuss and voted ten million pounds to the project. The 
immediate response of the northern MLAs was to support such a railway. However, 
when the route of the proposed railway came to be discussed, opinions amongst 
northern MLAs differed. Three routes were proposed: one from Kumasi through 
Tamale to Navrongo: Another further west through Kintampo and Damongo; and 
another through Bimbilla and Yendi to Bawku. Each of the Northern MLPs 
supported the railway which passed closest to the area from which he came. The 
lack of consensus over the route the railway was to take caused the project to be 
shelved for 15 years. In the meantime, the Volta Dam became an increasingly 
interesting proposition for Nkrumah, and resources voted for the railway were 
redirected. Instead, the existing Kumasi-Tamale road was tarred, and work was 
begun on a new road from Kumasi through Kintampo to Tamale. But this was 
considered sparse compensation for the abandonment of the railway project. The 
question of the railway route exposed the illusion of the northern unity that the 
northern block had hitherto propagated. The implications of the railway split created 
new hostilities within the northern block, which led to other political frictions. When 
the question of the timing of independence arose again, the northern MLAs who 
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were also now CPP members pushed explicitly for independence sooner rather than 
later, while others such as J. A. Braimah, continued to caution against a hasty move 
towards independence. If the northern block had previously considered the CPP with 
suspicion, it increasingly saw the CPP as an outright threat and treated it with 
hostility. The increasing strain between the hard core of the northern block and the 
CPP caused Nkrumah and the Governor to schedule a meeting with the NTC and a 
number of northern traditional leaders in Tamale in May 1953. The purpose was to 
discuss how the path to independence was to proceed. Prior to the meeting, two 
memoranda were issued by prominent northern MLAs, one by J. H. Allasani with a 
conservative tone and another my Ayarna Imoru, by now a staunch CPP member, 
calling for immediate independence. The NTC placed its hope in the British to fulfil 
their obligations of ‘protection’, as set out by earlier treaties. But the Governor was 
quick to dismiss such expectations. Essentially, the game was up, and the northern 
block and the NTC had to concede that independence would come sooner, rather 
than later.  
The formation of the NPP  
The formation of the NPP out of existing NTC structures meant a departure from a 
number of fundamental illusions. As Ladouceur notes: ‘Gone were the days of 
aspiring for neutrality in the Assembly, striving only to promote Northern interests, 
with no alignments with parties in the south’.
20
 As the relationship between the 
northern block and the northern CPP-members became increasingly unworkable, the 
idea of a northern political party was mooted by MLAs aligned to the NTC. The 
NTC was not a political party, and it was felt that northern interests needed to be 
represented in the upcoming elections in 1954. As a result, in April 1954, the 
Northern People’s Party (NPP) was established in Tamale with a leadership which 
came very close to matching that of the NTC. It set out, originally, to act as a 
pressure group, to defend northern interests. It aimed primarily to have the economic 
gap with the south closed before any form of self-government took place. It 
consciously attempted to aggregate all northern interests, electing a Dagau as 
                                                 




National Chairman, a Mamprusi as Vice-Chairman and a Dagomba as General 
Secretary.
21
 Despite the short period between the formation of the NPP and the 1954 
elections, the NPP-controlled seats (independent NPP sympathisers and the MAP, a 
staunch pro-NPP organisation) won more than 60 per cent of the northern vote, 
while the CPP won 35.1 per cent. The CPP thus controlled 9 of the north’s 26 seats, 
against the NPP’s 17. Although the 35 per cent won by the CPP represented a fairly 
good showing, the NPP was in firm control of most of the Northern Territories. 
Ironically, the 1954 election result threatened to be too good for the NPP. The 
Asante-based Ghana Liberation Party, which the NPP leadership held in high regard, 
had won only one seat. After the CPP, the NPP had the most votes and was suddenly 
confronted with being the official opposition party. As the NPP was born out of 
those who wanted to represent northern interest in parliament from a neutral political 
position, the step to official opposition party was indeed large. The NPP, angered by 




During the period 1954-6, in which the NPP sat uncomfortably in the role of official 
opposition, the political landscape changed significantly, especially with the 
formation of the National Liberation Movement (NLM). The NLM was born out of 
disgruntled Asante cocoa farmers who blamed the CPP for the fixing of cocoa 
prices, despite the sharp increases in global cocoa prices over the period. The NLM 
soon received the political and financial backing of the Asantehene. Politically, the 
NLM sought to create a federal system for the new independence structures. The 
federal emphases of the NLM appeared to be fundamentally contradictory to the 
demands of the NPP, making an alliance between the two parties unhandy. 
Furthermore, unlike the NPP, the NLM were not at all opposed to a swift move 
towards independence. The Togoland Congress, a party who lobbied for Togoland 
to be re-united with French Togo, also joined the opposition alliance, further 
                                                 
21  Kelly, B. & R.B. Benning, ‘Ideology, regionalism, self-interest and tradition: An 
investigation into contemporary politics in Northern Ghana’, Africa, 77: 2(2007), 7. 
22  Nkrumah’s refusal to recognise the NPP as the official opposition when the Assembly 
reconvened in July 1954 so angered the NPP leadership that they decided to take up the 
position of official opposition.  
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reducing the points of contact between parties within the alliance. For the NPP, 
within the alliance, federalism meant that money earned in the cocoa and gold 
sectors in Asante would remain in Asante, while the presence of the Togoland 
Congress in the alliance threatened to divide Dagbon and Mamprussi, two very 
powerful northern kingdoms. It appeared as if what bound the alliance was the 
pervasive anti-CPP, anti-Coast sentiment, which is not a good basis for a 
constructive partnership.
23
 However, the NPP regarded the federal system as an 
extreme version of a political structure that safeguarded local interests by inhibiting 
the regional power of central government, which spoke directly to the leadership of 
the NPP. An alliance with the NLM would also rebut CPP allegations that the NPP 
could not be considered a true political party because it had only a regional 
following. To the NLM, the NPP was an interesting partner because they held 
significant representation in the Legislative Assembly. On the grounds that the NLM 
promised a development fund for the north, outside the federal system, the NPP 
agreed to an alliance with the NLM and the Togoland Congress.  
The alliance between the NLM, the NPP, and the Togoland Congress significantly 
changed the national and regional political debate. The change in the political 
landscape prompted a call for new elections, one condoned by the British 
authorities. New elections were to be held in December 1956. The NPP set itself a 
target of controlling 20 of the 26 northern seats, an improvement of 5 over the 1954 
result (in 1954 the NPP controlled 15 seats by winning 12 seats and controlling 5 
more through 4 NPP-independents and the MAP, and losing 2 seats where 
politicians crossed the floor to the CPP). To the CPP, the north was no longer an 
unknown entity as it had been in 1954 when it held its first direct election. Far more 
attention was thus given to the local level than had been the case in 1954. In the 
event, the CPP won 3 formerly NPP-controlled seats during the 1956 election 
(Bawku, Tallensi, and the seat of the Tamale-Nanton constituency). But the CPP 
also lost 3 CPP-controlled seats (Tumu, Bolgatanga, and Savelugu). The result of 
the 1956 election was thus the same as that of 1954: CPP controlled 11 seats, while 
                                                 




the NPP controlled 15. In total, the NLM won 12 seats, and the Togolese Congress 
won 2. In total, the NLM/NPP/Togoland Congress alliance won 29 seats, against the 
CPP’s 71.  
7.5. Gold Coast: Election outcome, 1956 
Party                     No.  of votes    % of votes      No. of seats  
                (104) 
Convention People’s 
Party (CPP) 398,141        57.10%              71 
Northern People’s 
Party (NPP) 72,440        10.39%             15 
National Liberation 
Movement (NLM) 145,657        20.89%             12 
Togoland Congress (TC) 20,352          2.92%              2 
Muslim Association 
Party (MAP) 11,111          1.59%              1 
Federation of Youth (FY) 10,745          1.54%              1 
Independents 38,811          5.57%              2 
Source: African Elections Database 
To Nkrumah and the CPP, having attained a reasonable majority, there were no 
more obstacles to freeing Ghana from colonial rule. A motion to call on the British 
Government to grant independence was put before the Legislative Assembly. Both 
the NLM and the NPP protested, boycotting the motion, which was subsequently 
passed with a majority of 72 to none. To no avail, the alliance sent a delegation to 
London to protest against the manner in which CPP was taking the Gold Coast to 
independence. But the game was up. Independence would be granted to Ghana, 
under the leadership of the CPP, with the NLM, NPP, and Togoland Congress 
alliance as the opposition. On 6 March 1957, outside the Chief Commissioner’s 
residence on Watherston Road in Tamale, the Union Jack was lowered for the last 
time, and replaced by the flag of independent Ghana.  
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Establishing politics in Tamale and Dagbon  
The subsection above has delineated the broad lines of northern involvement in 
Ghana’s independence for the period 1946-57. We noted earlier Martin Staniland’s 
observation: ‘the degree to which Tamale kept to itself politically is an interesting 
feature of northern politics’.
24
 There were two reasons for Tamale’s political 
isolation: The first was that the complexity of Tamale’s institutional anatomy 
created a political matrix which was introspective; the second was that Tamale’s 
political elite were to some extent forced to look inwards because of the tension 
between internal and external alliances.  
Delineating Tamale’s political landscape  
Why did the CPP lose the Tamale-Nanton in the 1954 election by a landslide, and 
how were they able to manifest themselves in Tamale so as to win, also by a 
landslide, the 1956 election? The reasons for Tamale’s political swing are fourfold: 
Firstly, cleavages within the CPP leadership of the Tamale branch, which split the 
CPP in the 1954 elections, were resolved for a brief period during the 1956 
elections; secondly, the death of the Nanton Na, a staunch supporter of the 
conservative Muslim Association Party (MAP), and the succession of his son, a 
supporter of the CPP; thirdly, the CPP managed to gain control of the TUC and 
exploited its municipal power for political gains; and fourthly, Tamale’s electorate 
was undergoing changes which inclined it more towards the anti-chieftaincy rhetoric 
of the CPP, especially amongst its growing numbers of non-Dagomba residents. The 
following subsection is concerned with each of these political determinants. 
Before attempting to deconstruct Tamale’s local political landscape, it should be 
noted that the fact that Tamale kept to itself politically did not mean that Tamale 
was itself not politicised. On the contrary, Tamale was the stomping ground of the 
north’s political elite. The Tamale branch of the CPP was by some distance the 
largest in the Northern Territories, with a membership estimated to be somewhere 
between two and three thousand in the early 1950s. The Northern People’s Party 
(NPP), the largest opposition party in the Gold Coast after the 1954 election, was 
                                                 




formed in Tamale. The NPP had its first delegates’ conference in Sabongida in 
Tamale in April 1954, where Mumuni Bawumia, a founding member of the NPP, 
complained of being slapped by Ayarna Imoru, a prominent northern member of the 
CPP. Imoru was restrained by police. Furthermore, at a rally for the inauguration of 
the NPP held near the Dakpema’s palace in Tamale, CPP leaders such as Ayarna 
Imoru, Ebenezer Adam, and R.S. Iddrissu threw stones at the delegates in order to 
prevent the inauguration taking place. Once again, police were required to intervene. 
But such political confrontations in Tamale had at their centre questions about the 
Northern Territories generally. The politics of Tamale existed separately from the 
larger discussion about the Northern Territories. This might not have been peculiar 
had Tamale not been the economic centre of the Northern Territories and by some 
distance the largest city. But to construe Tamale as being somehow a-political is a 
profound misrepresentation. 
In 1954, the Tamale-Nanton constituency was won by the MAP with Alhadji 
Osumanu, the elder statesmen of the party, winning the seat. He defeated R.S. 
Iddrissu of the CPP by a landslide. The MAP manifesto reaffirmed the traditional 
alliance between Muslims and chiefs and declared: ‘Chieftaincy shall be restored to 
its ancient dignity’.
25
 As staunch supporters of chiefly institutions, the MAP was 
anti-CPP. Alfai Larden, chairman of the Kumasi branch of the MAP, wrote to the 
Ashanti Pioneer newspaper: ‘True Moslems can never be friends with the CPP’.
26
 
The newly formed NPP did not run in Tamale owing to an agreement with the MAP. 
The MAP and the NPP occupied the same political ground, and the NPP felt that if 
they were to enter the race in Tamale, they would divide the conservative vote, 
opening the way for a CPP victory. Mumuni Bawunia writes of the 1954 election 
results:  
                                                 
25  Austin, Politics, 232. 
26  Ibid. 
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The 1954 general elections gave the Northern People’s Party 17 out of the 26 
seats including the independent candidates of Yakubu Tali, J.A. Bramaih, C.K. 
Tedam, Alhaji Osumanu & W.A. Amoro who were sponsored by the party.
27
 
The (erroneous) idea in the mind of this high-ranking NPP member that Alhaji 
Osumanu was an NPP sponsored independent candidate is indicative of the 
relationship between the MAP and the NPP.  
Whereas in the 1954 elections the conservative MAP defeated the CPP by a 
landslide in the Tamale-Nanton constituency, in the 1956 elections the CPP won, 
also by a significant margin. The outcome of the 1956 election was thus almost the 
reverse of the 1954 election: in 1954 the MAP won over 60 per cent of Tamale’s 
vote, and R.S. Iddrissu only 39.6 per cent, while in the 1956 election Iddrissu won 
59 per cent of the vote, and the MAP only 36 per cent.  
Given the relatively large CPP presence in Tamale, it is noteworthy that the CPP lost 
so dramatically in 1954 to a party even more opposed to the CPP than the NPP. 
Tamale’s swing has been mentioned, albeit in passing, by previous authors.
28
 Martin 
Staniland argues that Osumanu Alhadji was able to win the 1954 Tamale-Nanton 
constituency on account of being supported by the chief of Nanton, the Nanton-Na 
Sulemana, a staunch supporter of the MAP. Staniland writes: ‘Nanton-Na (who died 
in 1954) was a firm supporter of the MAP and it was largely through the accession 
of Nanton votes that Osumanu defeated Iddrissu’.
29
 Staniland notes in a footnote 
that the Nanton-Na’s son, Tia Sulemana, who succeeded his father as chief, was, in 
contrast to his father, a staunch CPP supporter. The lack of endorsement in the 1956 
election was responsible for the MAP’s defeat by the CPP. Staniland points also to 
‘factionalism’ within the Tamale branch of the CPP. According to Staniland, 
Ebenezer Adam was head of a ‘youth faction’ within the Tamale branch, which 
included Yahaya Iddi, the brother of the Gulkpe-Na. R.S. Iddrissu, however, was 
wealthier and better connected at the party headquarters in Accra. R.S. Iddrissu 
managed to get Ebenezer Adam excluded from the party slate in the 1954 elections 
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and Ebenzer Adam and his friends refused to campaign for R.S. Iddrissu, who 
subsequently lost the Tamale-Nanton constituency. A modus vivendi was established 
whereby Ebenzer Adam ran the TUC whilst R.S. Iddrissu ran the party.
30
 The fact 
that almost the total number of votes counted for the 1956 election was almost 30 
per cent more than the total counted during the 1954 election (3,706 in 1954 and 
4,810 in 1956) may suggest that some CPP members boycotted the earlier election, 
although the MAP also lost a significant number of votes, and it may also have been 
the case that since the 1954 elections were the first, the number of unregistered 
residents of Tamale was significantly higher than in 1956. Nonetheless, in a similar 
vein to Staniland, Dennis Austin argues that the swing was the result of a by now 
well-documented feud between Ebenzer Adam and R.S. Iddrissu. According to 
Austin, this feud split the party and, consequently, the CPP electorate, opening the 
way for Alhadji Osumanu’s victory. Austin writes:  
It is doubtful whether either Ebenezer Adam or R.S. Iddrissu could have won in 
Tamale in 1954 without the support for each other which each refused to give. 
So Alhadji Osumanu got in on a MAP/NPP ticket. In 1956 however, when the 
CPP was more united and the local quarrel between Iddrissu and Ebenezer Adam 
had been patched up, Iddrissu defeated Alhaji.
31
 
There were more reasons still for Tamale’s swing between 1954 and 1956. 
Significantly, the emergence of the TUC as a CPP-dominated institution meant that 
the CPP was able to exert significant influence over the everyday authority in 
Tamale. This drastically and increasingly changed Tamale’s political landscape. 
Finally, chieftaincy increasingly struggled to cope with the complexities of urban 
life in Tamale. The first of the reasons why chieftaincy in Tamale struggled to assert 
itself over the new apparatus is the subject of Chapter 4, and it is superfluous to re-
develop the arguments here. However, the second two reasons – the TUC and urban 
life – require specific attention.  
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Chieftaincy and politics in Tamale; ‘nobody will break down his own house to make 
it possible for somebody to build his’
32
 
Bayart’s ‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’
33
 has been employed by previous authors 
to describe the ‘fusion of elites’
34
 in the Northern Territories.
35
 This fusion occurred 
not only within the burgeoning northern intelligentsia but also across different strata, 
between members of the intelligentsia and traditional elites and, of course, the 
colonial administration itself. But such fusions also had limits at the local level, 
between the Gulkpe-Na and the Dakpema. Such a fundamental polarisation could 
not be overcome through Bayart’s process. The process of fusion was not fluid at all 
levels, and this meant inconsistencies were created in some instances between 
alliances on the local, regional, and national levels. The following subsection is 
concerned with alignments (fusions) both between and across the tradition/non-
traditional political divide in Tamale, at the local, regional, and national level. 
Since the formation of the NTC in 1946, it became clear that not chiefs, but the sons 
of chiefs and those strongly aligned and associated with chiefly institutions would 
represent the north in the national political apparatus. Such ‘representatives’ were 
pushed forward and ‘sponsored’ by chiefs and acted on behalf of the chiefly classes. 
There were exceptions – most notably the Tolon-Na, who served as a prominent 
figure within regional, national, and traditional politics – but generally speaking, 
chiefs were not directly involved in national politics. After 1951, with the march 
towards independence in full swing, this tendency expressed itself as a pretence of 
political neutrality on behalf of chiefs. Despite the thin veil of political neutrality, 
chiefs were both subjected to political outcomes as well as being crucial 
determinants of those outcomes. There was perhaps only one issue on which the Ya 
Na could be outspoken, and that was the issue of Togoland. A position on Togoland 
could be taken because its inclusion in an independent Ghana was supported by all 
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Dagombas, no matter which intra-ethnic division they belonged to. Braimah noted 
that the Ya Na had stated that:  
if the new constitution will make it possible for that part of Dagbon State under 
the United Kingdom Administration to remain and become part of the free Gold 
Coast, then it may be possible for me and my people to give it our support. On 
the other hand, if the new constitution makes for the entire breaking away of that 
part of Dagbon State in Togoland from the main part of the state which is in the 
Gold Coast, then of course it will only be natural for me and my people to resist 
any movement towards independence for the Gold Coast … Nobody will break 
down his own house to make it possible for somebody to build his.
36
  
But the Ya Na’s role was to unite Dagbon, and taking a side politically threatened to 
deepen existing divisions. Those divisions are broadly speaking the subject of this 
subsection, and especially, how they relate to Tamale’s traditional elite. For the 
historian, the contradiction between the prominent political role played by chiefs and 
their absence from primary sources is of course problematic, because it means that at 
an important political vector, namely chiefs, is largely silent in the available primary 
sources relating to the emergence of nationalist politics in the Northern Territories. 
There are, however, thankfully, enough sources to carry out a discussion about 
chieftaincy in Tamale in the context of the development of nationalist politics. Of 
particular interest here are the political alignments of Tamale’s traditional political 
elite and how those alignments came to be. Given the political determinacy of 
chiefs, the discussion speaks also to questions about how the CPP came to manifest 
its presence in Tamale.  
The interaction between national, regional, local, and traditional political structures 
in the Northern Territories is extremely complex. ‘Local politics involved a 
complicated set of relations between chiefs, civil servants, MPs, ministers, local 
councillors, party officials’.
37
 Such ‘sets of relations’ were determined by a 
combination of personal ties, inter- and intra-ethnic considerations, historical 
developments, and chieftaincy disputes. In order to understand the contours of 
Tamale’s local politics, a number of such political variables need to be brought into 
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    209        
 
focus. This requires an understanding of developments surrounding chieftaincy in 
Dagbon and how emerging political parties aligned themselves within the divisions 
created through succession disputes of the Ya Na at Yendi. There were a number of 
issues in which (Dagomba) chiefs were either for or against, either directly or by 
association. The following subsection is concerned with the political divisions on 
the national and regional and traditional level, and how and why both the Gulkpe-Na 
and the Dakpema slotted into such divisions. 
On the 6 February 1948, upon his death, the ten-year reign of Ya Na Mahama II of 
the Andani Gate came to an end. Two candidates emerged as the most likely to 
succeed Ya Na Mahama II: His eldest son (thus also an Andani), the serving regent, 
who was hovering between the chieftaincy of Sanerigu and Karaga (both important 
skins in the Dagomba traditional hierarchy) without holding either, and the chief of 
Mion, the Mion-Lana, an Abudu. Attempts to ‘democratise’ the succession process 
by, most notably, the colonial administration, were largely abandoned in the 1948 
succession, and in the presence of considerable tension between supporters of the 
two candidates, the Mion-Lana (from the Abudu Gate) was selected as the new Ya 
Na, Mahama III. As Mahama III made his way to Yendi, the aforementioned regent 
(from the Andani Gate) moved to assume the skin vacated at Mion.  
In 1954, the same year in which the north held its first direct elections, Ya Na 
Mahama III died, reopening new complex succession disputes. The most contested 
components of the discussion had to do with what the succession procedure was, 
and in the absence of clarity on the procedure, almost anything was defendable. The 
son of Mahama II, now Mion-Lana, again put himself forward as a candidate, and 
for the first time introduced the idea of a rotational basis between the two gates. The 
other candidates were the following: The Yo Na (chief of Savelugu), who was at this 
stage well over eighty years of age (an Andani); the eldest son of Mahama III, who 
had assumed the regency (an Abudu); and Karaga-na Adam (the great-grandson of 
Mahama III, and so also an Abudu). This time the expanded, ‘democratised’ 
selection committee – introduced largely by the colonial administration – including 




mechanism. In March 1954, the selection committee voted in the incumbent regent, 
the son of Mahama III, Abdulai III. The Mion-Lana, six years previously in 1948, in 
more or less the same situation, had not been selected to succeed the Ya Na because 
he was only the regent and did not possess a chieftaincy (at the time he was 
hovering between Saniergu and Karaga). The outcome sparked protests amongst the 
Andani Gate and its followers. Nonetheless, the outcome of the 1954 succession was 
that the Abudu Gate, who had dominated the paramountcy for many years (except 
the ten years between 1938 and 1948, when Mahama II had ruled) once again 
managed to retain the paramountcy.  
The emergence of party politics in the north aligned itself almost immediately with 
this increasingly deep division. J.H. Allassani and Yakubu Tali, who in 1953 
became Tolon Na, were the most actively involved in the interface between politics 
and Dagon’s political structures. Both men had been members of the NTC. Allassani 
came from a village near Tamale and entered Tamale primary school in 1914. In 
1949, after serving as a headmaster in Kumasi, he became Secretary to the Dagomba 
Native Authority. Like the Tolon Na, Allassani was appointed to Nkrumah’s first 
cabinet in 1951. Interestingly, like many, Allassani moved from the NPP to the CPP 
during his time in Nkrumah’s cabinet, while Tolon Na switched to the CPP only 
much later, after Ghana’s independence. During the period 1951 to Ghana’s 
independence (and also thereafter), Allassani and the Tolon Na emerged as 
representatives, in terms of the Northern Territories, of opposite ends of the political 
spectrum: Allassani, a CPP member, was a staunch supporter of the Mion-Lana 
(Andani chieftaincy), while the Tolon Na, a founding member of the NPP, was 
related through marriage to, and strong advocate of, incumbent Ya Na Abdulai III, 
an Abudu.  
The Ya Na, Abdulai III, made every attempt to present himself as politically neutral, 
but this position, given what was at stake, was never likely to be tenable. When 
Nkrumah visited the Ya Na in 1954, the most he could get from the Ya Na was a 
declaration of neutrality, which was announced on the radio, and angered the NPP 
leadership. It angered the NPP leadership because, no matter how nuanced attempts 
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were to establish neutrality, the Ya Na was effectively an NPP supporter. He would 
become increasingly NPP as prominent northern politicians, lead by Allassani, 
advocated increasingly for his abdication and the installation of the Mion-Lana as 
Ya Na.  
What were the implications for political alliances amongst Tamale’s political elite of 
the interaction between national politics and Dagbon political structures? The 
Gulkpe-Na supported the CPP candidate, R.S. Iddrissu, because of ‘his connections 
and deference towards chiefs’.
38
 But one could not be aligned to R.S. Iddrissu 
without being aligned also to the CPP, and to Allassani – and if one were aligned to 
Allassani, one was necessarily anti-Abudu rule. Developments on the local level 
further manoeuvred the Gulkpe-Na into the CPP corner. The NPP, under the 
leadership of amongst others, the Tolon-Na, aligned themselves with the Dakpema. 
Indeed, the inaugural rally of the NPP in 1954 was held at the Dakpema’s palace. It 
is of course ironic that the NPP – ‘the chiefs’ party’ – so fundamentally concerned 
with the legitimacy of ‘tradition’, sought not only to exploit the Dakpema’s ongoing 
legitimacy, but also sought clearly to promote his legitimacy in Tamale. Perhaps the 
close relations between the CPP and the Gulkpe-Na had forced the NPP to look 
elsewhere for a traditional foundation upon which to build their campaign, but 
alliances created were in many respects glaring contradictions. The Gulkpe-Na, 
who, we have seen in a previous chapter, had the Ya Na to thank for his presence in 
Tamale, found himself backed by and backing a political party which vilified the Ya 
Na – while the Dakpema, who, from the point of view of ‘traditional’ Dagbon 
political structures, as an imposter, found himself backed by and backing a political 
party whose campaign was based on the idea that ‘tradition’ needed to be 
consolidated. Tamale’s local political elite reacted not only to the developments 
taking place on the national and regional level, but the divisions created forced them 
also to react to each other.  
In 1957, with the CPP in power, the campaign against Abudulai began in earnest. 
Allassani held a public speech in Yendi on market-day, announcing that government 
                                                 




would depose Abudulai on the grounds that he was ‘deformed’ (blind in one eye and 
allegedly with six toes on one foot) and that his succession had not been in 
accordance with custom, namely, the rotational basis. Fifty mostly CPP activists 
signed a petition to de-skin Ya Na Abudulai. Interestingly, the most noteworthy 
signatories were Allassani, Salifu Yakubu (Yo Na), and MP for Tamale, R.S. 
Iddrissu. Opposing the petition were brother of the Gulkpe-Na, Yahaya Iddi, S.I. 
Iddrissu, and Ebenezer Adam, who all gave their support to Ya Na Abudulai. 
Yahaya Iddi, the brother of the Gulkpe-Na, had been a close associate of Ebenezer 
Adam within the Tamale branch of the CPP. He had been a member of Ebenezer 
Adam’s CPP ‘youth faction’, which had campaigned against R.S. Iddrissu during 
the 1954 elections, which R.S. Iddrissu subsequently lost to the MAP. We may draw 
one of two conclusions from the alignment of Ebenezer Adam with the Abudu Gate, 
especially given that the Gulkpe-Na had supported R.S. Iddrissu in the 1954 and 
1956 elections, and R.S. Iddrissu in turn supported Allassani in his crusade to de-
skin the incumbent (Abudu) Ya Na: Either the Gulkpe-Na was not at all influenced 
by his brother’s political affiliations (or vice versa), or the Gulkpe-Na, who had been 
reintroduced to Tamale on the insistence in 1920 of Abudulai II, an uncle of the 
incumbent Abudulai III, did not share R.S. Iddrissu’s support of Allassani and his 
anti-Abudu rhetoric. The second conclusion, although not possible to verify, is the 
most plausible. It suggests also that the Gulkpe-Na and the Dakpema positioned 
themselves also in relation to each other, given that the Dakpema had aligned 
himself with the NPP (this is, conversely, equally as contradictory as the Gulkpe-Na 
aligning himself with an anti-Abudu CPP).  
From the perspective of Tamale’s ruling elite, the relationship between local, 
regional, national, and traditional politics. The subsections reveals that the political 
aspirations of Tamale’s traditional elite contradicted each other at various levels: 
The local, regional, national, and traditional political positions taken up by Tamale’s 
traditional elite made for an uncomfortable mixture. This was in part because the 
Gulkpe-Na and the Dakpema reacted also to one another. 
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The politics of urban space  
Urbanisation itself was, for a number of reasons, a political determinant. The 
formation of the TUC in 1952 was an important step in creating a municipal 
governance apparatus. But the rate of urbanisation endowed this organ with 
considerable power, as disputes arose over the allocation of urban space.  
7.6. Interactions between local, regional, national, and traditional 




The TUC was the Local Authority for Tamale, based on the recommendations set 
out by the Coussey Committee, as outlined above. The TUC had its first meeting in 
May 1952. The minutes of TUC meetings depict a rather banal organization. Within 
the mundane discussions of the TUC, however, significant influence unquestionably 
simmered. The TUC was responsible for planning and building various public 
services, such as water and sewerage facilities, an industrial area, and market stalls. 




buildings in Tamale, including that of residences of individuals, needed to be 
approved by the Tamale Sanitation Board (TSB). The fact that two-thirds of TUC 
members were directly elected meant that the influence of chiefly institutions was 
limited, which in turn opened the door for the CPP to dominate the TUC. Indeed, 
prominent CPP members filled high-ranking positions within the TUC. Ebenezer 
Adam, for instance, was elected chairman of the TUC, while R.S. Iddrissu was also 
heavily involved. Both Ebenezer Adam and R.S. Iddrissu represented the TUC on 
the TSB, an extremely powerful organ in Tamale which granted (or refused) 
building permits. Both Ebenezer Adam and R.S. Iddrissu also sat on the Finance 
Committee. R.S. Iddrissu also represented the TUC at the District Council in Yendi. 
Although the chief of Tamale, the Gulkpe-Na, was the president of the TUC, 
minutes of TUC meetings suggest that he was not a particularly active member. The 
minutes suggest that the only TUC meeting at which the Gulkpe-Na was present was 
the
 
second meeting, on 16 June 1952. At that meeting, the Chairman ‘assured the 
Gulkpe-Na and his elders that the elected councillors were anxious to work hand in 
hand and in full co-operation with the chief, his elders, and all the people’.
39
  
The TUC was formed prior to the 1954 election, and one may ask if their influence 
on Tamale’s local politics was not the same in each of the elections in 1954 and 
1956? The answer is a resounding No. The CPP’s approach to the two elections in 
the north was different. It was clear after the 1954 election that northerners were 
generally not moved by the great themes of decolonisation, which motivated 
southern voters. As a result, the CPP campaign in the north for the 1956 election had 
a far more local emphasis. “They sent E. A. Mahama and Sumani Bukari, two 
northern MLAs, to the north to make recommendations concerning candidates … 
they took local factors into consideration: ‘why a person must win, or why this man 
would stand a better chance that that one’”
40
 Within the context of a new emphasis 
on local factors, the CPP-dominated TUC took on new significance. Ebenezer Adam 
describes the TUC as “not at all a political organ”.
41
 However, its influence in terms 
                                                 
39  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/5/82. (Minutes of the Tamale Urban Council), June 16th, 1952. 
40  Interview with E.A. Mahama, in Ladouceur, Chiefs, 144. 
41  Interview with Ebenezer Adam. 
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of the party politics in Tamale can hardly be disputed. All building in Tamale, both 
private and commercial, needed to pass through the TUC. In the context of 
significant demographic and economic expansion, the power to decide what gets 
built where and by whom is hardly irrelevant. This power was exploited in order to 
make political gains in Tamale. For instance, the Chief Market Dues Collector of the 
Tamale Central Market, Allassan Dagomba, wrote to the Secretary of the Dagomba 
State Council:  
As Market Master, I am to be looking after the interest of the people in the 
market … Two men approached me for the space to put up a temporary shed, I 
provided them a space, and the said Issah pulled down the two shed. I reported 
the matter to … the Native Administration’s office, Tamale, he sent a Native 
Administration’s Police to … enquire into the cause of his action, but the Native 
Administration’s Police returned that Iddrissu the Tamale Chairman of the C.P.P 
have told him not to attend the call.
42
 
Another, perhaps even less nuanced example of the manner in which the TUC and 
CPP interacted with one another is that of Salifu Dagomba, a cigarette vendor by 
trade, who wrote a letter to the Assistant District Commissioner of Tamale: 
 … I began to trade at the Tamale Lorry Park with some other men since 10 
years ago … I always pay 2 pence per day until I was asked by the Chief of 
Lamshegu to pay two shillings and 6 pence for the Hawkers License and I did so 
… This morning … he again and asked that he does not want anybody to sit 
there anymore and that we should all go to the market which I found it 
impossible to go with my bicycle that I hire in addition, and I cannot join the 
C.P.P. His son saying Mr. Idirisu requested that we should all join the C.P.P., 
which may enable us to sit there which is by the road.
 43
 
The rise in prominence of the TUC, under the influence of high-ranking CPP 
elements such as Ebenezer Adam and R.S. Iddrissu, changed the configuration of 
everyday authority in Tamale. Other forms of authority were challenged (and seen to 
be challenged) by the TUC, especially since those responsible for running the TUC 
generally held political convictions which challenged chieftaincy. The kind of 
exploitations illustrated here were perhaps possible across the Gold Coast, but 
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especially so in Tamale, because chieftaincy in Tamale had always been a tenuous 
concept within a colonial framework which advocated for chieftaincy. The resulting 
ambiguous character of Tamale’s institutional anatomy made it especially 
susceptible to the kind of the exploitation which the CPP exercised through the 
TUC.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has been concerned with the relationship between the rise of party 
politics in the Northern Territories, in Dagbon, and in Tamale. More specifically, the 
chapter has been concerned with why Tamale ‘kept to itself politically’ in the years 
between 1948 and Ghana’s independence in 1957. The chapter has argued that 
Tamale’s political landscape became increasing complex and congested. Tamale’s 
institutional multiplicity, discussed in a previous chapter, was exploited and thus 
consolidated, reinforced, and expanded. The formation of the TUC, the arrival of 
party politics on the local scene, and the alliances between the NPP and the 
Dakpema and between the Gulkpe-Na and the CPP are all examples of this type of 
exploitation. The increasing complexity and contestation of Tamale’s political 
landscape created an inward-looking political focus. This inward focus, the chapter 
argues, was exacerbated by tension between local and external alliances. This 
tension is a major finding of this chapter. Tamale’s colonial origins and the 
subsequent institutional multiplicity complicated the coherency of political alliances 
on the local level on the one hand, and on traditional, regional, and national levels 
on the other hand. In this instance, although the alliance between the Gulkpe-Na and 
the CPP made sense on the local level, on the level of ‘traditional’ politics the 
alliance was problematic, as it positioned the Gulkpe-Na in opposition to the Abudu 






There is a profound tension in Tamale’s urban existence; on the one had, Tamale 
stands as a sprawling symbol of the colonial period, and on the other hand, it never 
really fitted into the structures which colonial administration was attempting to 
erect. In many respects, the relationship between Tamale and the many phases of 
colonial administration is not unlike that between the various forms of colonial 
administration and the Konkomba
1
 and other acephalous peoples in the Upper-West 
and Upper-East regions, about whom so much has been written.
2
 I have waited until 
the conclusion to make this comparison, because of the feeling that the 
acephalous/chiefly dichotomy, however relevant (along with the ‘underdevelopment 
theme’), hangs like an albatross around the neck of the historiography of the 
Northern Territories. But the comparison is relevant nonetheless. In the same way 
that the colonial administration attempted to force colonial stereotypes on ill-fitting 
realities, creating disputes, dislocation, complexities, and long standing rivalries, so 
                                                 
1  See Talton, B., Politics of social change in Ghana: The Konkomba struggle for political 
equality. MacMillan, 2009. 
2  On the Dagara, see for instance, Lentz, C., Ethnicity and the making of history in 
Northern Ghana. Edinburgh University Press, 2006, & Van der Geest, K., The Dagara 




also in Tamale, round pegs were forced into square holes. Of course, the difference 
between Tamale and the acephalous peoples’ narrative is that unlike the latter, 
Tamale has escaped academic attention, despite being, in its own right, the most 
overwhelming and tangible example of the transformation of colonial rule in the 
Northern Territories. This thesis is an attempt to fill that void.  
 
This dissertation has argued that Tamale’s economic hegemony in northern terms is 
a ramification of two inter-related events: The establishment of an administrative 
headquarters at Tamale in 1907, and the completion of the Great North Road in 
1920. These two events together comprise Tamale’s administrative and commercial 
function. Furthermore, both of these functions need to be taken equally seriously in 
terms of understanding the founding of Tamale. Through the intersection of these 
two events, a settlement of 1,435 inhabitants with no significant pre-European 
political or economic relevance became the centre of the Northern economic 
framework, the largest city by some distance in northern Ghana, and today, Ghana’s 
third-largest city. While the economics of northern Ghana were being centred at 
Tamale, a political framework was simultaneously being established by colonial 
initiative with heavy ‘traditional’ emphasis. In terms of Dagbon, that meant the 
centring of political power under the Ya Na at Yendi. Tamale thus grew up without 
corresponding political (and cultural) relevancy. The purpose of this historical study 
has been to identify the implications for Tamale of its extra-traditional urban process 
in a climate dominated by traditional discourses. The study identified two central 
implications of this economic/political discontinuity – one internal, one external: 
Tamale’s institutional anatomy is characterised by ‘multiplicity’, and Tamale 
emerged from the colonial period politically isolated, disconnected from the 
Northern Territories generally.  
Relevance of the study  
Tamale does not appear to possess the grand history of settlements such as Salaga 
and Wa. Its history is also not celebrated in the same way as those settlements and, I 
would add, the mosque at Larabanga, the slave camp at Paga, and the shrines in the 
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Tong Hills, amongst others. In Tamale, on the contrary, one is faced by that horrible 
urban façade, neither old nor new enough to be of any interest. Of course, that 
Tamale’s history is not immediately visible does not mean it is not there. As Wyatt 
MacGaffey points out, the small cluster of villages which made up Tamale in 1907 
‘behind the urban façade of banks and businesses, this is the Tamale to which the 
native citizen belongs’.
3
 Despite not exposing itself as readily as elsewhere in the 
north, Tamale’s awkward history has thus survived the enormous transformations of 
the colonial and post-colonial periods.  
The tension between the Gulkpe-Na and the Dakpema has never been resolved, 
although both houses deny any hostilities. However, in 1962, after Ghana had 
obtained its independence, the Gulkpe-Na contested the right of other chiefs to 
collect taxes on behalf of the government. Dakpema Alhassan Dawuni installed his 
own Mallam, Seidu Dagomba. He claimed, ‘I am in charge of Changani, Ward H 
and Ward F … but in these areas other Mallams get to weddings and funerals and 
the like before Seidu, depriving him of his daily bread.’ The DC for Tamale (a CPP 
supporter, like the Gulkpe-Na, and unlike the Dakpema) replied that the Dakpema 
was only a fetish priest, not entitled to install sub-chiefs, and that the Limam of 




Presently, there is a lull in the rivalry between the two houses, but that has much to 
do with what is currently taking place in Yendi. In 2003 the Ya Na Yakubu Andani 
II, King of Dagbon, was murdered. His succession remains a profoundly 
complicated affair and threatens to unlock simmering tension.
5
 In 2008, Tamale’s 
Gulkpe-Na passed away. Because, according to Dagbon custom, the Gulkpe-Na can 
only be ‘enskinned’ by the Ya Na, the fact that there is currently no Ya Na means 
that the Gulkpe-Na also cannot be replaced. In the interim period (which shows no 
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signs of ending in the foreseeable future), a regent of the Gulkpe-Na carries out the 
responsibilities of the Gulkpe-Na. The Dakpema of Tamale, on the other hand, is not 
bound to Dagbon political hierarchies. As a result, the institution is also not 
dependent on the Ya Na for succession. Thus, in 2009, after the death of the 
Dakpema, a new Dakpema was ‘enskinned’ relatively quickly. Currently thus, 
especially in the absence of the Gulkpe-Na, the Dakpema has a very prominent 
traditional function in Tamale. The Dakpema recently wrote an article for 
GhanaNation.com, a popular Ghanaian digital news source. Credit for the article 
was given to ‘Chief of Tamale, Naa Dakpema Alhassan Dawuni’.
6
 A recent article 
on a popular Ghanaian internet site began as follows; ‘The chief of Tamale, 




Furthermore, when in December 2010 I attended a conference in Tamale, the subject 
of the conference was the lasting impact of mandated territories. In Ghana’s case, 
this referred especially to the impact of German colonial rule in Togoland, which, 
after WWI, became a mandated territory. On the second morning, the conference 
was interrupted by the sound of drumming outside. This signalled the arrival of the 
Dakpema along with his entourage. He was presented to the group (of primarily 
non-Ghanaians) as the chief of Tamale. I am certain that no irony was intended, but 
I doubt there was a more real and tangible example of the lasting impact of German 
colonial rule than the Dakpema of Tamale being presented to a group of largely non-
Ghanaians as the chief of Tamale.  
What these contemporary examples reveal is that the Dakpema’s traditional 
prominence in Tamale is in large part related to the weakness of Dagbon. In 
Tamale’s history, there has indeed been only one other period in which the Dakpema 
effectively functioned as the chief of Tamale. That has been a thread throughout this 
                                                 
6  GhanaNation.com. (19 April 2011). 
http://news1.ghananation.com/vivvo_general/137689-chief-of-tamale-naa-dakpema-
alhassan-dawuni.html (accessed 4 December 2011). 
7  GhanatoGhana. (5 April 2011). 
http://www.ghanatoghana.com/Ghanahomepage/dakpema-na-alhassan-dawuni-calls-
tamale-youth-exercise-restraint (accessed 4 December 2011). 
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study. Between 1899 and 1919 the Anglo-German boundary existed such that Yendi 
lay in German territory while the larger part of Dagbon fell under British 
jurisdiction. Indeed, during this period, and partly on the initiative of the Dakpema, 
the British colonial administration established an administrative headquarters at 
Tamale. Later, after Dagbon had been reunited in the early 1920s, the Dakpema 
would be referred to as ‘an excellent example of a white-man’s chief’.
8
 
At the aforementioned conference, I (thankfully not in the presence of the Dakpema) 
presented a paper on chieftaincy in Tamale, the subject of Chapter 4 (‘From 
Dakpema to Gulkpe-Na’) and argued that tension between these two houses in 
Tamale is the result of the division of Dagbon into British and German jurisdictions 
in 1899. A number of Ghanaians who were present objected to the suggestion that 
there existed (and exists) competition between the institution of the Gulkpe-Na and 
that of the Dakpema. They pointed out that the Dakpema and the Gulkpe-Na have 
different functions in Tamale. The Dakpema, they told me, is the market head, while 
the Gulkpe-Na is the chief of Gulkpeagu. As chief of Tamale, they said, the Gulkpe-
Na has authority over Tamale’s land. Today, however, Tamale’s urban character has 
ensured that customary land tenure has been replaced by private land ownership. 
That the Gulkpe-Na ‘controls’ Tamale’s land is an idea born out of theoretical 
momentum, rather than an established, practical fact. This we have also seen in the 
course of this study (Chapter 5, ‘The Whole of Tamale is the Property of the 
Crown’). Then, like now, the Gulkpe-Na did not control Tamale’s land, in spite of a 
discourse which suggested that the source of his chiefly legitimacy was his control 
over land. As a result, Tamale’s traditional focus was (and is) unstable and 
circumstantial. Indeed, this study has been concerned fundamentally with 
understanding the implications of urban Tamale’s colonial origins in a climate 
dominated by traditional discourses. The question of land tenure is one example 
thereof. Of this cleavage between Tamale’s urban growth on the one hand, and the 
development of a colonial paradigm focussed on interpretations of ‘tradition’ on the 
other hand, the study argues that there are, broadly speaking, two significant 
                                                 
8  PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/2/28, (Dagomba Native Affairs), ‘Note by District 




implications: The first is Tamale’s disconnection from the Northern Territories 
generally, and the second is Tamale’s institutional multiplicity and the resulting 
legal pluralism.  
Before turning to the major themes contained within this study, a second broader 
relevance may be highlighted. This study inserts an entirely novel entity into 
northern Ghana’s historiography. The historiography of northern Ghana has been 
dominated broadly by one trajectory; historicising ‘underdevelopment’. In terms of 
transportation (a fundamental component of ‘development’), this trajectory has 
meant an emphasis on the Northern Territories railway, which was never built. The 
‘underdevelopment’ trajectory of northern historiography has also locked the 
definitions of the Northern Territories into an agrarian paradigm. This study takes a 
different and entirely unique starting point, that is, the completion of the Great North 
Road in 1920 and the subsequent introduction of motorised transportation. Taking 
this transportation presence (rather than the absence of a railway) as a starting point, 
Tamale’s urban ‘development’ (instead of northern ‘underdevelopment’) comes into 
focus. The result is by no means the unravelling of hitherto northern historical 
narratives. Rather, such an approach adds new contours to the historiographical 
landscape of northern Ghana.  
Theories of urban formation 
Anthony O’Connor noted that ‘the combination of low levels, but high rates of 
urbanisation means that tropical Africa provides almost unparalleled opportunities 
for the outside observer to see ‘cities in the making’.
9
 That is as true today as it was 
in 1983, when O’Conner’s work was published. Furthermore, in relative terms, 
Tamale is indeed a very new city. As an academic object of enquiry, that is also 
Tamale’s strength. From that perspective, at its core, this study argues for a 
disaggregation of African cities: different histories produce different cities. That 
such differences produce corresponding differences also in the social relations 
within cities has been argued by Aiden Southall. Southall in the early 1960s 
presented a model in which two types of African cities exist. Type A cities, 
                                                 
9  O’Conner, A., The African city. Hutchinson & Co Publishers, London, 1983, 16. 
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according to Southall, have pre-European origins.
10
 Such cities have a rigid 
traditional structure (such as Kumasi or Abomey in Benin). Type B cities have 
colonial origins (such as Tamale). Such cities lack traditional focus. Southall argues 
that the type of a city has implications for the social relations within the city. 
Southall’s dichotomy has more or less fallen apart. In reality, cities display 
characteristics of both Type A and Type B cities. However, this study 
wholeheartedly agrees with the central argument presented by Southall: The origins 
of cities have implications also for the manner in which social relations are defined 
within the city. The study thus underlines a concern about blanket definitions of 
‘urban’ in Africa and reaches back to earlier debates about cities in Africa, to 
promote a more nuanced understanding of African cities (beyond simply primate vs. 
secondary). This suggests that the specific origins of cities are highly relevant 
objects of academic inquiry. Tamale is in the first instance an inland, secondary (or 
second-tier) city. But there is more to the type of city which Tamale is. Tamale is a 
city created for, and by, the colonial political economy, in a political climate which 
continues to have strong pre-colonial emphases. Furthermore, the region in which 
Tamale is located possesses no obvious natural resources (unlike the cities on the 
Zambian Copperbelt, for instance). Its raison d’être is to provide a central 
administration for Northern Ghana and to facilitate transit trade.  
Tamale’s urban development, this study has shown, is rooted in the events 
mentioned above, namely, the decision by the British colonial administration to 
build an administrative headquarters at Tamale and the construction of the Great 
North Road. Urban Tamale was thus an administrative and economic centre created 
by colonial initiatives for colonial purposes (administration and commerce). 
Simultaneously, the colonial administration relied on a political system which 
increasingly employed chieftaincy as an auxiliary of colonial administration. Such 
reliance, it was argued, required the consolidation of pre-colonial historical 
dimensions of chieftaincy. Therein, it was felt, lay the public legitimacy of the 
institution of chieftaincy required in order to effectively incorporate chiefs into 
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colonial administrative apparatus. Within that (political) domain, however, Tamale 
had little relevance. The discontinuity between political and economic frameworks 
introduced to the Northern Territories through the initiative of the colonial 
administration had implications for Tamale’s urban character, namely, a 
disconnection from the Northern Territories generally, and institutional multiplicity 
and resulting legal pluralism. Those implications are, broadly speaking, the subject 
of this study. 
(Dis)connection 
The study has argued that Tamale’s economic hegemony was not matched by any 
real political significance within the politics of the Northern Territories, which had 
implications for Tamale’s urban character. On various levels, Tamale detached itself 
from the Northern Territories generally (disconnection). There is purposeful irony in 
this subheading. The Great North Road was for Tamale the great connector. Tamale 
became linked by motorable road to Kumasi, the first such link between north and 
south. The implication for Tamale of the north-south connection was, however, a 
disconnection from the Northern Territories generally.  
Perhaps the most concrete manifestation of Tamale’s isolation and disconnection 
from the Northern Territories came during the 1956 elections. Martin Staniland has 
made this observation in a footnote.
11
 This study has attempted to unpack that 
observation (Chapter 7: ‘A Town of Little Importance’). The reasons for this 
disconnection, argued here, lie in Tamale’s colonial underpinnings and in a political 
climate dominated by traditional discourses for the north more generally. This 
traditional discourse was not dismantled by the ending of colonial domination. With 
the formation of the Northern People’s Party (NPP), a party concerned primarily 
with the lack of northern development, ‘tradition’ found a voice also within Ghana’s 
nationalist politics of the 1950s. The NPP emerged from the 1953 elections as the 
second-most successful party in the Gold Coast, an indication of the dominance of 
conservative attitudes in the Northern Territories. Between the 1953 and the 1956 
elections, Tamale’s electorate swung dramatically from the ultra-conservative 
                                                 
11  Staniland, Chiefs,  217. See footnote 26.  
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Muslim Association Party (MAP) to the anti-chieftaincy Convention People’s Party 
(CPP). Northern politics focussed on the traditional apexes of Gonja, Dagbon, 
Mamprussi, Wa, and Nunumba. Although Tamale was highly politicised and much 
northern politics found a place in Tamale, Tamale itself was not a part of the debate. 
As a result, Tamale’s politics were by definition local urban affairs. This 
disconnection is a result of the aforementioned cleavage.  
Tamale’s disconnection from the north was both illustrated and consolidated after 
the colonial period. The military regime which overthrew Nkrumah dispatched his 
large-scale, state interventionism and sold off cheap machinery, mainly for rice 
cultivation, into the private market. A number of capitalists, including southerners, 
military men and civil servants, took the opportunity to purchase, mainly in the area 
around Tamale – and for next-to-nothing – large-scale, mechanised rice farms. 
Between 1970 and 1972, primarily in the area around Tamale, private farmers, 
mostly from Tamale, doubled both the area under cultivation and their output. On 
account of both poor conditions and increases in the price of rice in Tamale, many 
‘villagers’, who would otherwise have sold their labour on mechanised rice farms, 
themselves took to farming rice, albeit on a much smaller scale. The result was an 
acute shortage of labour for the mechanised rice farms, which turned to Tamale to 
recruiting young boys as labourers. Tamale, through ‘by-day’ labour centres, 
became a centre for the recruitment of (often illegal on account of their age) casual 
labour. It was estimated that in November and December 1971, 4,000 men were 
hired from Tamale very day at labour centres. Tamale served as a location for the 
procurement of farming inputs, from labour through to tractors. Furthermore, 
between 1970 and 1983, the by-day rates for adult men increased from 0.50 Cedis to 
50 Cedis. This applied not only to those recruited from Tamale but also, as a 
consequence, to labour which large-scale farmers were still able to source from 
within the villages. Van Hear notes that ‘higher wages were also a consequence of 




workers “poisoned the minds” of the villagers with their wage demands’.
12
 Tamale 
served as a site for contested and seedy labour class struggle. Theft increased. The 
difficulty of separating perceptions of ‘tradition’ from agrarian livelihoods mean that 
Tamale urbanism could only be perceived as a corruption of traditional morality. 
The idea of Tamale representing something ‘other’ and certainly ‘worse’ was, as this 
thesis has shown, not something new. At least from the moment indirect rule was 
introduced, Tamale’s urban nature came to be seen by traditional and agrarian 
structures alike as threatening, and this also contributed to its isolation. 
Institutional multiplicity 
More specifically, this study set out to argue that Tamale’s rapid urbanisation (both 
social and economic), in a political context dominated by tradition (in which Tamale 
lacked relevancy), created in Tamale an institutional anatomy in which the 
jurisdictions of various institutions continuously overlapped. The first step in the 
creation of an institutional anatomy characterised by multiplicity was the 
demarcation of the Anglo-German border in 1899. At that time, the Gulkpe-Na was 
visiting Yendi and was ordered to remain there. In the absence of the Gulkpe-Na, the 
Dakpema assumed all the powers of the chief of Tamale. In 1930, the Gulkpe-Na 
was ordered to return to Tamale in order to resurrect Tamale’s traditional structure 
(for the purposes of indirect rule). The Gulkpe-Na, however, did not simply replace 
the Dakpema, as the colonial regime had anticipated. Instead, a two-in-one system 
developed. The nature of the system meant that the colonial administration, in 
contradiction to its own policy of ‘ruling indirectly’, was frequently required to 
wade into affairs which they had hoped would be managed by ‘tradition’. This 
further undermined Tamale’s traditional focus and increased its institutional 
multiplicity.  
                                                 
12  Van Hear, N., ‘“By-day” boys and Dariga men: Casual lLabour versus agrarian capital in 
Northern Ghana’. In: Review of African Political Economy, No. 31, Capital vs. Labour in 
West Africa (1984), 46. 
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The term ‘institutional multiplicity’ is borrowed from work by Jo Beall.
13
 It contains 
a small but relevant difference in emphasis to Christian Lund’s reference to 
‘institutional ambiguity’.
14
 ‘Institutional ambiguity’ suggests an internal dynamic, 
whereby one institution may define their authority holding over several jurisdictions. 
‘Institutional multiplicity’ suggests that a number of institutions define their 
authority holding over the same jurisdiction. Both may be used to describe Tamale, 
but the emphasis is more on multiplicity than on ambiguity, as an result of Tamale’s 
anti-traditional urban process. An example of institutional ambiguity is the 
establishment of the Tamale Urban Council (TUC) in the early 1950s. Although the 
TUC had, as its official mandate, municipal affairs, the TUC came to be dominated 
by the CPP, who employed the jurisdictions of the TUC for political purposes. 
Tamale’s institutional multiplicity is best illustrated by the plans to redevelop Ward 
D in the 1940s (Chapter 5: ‘The Whole of Tamale is the Property of the Crown’). 
This study reinforces (in a historical context) the argument presented by Christian 
Lund that ‘disputes over land tenure can be understood only if a wider socio-
political context is considered and if several different levels of confrontation are 
included in the analysis’.
15
 Lund suggests that in analysing land tenure conflicts, it is 
useful to distinguish between three types of confrontation: A confrontation between 
different land users over access to land; a confrontation between different political 
authorities over the jurisdiction to allocate land access rights: And a confrontation 
between land users and the politico-legal authorities over the extent of the 
jurisdiction of authorities to allocate land.
16
 Ward D serves as an example of all 
three of these confrontations. The example of Ward D serves not only as an example 
of how land was administered but, because land was considered such a fundament 
source of chiefly authority, also as an illustration of how authority was negotiated in 
                                                 
13  Beall, J., S. Mkhize & S. Vawda, ‘Traditional authority, institutional multiplicity and 
political transition in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa’, LSE: Crisis States Programme, 
Working Paper no. 48(July, 2004). http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28212/1/wp48.pdf (accessed 4 
December 2011). 
14  Lund, C., ‘Struggles for land tenure and political power: On the politicisation of land 
tenure and disputes in Niger’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 40(1998), 
1-2. 
15  Ibid. 1. 




an increasingly urban Tamale. The case of Ward D thus exposes Tamale’s 
institutional multiplicity and the resulting legal plurality.  
Tamale’s disconnection from northern Ghana possesses both strengths and 
weaknesses. Currently, while the Dagbon political structures are in disarray, Tamale 
possesses political elites who continue to provide socially stabilising functions. In a 
study about local government accountability carried out in December 2010, many 
respondents and focus groups stated that if the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly 
(TAMA) had ‘sensitive’ information they wished to relay to the residents of Tamale, 
they should do so through the chief. This, they said, was so because the chief was a 
very well-respected man in Tamale. Other centres, such as Savelugu and Karaga, are 
entirely dependent on Yendi for their traditional political stability. Tamale is 
threatened by the appointment of a new Ya Na, and thus, by the ‘enskinning’ of a 
Gulkpe-Na. Although there is no guarantee that such an eventuality need be 
problematic, it certainly has the potential to generate a series of internal 
confrontations. The institutional multiplicity which characterises Tamale’s 
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Ward G: Ethnic Breakdown of 'non-native' (non-Dagomba) Leaseholders, 1935-1944
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Trade Statistics, Yeji Ferry, 1926-1932
2
 
      1926 1927 1928
*






 Horses 28 37 79 9 19 43 32 
Cattle 19884 26688 27043 33165 32284 30072 25063 
Sheep & Goats 9025 15206 17150 33224 41140 32668 26213 
Donkeys 2720 2632 533 210 110 65 5 













Cars 104 179 241 217 291 243 206 
Lorries 1487 2260 1982 3180 4190 3645 2545 
Trailers 727 1252 1295 1796 2298 2310 1877 
S. 
Bound 
Cars 97 173 58 221 241 229 204 
Lorries 1521 1830 2064 3358 4313 3658 2510 
Trailers 754 1000 622 2020 2623 2288 1868 













Kola Nuts 5699 18066 49642 11338 16680 17269 15054 
English Cloth 1237 1751 5953 2190 1331 1190 801 
European Salt 5971 11844 25030 36416 50304 50652 59872 
Flour, Barrels 0 163 #DIV/0! 160 227 420 450 
Miscellaneous 2930 7740 11422 2267 1523 2026 1586 
Beer, Cases 239 346 886 1376 1165 1292 896 
S. 
Bound 
Yams 14949 10192 5056 10 3335 485 2468 
Corn 884 1688 2802 1197 1564 1429 2331 
Ground Nuts 797 2888 4311 3848 4144 2280 722 
Fowls 2999 8051 12553 85504 9444 7281 7407 
Miscellaneous 5298 2990 6092 1643 1516 801 529 
  
Total Lorry 













Kola Nuts 20113 13154 9160 4851 9537 2738 2961 
English Cloth 5777 6244 5487 1397 1266 558 434 
Salt 1650 228 343 182 11 32 12 
Matches 0 48 #DIV/0! 227 188 199 82 
Miscellaneous 5285 3519 11359 1282 915 840 563 
Kerosene 0 0 #DIV/0! 605 1464 1435 941 
S. 
Bound 
Native Cloth 11 426 246 311 179 226 13 
Sheabutter 2828 3763 3965 1517 888 2316 16 
Dawa Dawa 810 1410 3533 476 456 543 46 
Hides 0 117 #DIV/0! 1757 1052 550 379 
String and 
Rope 0 105 #DIV/0! 180 138 115 1 
Dried Fish 408 903 1605 646 347 657 122 
Fowls 873 671 875 3744 338 547 12 
Miscellaneous 4288 2851 5445 599 302 240 26 
  
Total Head 
Loads 42043 33439 40275 17774 17081 10996 5608 
                                                 
2 PRAAD, Accra, ADM 56/1/310, (Yeji Trade Statistics) 
* The statistics for “1928” were estimated by taking an average ‘“Quarter Ending June 31st” 
to “Total Year” Ratio’ for the entire year, and then dividing “Quarter Ending June 31st, 
1928” by ‘average ratio’.  
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Trade Statistics, Yeji Ferry, 1940-1944
3
 







Horses 31 12 22 25 40 
Cattle 141 1590 414 1903 278 
Sheep and 
Goats 53219 54086 41252 55289 84268 
Donkeys 7 20 39 27 118 














Cars 46 49 21 9 18 
Lorries 2214 1987 1387 1049 1842 
Trailers 2099 1936 1360 1038 1798 
S. 
Bound 
Cars 49 46 24 8 19 
Lorries 2251 1994 1370 1081 1813 
Trailers 2127 1931 1334 1067 1770 
























Loads 80041 79327 53708 40091 71252 
English Cloth 2930 2867 2434 3031 5537 
Salt, Bags 14859 15483 13468 9885 16524 
Cement 12 50 75 0 0 
Millet. Bags 7043 577 0 45 11544 
Iron 8678 6943 6144 3499 5839 
Beer, Cases 226 306 81 81 35 
Miscellaneous 14048 8802 7768 5928 7858 
Yams 2758 1745 377 69 1191 
Planks 220 0 0 0 0 
Corn, Bags 0 0 204 149 1558 
Sugar 54 218 497 208 154 
Petrol 37 550 0 0 0 
Kerosene 127 101 83 31 68 











Corn 18 725 16 0 0 
Beans, Bags 0 0 0 75 2117 
Groundnuts, 
Bags 33686 54483 15960 24786 28661 
                                                 




Fowls, Crates 11227 9642 6456 4474 5189 
Dried Meat 0 0 0 0 133 
Hides 65 222 168 536 715 
Dried Fish 24589 647 720 509 1336 
Dawa-Dawa 4641 3657 1012 539 672 
Shea Butter 4998 5736 5968 3357 3587 
Native Cloth 0 0 0 0 9 
Miscellaneous 2004 1208 4333 575 939 
Kapok 541 410 463 210 45 
Pigs 0 80 331 146 54 
  
Total  Lorry 





















Kola Nuts 128 75 71 68 106 
English Cloth 21 0 0 3 0 
Salt 6 5 13 3 5 
Miscellaneous 1 40 87 115 34 
Ground Nuts 0 0 0 0 41 











Native Cloth 4 0 0 10 51 
Shea Butter 795 855 2003 486 1729 
Dawa-Dawa 96 10 30 120 197 
Hides 0 0 0 1 8 
Pots 0 0 0 425 602 
Dried Fish 128 321 182 322 198 
Fowls Crates 108 38 70 45 31 
Dried Meat 0 0 42 0 14 
Miscellaneous 541 188 408 165 83 
  
Total Head-
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4
 1948 Census of the Gold Coast 
Male Population: Breakdown by Age Category (Absolute Numbers) 
 Under 1 Year 1-16 Years 16 - 45 Years 45 Years and Over 
Accra 2078 20140 41524 8017 
Kumasi 921 9393 17893 2972 
Tamale 768 2043 4537 957 
Male Population: Breakdown by Age Category (Percentages) 
 Under 1 Year 1-16 Years 16 - 45 Years 45 Years and Over 
Accra 2.90% 28.07% 57.87% 11.17% 
Kumasi 2.95% 30.13% 57.39% 9.53% 




Number of Vehicles Crossing Yeji Ferry, 1926-1930 
 
   1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 
1926-
1930 




















































Cars 35 104 0.34 20 179 0.11 59 258 0.23 62 217 0.29 53 291 0.18 0.23 
Lorries 457 1487 0.31 616 2260 0.27 592 2063 0.29 1005 3180 0.32 1055 4190 0.25 0.29 








 Cars 30 97 0.31 22 173 0.13 56 248 0.23 63 221 0.29 44 241 0.18 0.23 
Lorries 454 1521 0.30 465 1830 0.25 535 1925 0.28 987 3358 0.29 1144 4313 0.27 0.28 
Trailers 158 754 0.21 213 1000 0.21 311 1354 0.23 472 2020 0.23 689 2623 0.26 0.23 
Total 
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Het proefschrift stelt dat de stad Tamale, opmerkelijk genoeg, verwaarloosd is 
binnen de geschiedschrijving van Noord Ghana, ondanks het feit dat het de op twee 
na grootste stad van Ghana is en veruit de grootste stad van Noord Ghana. Dit 
wordt, in het proefschrift, enerzijds toegeschreven aan het dominante discours van 
‘onderontwikkeling’. Dit discours benadrukt de blokkering van de ontwikkeling van 
het Noorden door het koloniale bestuur en ziet in de koloniale strategie om de 
Noordelijke uitbreiding van het spoorwegnet niet te voltooien, een bewuste strategie 
om de Noord-Zuid arbeidsmigratie te stimuleren. Anderzijds ligt de oorzaak in een 
academische focus op traditionele structuren en op de politiek van ‘indirect rule’. 
Dit discours richt zich vooral op etnische kwesties, en de rol van kolonialisme in de 
ontwikkeling van etniciteit. De geschiedenis van Tamale past in geen van beide 
discoursen. 
Het proefschrift stelt dat Tamales interne historiografie in strijd is met de 
historiografie van de Northern Territories in het algemeen. Zo waren bijvoorbeeld de 
periodes dat Tamales bevolking snel groeide, episodes van grootschalige 
arbeidsmigratie uit de Northern Territories, naar het Zuiden. In dit opzicht stelt het 
proefschrift dat het voltooien van de Great North Road en de twee wereldoorlogen 
bepalend zijn geweest voor de geschiedenis van Tamale.  
In hoofdstuk 1 worden de centrale thema’s beschreven, de onderzoeksvragen gesteld 
en de theoretische kaders gedefinieerd. Het hoofdstuk stelt dat de interne 
sociaalpolitieke en sociaaleconomische dynamiek van Tamale vooral gevormd werd 
door de splitsing tussen een koloniaal gemotiveerde, traditionele politiek aan de ene 
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kant en een economische structuur die bijna volledig gebaseerd was op de berijdbare 
weg tussen Tamale en Kumasi, aan de andere kant. Zo werd Tamale een bijproduct 
van koloniale doelstellingen, in plaats van een integraal onderdeel van het koloniale 
systeem. De fundamentele doelstelling van het proefschrift is om deze stelling te 
bewijzen. Hoofdstuk 1 schetst de referentiekaders waarin Tamales verstedelijking 
wordt bestudeerd; de politieke structuren van Dagbon, koloniale chiefs, handel, 
‘new developmentalism’ en de opkomst van de partijpolitiek in Tamale. De 
theoretische kaders van dit proefschrift hebben betrekking op de vraag waarom 
steden ontstaan, hoe ze worden ondersteund, en hoe de externe krachten van 
stadsformatie invloed uitoefenen op het  interne sociaaleconomische en 
sociaalpolitieke landschap van de stad. 
 
Door het situeren van Tamales bestaan binnen grotere koloniale 
ontwikkelingsprocessen, stelt hoofdstuk 2 dat Tamale een ongemakkelijke keuze 
bleek als administratief en commercieel  centrum binnen de koloniale 
ontwikkelingsstrategie. Het hoofdstuk stelt dat als gevolg van de afwezigheid van 
een spoorweg en de toename van gemotoriseerd transport, na 1920 een 
handelseconomie is ontstaan (met Tamale in het midden), die noch Europese 
handelaren heeft gelokt,  noch  systemen en structuren van de Afrikaanse boeren in 
Tamale heeft geconsolideerd. De opkomst van het ‘single-lorry-owner/driver’ 
businessmodel en het daaruit voorvloeiende gebrek aan geconcentreerde controle 
over handel, maakte het moeilijk voor het koloniale bestuur om financiële voordelen 
te boeken van de toename van de handel die gemotoriseerd vervoer veroorzaakte. 
Het ‘single-lorry-owner/driver’ model in het hart van de Noord-Zuid handel, 
creëerde ook individuele accumulatie van rijkdom in Tamale, wat door de liberale 
koloniale agenda beschouwd werd als de antithese van de Afrikaanse sociale en 
politieke systemen, die het koloniale bestuur probeerde te bedienen. 
Hoofstuk 3 gaat over de demografische en sociaaleconomische transformatie in 
Tamale na de introductie van gemotoriseerd vervoer in 1920, toen de ‘Great North 
Road’ tussen Kumasi en Tamale eindelijk af was. Er worden drie onderling 
samenhangende argumenten gemaakt in dit hoofdstuk. Het eerste is dat tijdens de 
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tien jaar na de introductie van gemotoriseerd vervoer, Tamales demografische groei 
negatief was samenhing  met die van de Northern Territories in het algemeen. 
Terwijl Tamales demografische groei een positieve functie was van de toenemende 
mobiliteit na 1920, daalde de bevolkingsgroei van de Northern Territories in deze 
periode als gevolg van de toenemende mobiliteit. Het tweede argument van dit 
hoofdstuk is dat Tamales economische veranderingen werden gedreven door 
soldaten die teruggekeerd waren uit de eerste wereldoorlog en door arbeidsmigratie 
tussen het Noorden en cacaoboerderijen in het Zuiden. Het derde argument van dit 
hoofdstuk suggereert dat de economische herconfiguratie als gevolg van de niet-
Dagomba, ex-militairen en cacaomigranten veel groter was dan hun directe bijdrage 
aan Tamales demografische groei. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 richt zich op de introductie van ‘Indirect Rule ‘ in Tamale in 1932. 
Indirect Rule, als koloniale strategie, had als doelstelling het (re)creëren van 
inheemse politieke en sociale normen en waarden. In Tamale was echter door de 
toename van gemotoriseerd vervoer en als gevolg van een economische een 
demografische transformatie, al lang een sociale progressie in gang gezet. Hoofdstuk 
vier stelt dat ondanks het feit dat Indirect Rule, als vorm van lokaal bestuur, lastig 
paste binnen Tamales in toenemende mate, stedelijke maatschappij, het koloniale 
bestuur zich inzette om toch Indirect Rule in Tamale in te voeren. Het gevolg 
daarvan, stelt dit hoofdstuk, was een lokale autoriteit die voor zijn legitimiteit totaal 
afhankelijk was van het koloniale bestuur. Daardoor kwam Tamale uit de periode 
van Indirect Rule, niet met een sterke traditionele politieke structuur, zoals de 
koloniale administratie had gehoopt, maar met een aantal slecht gedefinieerde centra 
van autoriteit. 
Door middel een case study bouwt hoofdstuk 5 voort op de thema’s ontwikkeld in  
hoofdstuk 4. Meer in het bijzonder, richt hoofdstuk 5 zich op het bestuur en beheer 
van land in Tamale. Het hoofdstuk illustreert hoe Tamales complexe politieke 
matrix in de praktijk werkte. Tamales stedelijke land word in dit hoofdstuk gebruikt 
als een informatief en analytisch instrument om de bredere implicaties te begrijpen 
van het gebrek aan een traditionele kern in Tamale. Het hoofdstuk plaatst vooral 
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nadruk op Ward D, de oudste wijk van Tamale, en daarbij het meest responsief voor 
de traditionele retoriek van Indirect Rule, en tegelijkertijd, het geografische centrum 
van de bloeiende stad Tamale, en dus, van grote commerciële waarde.  
Hoofdstuk 6 richt zich op de periode na de Tweede Wereld Oorlog (WWII). 
Aangezien de meeste de soldaten van de Gold Coast Regiment (CGR) van 
oorsprong Noordelingen waren, en veel na de oorlog terug gingen naar het Noorden, 
was deze periode er een van grote transformatie, vooral in Tamale, waar veel oud-
soldaten zich vestigden. Het was ook een tijd van grote veranderingen in de 
koloniale strategie, met de introductie van ‘post-war new developmentalism’. 
Echter, dit hoofdstuk stelt, in overeenstemming met het argument van Jeff 
Grischow, dat in de Northern Territories, ondanks de invoering van 'post-war new 
developmentalism', de nadruk op het behoud van inheemse Afrikaanse sociale 
structuren de ondergang van Indirect Rule overleefde. Het resultaat was een 
voortzetting van de ongemakkelijke relatie tussen verstedelijking in Tamale en het 
grotere. koloniale, politieke en economische kader in Dagbon en de Northern 
Territories. Dit hoofdstuk geeft ook een belangrijke context voor het volgende 
hoofdstuk (hoofdstuk 7), dat de interne lokale politiek in de aanloop naar de 
onafhankelijkheid deconstrueert. 
Hoofdstuk 7 is op de Conclusie na, het laatste hoofdstuk van het proefschrift. Dit 
hoofdstuk stelt dat door de invoering van partijpolitiek en een aantal 'seculiere' 
instellingen, Tamales sociaal politieke landschap transformeerde. Deze 
veranderingen leidden tot een aantal politieke herschikkingen in de horizontale en 
verticale afmetingen tussen de legitimiteit van Tamales twee chiefs, de Gulkpe-Na 
en de Dakpema, het koloniale bestuur, islamitische en christelijke elites, etnische 
hoofdmannen, zuiderlingen, en nieuwe 'seculiere' politieke apparaten, zoals de 
Tamale Urban Council (TUC),  
Allianties waren gebaseerd op een mix van complexe persoonlijke relaties en vaak 
tegenstrijdige, lokale en traditionele doelstellingen. De complexiteit van Tamales 
socialepolitieke landschap, in relatie tot die van Dagbon en het Noorden meer in het 
algemeen, resulteerde in een afscheiding van Tamales lokale politiek van de bredere 
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politieke structuren van Dagbon en de Northern Territories. Tamales naar binnen 
gerichte politieke dynamiek werd versterkt, niet alleen door spanningen tussen 
verscheidene lokale politieke lijnen, maar ook de nationale, regionale en traditionele 
breuklijnen. Kortom, dit hoofdstuk stelt dat Tamales isolement het gevolg is, voor 
een deel, van de complexe en omstreden interne politieke stratificaties, en voor een 
deel, van de lokale politieke allianties van Dagbon. 
Hoofdstuk 8 geeft de conclusies aan. Kort gezegd, het doel van dit historische 
onderzoek is het identificeren van de gevolgen van stedelijke processen tijdens de 
koloniale periode buiten traditionele structuren, in een klimaat gedomineerd door 
een (koloniaal) traditioneel discours. De studie toont twee centrale gevolgen van 
deze economische en politieke discontinuïteit aan - een interne en een externe: 
Tamales institutionele anatomie wordt gekenmerkt door 'multiplicity', en Tamale is 
voortgekomen uit de koloniale tijd, politiek geïsoleerd, en losgekoppeld van de 
Northern Territories in het algemeen. Dit is te zien in de hedendaagse politieke 
structuren en, in de afwezigheid van Tamale in de historiografie van de ‘Northern 
Territories’. 
 
